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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the scope, intensity, and complexity of the 
interracial violence in the ex-Confederate states from 1940 through 19460 
Employing a survey and analysis approach, with the major peaks of vio-
lence during May 1943-August 1944 and August 1945-September 1946 as the 
most significant periods, this work will demonstrate that blacks in the 
South underwent a generally oppressive, not uplifting, experience during 
the war. While northern blacks and northern-based civil rights groups 
seemed to utilize the war era as a springboard for the "Second Recon-
struction," most of the positive changes in fact emanated from political, 
economic, and military necessity rather than any great humanitarian im-
pulse. 
Three forms of violence--lynchings, civilian riots, and military- \ 
related conflicts--confirm and illustrate the overall thesis. From 1940 
through the spring of 1943 both lynching and military violence escalated 
in direct response to the exigencies of war, black attempts to break down 
the color line, and white attempts to preserve it. Duxing mid-1943 major 
civilian riots erupted in Hobile and :Beaumont, together with an alarming 
rise in mutinies by black soldiers in southern camps and bases. From 
then to the end of the war mutinies and lynchings continued, but with the 
end of the conflict came a resurgence of violence as the nation reconverted 
to a peacetime footing. Riots in Columbia, Tennessee, and Athens, Ala-
bama., along with a serious increase in lynching, showed white reaction 
to wartime gains for blacks and a general fear of the changes returning 
black veterans might bring. In the end, blacks remained in as separate 
iv 
V 
and unequal a society in 1946 as they had in 1940 below the_Ma.son-Dixon 
Line. Thus, the wartime experience for southern blacks proved to be 









TA:BLE OF CONTENTS 
"THE PROBLEM OF THE COLOR-LINE"• • • ••• . . . . . . . . 
CLOUDS OF WAR. • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
"NEARER AND NEARER THE PRECIPICE". • • • • • 
"SIDREGATION ALWAYS MEANS DISCRIMINATION" •• 
II THERE EXISTS A DANGER" • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . 
"AN EPIDEMIC OF INTERRACIAL VIOLENCE". 
FROM WAR TO PEACE? •••••••••• 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
VIII. "TERROR IN TENNESSEE" •• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
IX. THE COLOR LINE TRIUMPHANT. • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 















"THE PROBLEM OF THE COLOR-LINE" 
"The problem of the twentieth century," W. E. B. DuJ3ois observed at 
the fin de si~cle, "is the problem of the color-line." Having lived through 
the trials, accomplishments, and shattered dreams of black people in the 
United States since the Civil War, DuBois' perception of what the future 
held was based both on keen observation and his training as a historian 
and sociologist. His words proved prophetic. 1 
Throughout American history the problem of race relations and the 
role of ethnic and racial minorities has been a major historical theme. 
Conflict between minority groups and the majority has often produced racial 
violence, and in the twentieth cen~LL-r:f racial discord was especially visible 
during the two world wars and the 1960s. In each of these pericxls, as in 
others, violence often reflected an attempt by blacks to bre~ out of the 
racial caste system and, during the wars, a corresponding white desire to 
maintain the racial status quo. Indeed, American race relations in general 
have bad as a major characteristic black desire to end discrimination and 
segregation and a white desire to preserve them. 
Conflict over whether World War II could change the status of blacks 
produced racial violence from 1940 through 1946. Black aspirations to 
destroy the color line during a period of widespread change and gradual 
improvement, and white fears that blacks were threatening a major upheaval 
1w. E. B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk, in Three Negro Classics 
(New York, 1965), 221. 
1 
2 
in a time of national crisis, resulted in one of the worst concentrations 
of violence in this century. Southern racial disorder was a major theme 
during the war, for the six civilian riots, over twenty military riots 
and mutinies, and forty to seventy-five lynchings not only hampered seri-
ously the region's contribution to the war effort but also showed the ex-
tent to which southern whites would go to preserve the color line. The 
southern black experience was different from the northern one during the 
war because of the white South's rigid adherence to racial separation. 
The history of racial violence in the South dated back to the ori-
gins of slavery in the seventeenth century. Since the region maintained 
a system of African slavery for 250 years, ths.t i~~titution fomed a major 
part of southern society and its vestiges lingered into twentieth century 
life. In a sense, the earliest form of racial violence, slave revolts, 
had much in common with the urban protest riots of the 1960s. Both showed 
black desires to escape either literal or figurative bondage, and the often 
swift white reaction. While North American slave uprisings did not occur 
as frequently as Caribbean or Latin American outbreaks, the Stone Rebel-
lion of 1739, the Gabriel Prosser insurrection of 1800, and the Nat Turner 
revolt of 1831 resulted in consternation among whites that often bordered 
on paranoia. These three rebellions, along with at least a dozen others, 
illustrated some slaves' willingness to rebel openly against their oppres-
sors even in the face of almost insurmountable odds. As Eugene Genovese 
has observed, "the significance of the slave revolts in the United States 
lies neither in their frequency nor in their extent, but in their very 
3 
existence as the ultimate manifestation of class war under the most un-
favo:rable conditions. 112 
Following the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, collective 
racial violence transformed from the slave revolt to the race riot. Since 
freedmen now posed a distinct threat to white hegemony, the postwar riots 
saw whites attack blacks and their property, especially during periods of 
change or transition. Actually, the first lmown race riot occurred in 
1831 in Providence, Rhode Island, when white sailors assaulted black resi-
dents. The largest riot in American history in terms of the number of 
lives lost erupted in New York City in 1863. Between 105 and 120 blacks 
lost their lives in this .11 draft riot" which exhibited racial connotationso 
Because of new and unwelcome adjustments and the attendant friction that 
the free blacks created in the South, a :rash of riots by southern whites 
against blacks occurred during Reconstruction. Riots in Memphis and New 
Orleans in 1866, Vicksburg in 1874, and Bamburg, South Carolina, in 1876, 
among others, showed whites forcing blacks into a new southern system of 
:race relations. At the turn of the century the Wilmington, North Carolina, 
riot of 1898 and the September 1906 Atlanta riot resulted from turmoil that 
accompanied the Populist and Progressive movements, the white reaction to 
Reconstruction's elevation of blacks to citizenship, and the rise of 
legalized segregation. In both cases whites forced blacks out of political 
2 Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 
(New York, 1974), 588. For a recent discussion of American slave revolts 
and slave resistance, see ibid., 587-660; Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: 
Ne roes in Colonial South Carolina from 16 0 thro h the Stono Rebellion 
New York, 1974, 308-26. 
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and economic power as the color line once again solidifiedo These riots 
served as violent confirmation of DuBois' observation. 3 
Though slave revolts and race riots seemed more spectacular, lynch-
ing also reflected strained race relations. Like whippings and other forms 
of slave punishment, lynching was a symbol of domination and authority 
meant to keep blacks in their "place." As with slave revolts and riots, 
lynching began early in American history. The meaning of the term has 
varied over the years; it involved both blacks and whites and occurred 
throughout the United States until around 1920 when it essentially became 
a southern phenomenon. No accurate count of the number of lynchi..71gs 
exists, but in the peak years, 1889 to 1930, some 3,724 people died at 
the hands of lynch mobs. Increasingly, southern blacks became the victims. 
Though lynching declined after 1930, this form of racial violence plagued 
the nation from colonial days through World War II.4 
3rrving J. Bartlett, "The Free Negro in Providence, Rhode Island," 
Negro History Bulletin, 14 (December 1950), 51-54, 66-67; Adrian Cook, 
The Armies of the Streets: The New York Cit Draft Riots of 186 (Lexing-
ton, 1974; Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Cons irac 
and Southern Reconstruction (New York, 1971; Vernon Lane Wharton, The 
Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel Hill, 1947); Carl N. Degler, 
The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Cent (New York, 
1974; Charles Crowe, "Racial Violence and Social Reform: Origins of the 
Atlanta Riot of 1906," Journal of Negro History, 53 (July 1968), 234-56; 
idem, "Racial Massacre in Atlanta, September 22, 1906," ibid., 54 (April 
1969), 150-73; Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In: 1919 and the 
1960s (Garden City, 1966). 
4James Elbert Cutler, ch-Law: An Investi tion into the Risto 
of Lynching in the United States New York, 1969 1905 ; Arthur F. Raper, 
The Tragedy of Lynching {Chapel Hill, 1933). The term "lynching'' originally 
referred to physical harassment, such as tarring and. feathering or whipping, 
but after the Civil War the term came to be closely associated with mis-
treatment of blacks by whites that usually resulted in death for the 
victims. The word also carried the connotation of death by hanging, but 
this was never the exclusive method. The general public increasingly 
accepted the myth that lynching occurred in interracial rape cases, but 
in fact less than one-fourth of the people lynched between 1889 and 1930 
had been accused of that crime. 
5 
Racial violence involving military personnel also had pre-1900 
precedents, and though such violence usually occurred during periods of 
war, there were exceptions. Perhaps the earliest military mutiny involving 
black soldiers occurred in Louisiana in 1863 among the men of the Corps 
d 1Afrique. Although the blacks killed no one, they reacted violently 
when a white officer whipped a black soldier. As a result a court-martial 
convicted ten men and the white officer was discharged. During the late 
nineteenth century, violence by black troops against real or perceived 
mistreatment occurred at San Angelo, Texas; Sturgis City, Dakota Terri-
tor.v; Suggs, Wyoming; Walla Walla, Washington; and Winnemucca, Nevada. 
Similar incidents broke out during the Spa..~ish-American War, most notably 
in Florid.a. These incidents contained general characteristics that were 
reflected in later military violence. In some minor cases chronic trouble-
makers, bored with military routine, caused violence. In others ill-feeling 
between two units gradually built to the breaking point. Because the uni-
form represented the right to enjoy the freedom exhibited by white troops, 
blacks often reacted violently when local white citizens tried to imple-
ment or enforce segregation against them. 
In the early twentieth century riots erupted at Brownsville, Texas, 
in 1906, and in Houston in 1917. Recent scholarship indicates ths.t the 
black soldiers stationed in Brownsville did not cause the violence. In 
the Houston riot, however, black soldiers, following weeks of intimidation, 
revolted against the local system of discrimiriation. In both cases local 
whites considered the troops guilty. President Theodore Roosevelt sum-
marily dismissed the Brownsville defendents from the service, while the 
War Department convicted the Houston insurgents through highly prejudicial 
6 
courts-martial. Such treatment helped destroy black military mom.le, and 
other incidents that did not develop into riots met with similar white 
response. These characteristics surfaced again in World War II when 
military violence occurred on a much larger scale.5 
During both world wars, lynchings, riots, and military violence 
occurred simultaneously. Even though lynchings and riots took place in 
large numbers during the First World War, the only full-scale military 
/ 
riot came in Houston. ' During World War II, in contmst, military violence 
constituted a large~ of the overall discord, and most of it occurred 
in the South, reflecting causal pattems common to earlier incidents. J 
From 1940 through 1942 the stationing of large numbers of black troops 
',/ ~-
in the South, many of them northemers unaccustomed to a rigid color line, ) 
and black soldiers' insistence on being given the dignity they thought the / 
uniform carried prompted violent reactions by whites who saw these ser-
vicemen as threats to racial harmony. From 1943 through 1944, however, 
blacks began to mutiny against oppressive conditions, in part because of 
the belief that if they were willing to give their lives for the country, 
they should be entitled to fair and impartial treatment. Southem whites, 
in tum, saw in this attitude a threat to the color line. The War Depart-
ment, supporting segregation as a matter of expediency, remained 
5The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate A:rmies, 127 vols., series I, vol. 26, pt. 1 
(Washington, 1889), 456-79; U.S., Congress, Senate, Message from the 
President of the United States Transmitting a Report from the Secretary 
of War Together with Several Documents, Including a Letter of General 
Nettleton, and Memoranda as to Precedents for the Summary Discharge or 
Mustering Out of Regiments or Companies, S. Doc. 402, 60th Cong., 1st seas.; 
Willard :B. Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans and the White Ma.n's Burden 18 8-
1903 (Urbana, 1975); John D. Weaver, The :Brownsville Raid New York, 1973 
Robert V. Haynes, A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917 (Baton 
Rouge, 1976). 
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insensitive to these problems and intervened only when conditions forced 
it to do so. 
Through the lynchings, riots, and military violence of World War II, 
DuJ3ois 1 assertion that the problem of the century was the problem of the 
color line held true, especially in the South. In reiterating the situ-
ation Gordon B. Hancock, a southern black scholar, stated in 1944 that 
"there is no way to avoid a head-on collision with the color question. 
It has been raised by the white man who dominates the Twentieth Century 
world." At the same time DuJ3ois 1 contemporary and fellow sociologist, 
Charles S. Jolmson, articulated the situation and sharpened its focus 
on World War II by observing that total war "is a cataclysmic national 
event that shakes and loosens many traditions from their deep moorings, 
whether these traditions are economic, religious, racial or romantic." 
The imperatives of war, he continued, "cannot trace a careful path arotmd 
the embedded orthodoxies of race any more than can a flood or earthquake." 
When racial traditions have been disrupted and the familiar patterns of 
life altered, "a sense of insecurity is inevitable. The race problem in 
such situations becomes more personal, and in becoming more personal it 
becomes more emotional." Jolmson saw that the tmpredictable changes of 
World War II clarified issues so tmt normally sensitive problems took on 
vastly more important connotations; race relations rated as a most criti-
cal issue. Blacks became more reluctant to accept second class citizen-
ship while fighting to preserve the "Four Freedoms," while most whites 
were tmable to contemplate the possibility of any ftmdamental change in 
race relations. In the South, where almost 80 percent of the nation's 
8 
blacks lived, the racial conflict became a central issue. 6 
During the war, when familiar institutions were threatened by 
forces beyond the South's control, insecurity developed into a potent 
force that pervaded every aspect of life. As in the Reconstruction era 
seventy years before, the white South beca.Ee monolithic in the face of 
uncertainty. Wilbur Cash in The Mind of the South suggested how whites, 
threatened by changes in race relations, reacted to create a "savage 
ideal "--a state of mind "whereunder dissent a..'l'ld variety are completely 
suppressed and men become, in all their attitudes, professions, and 
actions, virtual replicas of one another." An endangering of sensitive 
"~ . 
/ / / ./ 
/ 
southern assumptions, beliefs, and values in turn produced an "incalculably 
sensitive and fierce determination engendered in the South not to be co- -) 
erced or destroyed in any essential part of its being." This attitude, 
of course, muted the voices of the small core of southern white and black 
liberals, representatives of what Carl Degler recognized as "the other 
South. 117 
During World War II, the enduring conflict between whites and blacks 
over the color line emerged once again. The white South's dogged insist-
ence upon racial segregation confronted black demands for radical changes 
and created conditions under which violent response from both sides proved 
inevitable. In the end the black minority lost, but it was an empty 
6Gord.on B. Hancock, "Race Relations in the United States: A Summary," 
in What the Negro Wants, ed. Rayford W. Logan (Chapel Hill, 1944), 217; 
Charles S. Johnson, "The Present Status of Race Relations in the South," 
Social Forces, 23 (October 1944), 27, 30. 
7wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York, 1941), 93-94, 140; 
Degler, The Other South. 
,,, •• 1 
9 
victory for the white South. It could no longer forestall the resurrection 
of fundamental rights that blacks had technically gained seventy years be-
fore. 
This study will probe the scope, intensity, complexity, and impact 
of the interracial violence in the ex-Confederat~ states from 1940 through 
1946, while an examination of disorder in other periods and outside the 
South will be made to provide the larger context. As the result of the 
clash between two powerful forces, blacks in the region underwent an ex-
perience that proved as oppressive in some ways as it was uplifting in 
others. While northe:m blacks and northern-based civil rights groups 
utilized the war years as a springboard for the "Second Reconstruction," 
many of the positive changes emanated not so much from their efforts as 
from political, economic, and military imperatives. Nationwide there 
appeared a renewal of assertiveness among blacks and a corresponding 
attempt to portray the war as a struggle for victory at home as well as 
victory abroad. The "Double V" slogan epitomized this feeling, and it 
became more obvious to blacks as the war progressed that a fundamental 
paradox existed as had existed in World War I. While the nation as a 
whole professed to be fighting for the Four Freedoms just as it bad 
fought a "War to Save Democracy" in 1917-18, in neither case bad those 
lofty ideals been applied to blacks. It seemed that freedom and democ-
racy in a real sense were for whites only. In the South militant blacks, 
northe:m soldiers stationed there, and northern-based organizations like 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
brought what they considered the irony and hypocrisy of the war effort 
home to many black citizens. Increasingly, they became aware of this 
10 
contradictory situation, and efforts to gain victory at home through politi-
cal and economic achievements grew more intense as the war progressed. 
At the same time statements reflecting these contradictions pointed out 
black perceptions. One soldier requested that when he died in battle his 
epitaph should read, "here lies a black man killed fighting a yellow man 
for the glory of a white man. 118 
Most southern whites could not see the logic in black assertions 
that the war represented for them an inescapable irony. No communication 
existed between the two groups on this problem. For example, whites con-
sidered black assertiveness and the Double V slogan antithetical to the 
war effort. For blacks the war effort was hypocritical; such sentiments 
seemed incomprehensible to whites. The mayor of Eufaula, Alabama, con-
veyed this confusion in a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, complaining that 
"since the outbreak of the present war, the Negro has adopted a policy of 
his own, being so bold as to state in some instances that 'when the war 
is over, the Negroes will take aver the South.'" He believed that such 
attitudes, if left unchecked, would disrupt the war effort. Similarly, 
the commissioner of public safety in Birmingham, Eugene "Bull" Connor, 
saw danger in black expressions of militance. "It is not right or demo-
cratic that negroes, who compose about ten per cent of our population, 
shape the policy of the Southern states," Connor grumbled. "In these 
perilous times, the most patriotic part of America should be allowed to 
live 'its own way of life. 119 
8
Harvard Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the 
Second World War," Journal of American History, 58 (December 1971), 666-67. 
9M. M. Moultrop to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 21, 1942; Statement by 
Eugene Connor, September 1, 1942, in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports: Labor 
11 
Such differing perceptions of the role of blacks in southern war-
time society reflected the same lack of communication and understanding 
that characterized earlier periods. Historical traditions, the color 
line, and the exigencies of war brought about widespread racial violence 
that climaxed in mid-1943 as the intensity of black assertiveness and 
white reaction peaked. From then through the end of the conflict, vio-
lence compelled blacks in the South to abandon direct forms of militance 
and retreat into rigidly segregated, alienated subsocieties. When the war 
ended, more violence resulted from the tension inherent in reconverting 
from a war to a peacetime society. The ultimate irony manifested itself 
as whites, who generally proved either directly or indirectly responsible 
for the wartime racial violence in the South, placed the blame for vio-
lence on blackso 
The South in 1940 was a region WJ:acked by depression. The South 
of 1946 had achieved considerable economic recovery, and along the way 
blacks had, in small ways, shared in tbat recovery. Yet most of the 7.4 
million blacks in 1946 had attained but small economic or political gains. 
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwri&rht (1944) outlawed the white primary, 
but other forms of discrimination against blacks at the polls continued. 10 
Mobilization and Utilization, Negro Recruitment," Series 11, Central Files 
and Monthly Mopac Area Reports, Records of the War Manpower Commission, 
Record Group 211, National Archives (hereafter cited as WMC Records, RG 
211). The records of the WMC for Region VII, which includes most of the 
South, are housed in the Federal Archives and Records Center in East 
Point, Georgia. The National Archives prefers that material from its 
collections be documented by folder heading rather than by box number. 
lOSm.ith v. Allwright, 321 U. s. 649 (1944). This decision, rendered 
on April 3, struck down the white primary in Texas. 
12 
Black soldiers, perhaps the most militant segment of the race, remained 
in second class positions despite symbolic gestures during the war. Black 
southerners simply could not overcome the savage ideal despite increased 
racial awareness; the N.AACP's rolls, for example, increased from 50,500 
in 1940 to 450,000 in 1946, much of the increase coming from the South. 
At the beginning of the conflict many blacks advocated equal em-
ployment opportunities through the unprecedented March on Washington Move-
ment of 1941, though this remained largely a northern-based effort. 
Southern blacks also wanted equal opportunity as they sought to realize 
the Four Freedoms, but they gradually became more pessimistic in the face 
of escalating violence such as the Fort Bragg incident of mid-1941, the 
Alexandria, Louisiana, riot of early 1942, and three deaths by lynching 
within one week in Mississippi during late 1942. Southern black soldiers, 
influenced by their northern black counterparts stationed with them in 
southern camps, in some cases sparked the violence by merely representing 
a threat to the status quo. In the Mobile and Beaumont riots and continu-
ing military-related incidents across the South during 1943 and 1944, the 
white backlash proved so forceful that blacks began to recoil. This de-
velopment held true in the North as well, but in the 1943 Harlem riot 
northern blacks demonstrated their impatience by using retaliatory vio-
lence against the most accessible symbols of oppression, white-owned 
property in and around the ghetto. 
By the end of the war further violence had forced blacks in the 
South to abandon direct forms of mili tance, and such incidents as the 
Columbia, Tennessee, riot of 1946 served notice that since the crisis had 
passed, the situation was going to return to "normal." Separate and 
13 
unequal black communities continued, and the region's black people, intimi-
dated by a number of lynchings in 1946, returned to an uneasy coexistence 
with whites or left the region altogether. In general the savage ideal 
prevailedo But within ten years more far-reaching changes would emanate 
from the federal government, signaling the beginning of the Second Recon-
struction. 
The justification for a study of racial violence in the South 
during World War II rests not only on its importance as a significant 
theme in American history but also on an assessment of the existing 
scholarly work in a variety of areas: sociological and historical 
studies of violence, the recent "information explosion" in Afro-American 
history, and volumes done in recent American and southern history dealing 
with the war. None of this writing has dealt explicitly with racial vio-
lence in the South. While the disorder of World War I and the "Red 
Summer" of 1919 has stirred academic interest, the violence of World 
War II and afterward has generated comparatively little historical 
research. 
Much of the published material on wartime violence came from con-
temporary writers who were concerned about the obvious rise of violence 
and sought to educate and enlighten the public. Invariably such writing 
reached a narrow readership. It does, however, provide worthwhile points 
of departure. The most influential of the contemporary voluroos, Gunnar 
Myrdal's massive An American Dilemma, examined a variety of subjects per-
taining to southern race relations such as lynching and ":racial etiquette." 
Other authors whose work took the South under examination included John 
14 
Temple Graves, Charles S. Johnson, and Howard W. Odum. 11 In some in-
stances contemporary authors studied specific incidents of racial vio-
lence to heighten public awareness of interracial problems. 12 
Interest in race relations remained limited, however, until the 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s brought the problem into 
clearer focus. Sociologists effectively probed racial theory, racial 
oppression, and violence. In addition to Myrdal's classic and the theo-
retical work of such people as Robert E. Park and John Dollard, other 
literature dealing to some extent with southern racial disorders E.!ld vio-
lence in general appeared during the 1960s. Several of these volumes 
combined theo:ry with historical examples to provide interdiscipli~~r~ 
anthologies. 13 
11Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner ani A.mold 
Rose, An American Dilemma: The Ne _o Problem and Modem Democracv (New 
York, 1944; John Temple Graves, The Fighting South New York, 1943); 
Charles S. Jolmson, To Stem This Tide: A Su.rve of Racial Tension Areas 
in the United States New York, 1969 [1943 ; Howard W. Odum, Race and 
Rumors of Race: Challenge to an American Crisis (Chapel Hill, 1943). 
12see, for example, Alfred McClung Lee and Norman Da.ymond Humphrey, 
Race Riot (New York, 1943); Harold Orlansky, The Harlem Riot: A St-i in 
Mass Frustration, Social Analysis Report No. 1 New York, 1943, copy in 
collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison; Terror 
in Tennessee .(New York, 1946), copy in "Press Releases--Colu.mbia Tenn. 
Riot," General Office File (GOF), Papers of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, Library of Congress (hereafter cited 
as NAACP Papers). This collection was being reprocessed in 1976. To cite 
old box numbers, which in many cases referred to sets of four to eight 
containers, would therefore be inappropriate. Instead, the separate 
folder headings (i.e. : "Lynching--1940") and general series (i.e. : 
"General Office File or abbreviation "GOF"), will be used. 
13 · Robert E. Park, Race and Culture (Glencoe, 1950); John Dollard, 
Caste and Class in a Southern Town (Garden City, 1957 [1937]); eee also 
Allen D. Grimshaw, ed., Racial Violence in the United States (Chicago, 
1969); James F. Short, Jr., and Marvin E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective 
Violence (Chicago, 1972); Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as Protest: A 
Study of Riots and Ghettos (Garden City, 1971); National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission 
1.5 
Historians of violence began studies at about the same time as· 
the sociologists, but the amount of worthwhile historical literature on 
the subject is neither as vast nor as comprehensive by comparison. Pre-
eminent among the historians in this field, Richard Maxwell Brown has 
focused on colonial and frontier violence. Other authors who rave written 
general studies of violence have in most cases ignored or minimized both 
southern conflict and World War II disorder, preferring instead to cover 
more sensational outbreaks in northem and midwestem cities. Some ex-
ceptions, however, exist. Robert V. Haynes dealt with southern discord in 
A Night of Violence, which examined the Houston riot of 1917. His insights, 
especially in dealing with military-related racial violence, are indis-
pensable. On the subject of World War II conflict, Harvard Sitkoff's 
"Racial !-Lili ta.ncy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War" stands 
as the single most important study of that topic. His discussion of 
southem conflict, however, was minimal. 14 
With the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 19.54 and the sub-
sequent civil rights legislation and reaction of the next fifteen years, 
interest among historians in Afro-American affairs increased. In the field 
of black history, part of the interest focused on World War II. A few 
on Civil Disorders (Washington, 1968); Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert 
Gurr, eds., Violence in America: Historical and Com rative Pers ectives 
(New York, 1969. 
14:ru.chard. Maxwell Brown, Strain of Violence: Historical Studies 
of American Violence and Vigilantism (New York, 197.5); Haynes, A Night of 
Violence; Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 661-81; in addition, see Waskow, 
From Race Riot to Sit-In; Elliott Rudwick, Race Riot at Fast St. Louis, 
July 2, 1917 (Carbondale, 1964); William M. Tuttle, Jr., Race Riot: 
Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919; Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, 
eds., American Violence: A Documentary History (New York, 1970). 
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important volumes appeared during the 1950s, but the next decade witnessed 
the publication of many valuable studies, some of which dealt at least 
briefly with southern violence. In 1966, as part of the Army's official 
history of World War II, Ulysses Lee's The Employment of Negro Troops was 
published and continues as the single most valuable source on blacks in 
the military during the war. It contained a limited discussion of southern 
military discord. Three years later Richard Dalfiume brought out Desegre-
gation of the U.S. Armed Forces, broader in scope than Lee's book yet 
less detailed. In both this study and in an earlier article, Dalfiume 
provided worthwhile but brief descriptions of southern interracial con-
n . t 15 l.C • 
Historians in the 1970s continued research in World War II era 
black history, finally producing two book-length eY..aminations of the sub-
ject. In 1976 Neil A. Wynn, a British scholar, published The Afro-American 
in the Second World War. It stands among the two or three most significant 
works on wartime black history, but its discussion of southern violence 
is lacking. One year later A. Russell Buchanan brought out Black Americans 
in World War II. It provides interesting conclusions in a variety of 
areas, and takes a topical, semi-biographical approach. 16 
l5Louis Ruchames, ~ce, Jobs, and Politics: The Story of FEPC (New 
York, 1953); Herbert Garfinkel, When Ne roes March: The March on Washi -
ton Movement in the Or izational Politics for FEPC Glencoe, 1959; 
Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops Washington, 1966); Richard M. 
Dalfiume, Dese re tion of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fi ht· on Two Fronts 
1939-1953 Columbia, 1969; idem, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro 
Revolution," Journal of American History, 55 (June 1968), 90-106. 
16Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War (London, 
1976); A. Russell ::Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II (Santa Barbara, 
1977); other recent works on World War II black history include Allan M. 
Winkler, "The Philadelphia Tra.I1si t Strike of 1944," Journal of American 
History, 59 (June 1972), 73-89; Lee Finkle, "The Conservative Aims of 
17 
General writing on World War II and southern history has not ef-
fectively developed the strain of violence. Recent overall studies, in-
cluding Richard Polenberg's War and Society and George B. Tindall 1s The 
Emergence of the New South, have presented balanced yet limited accounts 
of interracial conflict in the South during the war. Earlier contemporary 
volumes, rather than the recent ones, remain the best sources on the sub-
ject from these categories. 17 
World War II provided the South with another opportunity to re-
assert its violent tradition. From 1940 through 1946 "the problem of the 
color-line" re-emerged in violent fashion, and once again the conflict 
between what whites wanted to preserve and what blacks sought to achieve 
became a central issue. This issue was one that linked the Old South to 
the New, for throughout the region's history the effort to keep blacks on 
the bottom, to limit their lives, and the simultaneous fight for racial 
dignity and equal treatment, provided a continual theme for the South and 
for Afro-Americans. The story of racial violence in the South during 
World War II was part of that theme. 
Militant Rhetoric: Black Protest Thlring World War II," ibid., 60 (Decem-
ber 1973), 692-713; idem, Forum for Protest: The Black Press Du.ri World 
War II (Rutherford Heights, 1975; Mary Penick Motley, ed., The Invisible 
Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II (Detroit, 1975). 
17Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 
(Philadelphia, 1972); George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, 1967); see also John Morton Blum, V was for Victory: 
Politics and American Culture During World War II (New York, 1976); 
Sheldon Hackney, "Southern Violence," American Historical Review, 74 
(February 1969), 906-25. 
CHA.PI'ER II 
CLOUDS OF WAR 
The United States in 1940 was a nation at a crossroads. After a 
decade of depression, the clouds of war promised renewed prosperity even 
as they augured death and destruction. A glimpse of what was to come 
had occurred in 1939 when, at the behest of the War Department, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt created the short-lived War Resources :Soard. A 
host of alphabet agencies followed in 1940 and 1941. If "Dr. New Deal" 
was being replaced by "Dr. Win-the .. War" during these months, he apparently 
had inherited the same penchant for creating a maze of overlapping authori-
ties. Reacting to the German invasion of France in mid-1940, Congress 
quickly passed the National Defense Act, providing tangible evidence of 
the United States• intent to gear up for possible entry into World War 
II. By 1941 the signs of American involvement were unmistakable despite 
Roosevelt's reassurances that no American blood would be shed on foreign 
·11 SOl. • 
These beginnings would ultims.tely grow to the largest and most suc-
cessful war mobilization in the nation's history. For example, the federal 
government's outlay for physical expansion within the borders of the forty-
eight states alone eventually amounted to an unheard of $74 billion, a third 
of which went into new manufacturing facilities. In addition, $11 billion 
was spent for military facilities such as forts, posts, and cantonments, 
1Polenberg, War and Society, 6-7;FrederickL. Deming and Weldon A. 
Stein, Disposal of Southern War Plants, National Planning Association, Com-
mittee of the South, Reports, No. 2 (Washington (1949]), 12. 
18 
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and another $10 billion was converted into non-farm housing. The remainder 
went for expansion of industrial services, petroleum extraction, highways, 
agriculture, and a variety of other areas. 2 
If this elephantine growth proved beneficial for millions of Ameri-
cans, it was a godsend to southerners. The South had been termed "the 
Nation's No. 1 economic problem" for good reason. In many economic sectors 
it had not shared the prosperity of the 1920s and as late as 1939 was still 
shrouded by depression. While the region possessed almost 41 percent of the 
nation's farm land, its farmers received only 2lo5 percent of the total 
gross agricultural income. And while Dixie contained 15.3 percent of the 
country's industrial workers, they took home a modest 10 percent of the in-
dustrial wages. No matter how the figures were computed, the South was in 
the doldrums on the eve of World War II. 3 
If life was hard for white southerners, it was even worse for the 
802 of the nation's 12.8 million blacks who still lived in the eleven ex-
Confederate states. 4 Blacks had historically been discriminated ~gainst in 
virtually every aspect of life. Of the southern black population, only 
about 34 percent were urban dwellers and this meant that for a large number 
of blacks sharecropping continued as a way of life. An accurate rule of 
thumb was (and is) that the black rate of unemployment usually ran twice 
that of whites, a problem the South was unable and perhaps unwilling to con-
front. 5 
2Deming and Stein, Southern War Plants, 1. 
3Ralph C. Hon, "The South in a War Economy," Southern Economic Journal, 
8 (January 1942), 292. 
4Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, ed., Negro Year Book: A Review of Events 
Affecting Negro Life, 1941-1946 (Tuskegee, 1947), 1-2. 
5rbid., 7. 
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Since the South possessed few of the nation's heavy industries, ini-
tial war contracts did not greatly affect it. In addition, of the $74 
billion spent in the states du.ring the war for physical expansion, the South 
was the recipient of only about $10 billion; of this, half went for the con-
struction and refurbishing of military facilities. Most of the remainder 
was spent on explosives and ammunition, chemicals and energy, and shiP-
building. Thus, the South received comparatively little (12 percent) of 
the wartime expenditures for physical expansion, and of the total, half 
was spent on areas th.at did not return major benefits in peacetime. In 
the meantime, the largest single area of southern expansion, military camps, 
was 36 percent of the national total expended. This brought a huge influx 
of federal money, partially offsetting the lack of industrial expansion. 
When Selective Service got underway in October 1940 the South quickly be-
came the campground, if not the arsenal, of democr:acyo 6 
Overall, the value of southern production rose from 12.7 percent to 
14.4 percent of the nation's total during the war, representing an increase 
in the number of manufacturing plants from 26,516 to 42,739. If this was 
in part a tempor:ary development, it was nonetheless better economic progress 
than the South had seen since the Civil Waro 7 
Increasing industrialization meant changes in southern demogm.pbyo 
During the first three years of the war the region lost 3.4 percent of its 
6Deming and Stein, Southern War Plants, 11, 17; Rudolph Heberle, 
The Impact of the War on Population Redistribution in the South, Papers 
of the Institute of Research and Training in the Social Sciences, No. 7 
(Nashville, 1945), 5. 
7Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 700-1. 
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population, yet its urban-areas grew markedlyo Savannah, for example, 
increased 28.9 percent, Charleston 37.5 percent, and Mobile by an aston-
ishing 60.9 percent by late 1943. It proved a major disruption for a 
people "always accustomed to the quasi-nomadic migmtions of share 
croppers and mill workers. 118 
These wartime problems were not confined to the South, but because 
it traditionally had been the most conservative region in the nation, such 
sweeping changes had perhaps a greater impact on southemers. Of all the 
alterations wrought by the war buildup, none was as potentially dangerous 
as the pressure placed on the delicate system of southem race relations. 
Gearing up for war meant the possibility of employment, and for 
depression-wracked black Americans this boded a brighter future. For black 
southerners it meant even more, for while the North had not proven to be 
the mecca many blacks had dreamed of, the South was even less inviting. 
Decades of explicit and implicit segregation and discrimination bad forced 
southern blacks into a caste system that was virtually impossible to escape. 
Furthermore, the South of the 1930s bad been a land of unremitting hard-
ship. The Scottsboro case was a well publicized example of southern injus-
tice, but the discriminatory measures of the Agricultural Adjustment Ad.min-
istration and the continued abuses in sharecropping arrangements indicated 
that the South remained hostile toward blacks. 
For blacks in the South, the clouds of war fostered feelings both 
of hope and cynicism--though the cynicism usually remained repressed. They 
8 Heberle, Impact of the War, 5, 14; U.S., Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, "Estimated Civilian Population of the United States, 
by Cormties: November 1, 1943," Population--Special Reports, Series P-44, 
No. 3 (Washington, 1944), 3-5. 
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remembered not only the hardships of depression but what many of them re-
garded as betrayal after the First World War. Most black Americans had 
gone into that conflict with high morale, "generated by the belief that 
the democratic slogans literally meant what they said." :But the "close 
ranks" admonition of W. E. B. DuBois had seemingly produced no more than 
the "Red Summer" of 1919, when riots erupted in several cities in reac-
tion to what whites perceived as a dangerous attempt by blacks to disrupt 
the racial caste system. 9 
By 1940 blacks knew better, especially southern blacks. They lived 
in a segregated world prescribed for them by the white power structure. 
While northern-based civil rights groups began to assert themselves, 
southern blacks generally adopted a passive optimism. This did not mean 
that they failed to support such groups as the NJ...ACP, but they had care-
fully to hide their feelings. While racial militancy escalated after 1940, 
little of it was directly traceable to the South. 
The Pittsburgh Courier's drive in mid-1940 to integmte the national/ 
defense program proved one of the best examples of increased hope a.~d 
cynicism as the clouds of war approached. The Courier, an important black 
newspaper, recognized the need for prompt action to keep black morale from 
plummeting into despair, so it sponsored the "Committee on Participation 
of Negroes in the National Defense Program." Headed by Rayford W. Logan 
of Howard University, the Courier group appeared in May before a· subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations which was considering the 
1941 military budget. 
9Dalfiume, "Forgotten Years," 92. 
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Logan asked the committee for amendments to the budget, requiring 
among other things that the armed forces contain 10 percent black service-
men, a figure derived from the overall percentage of blacks in the American 
population. In addition, he requested that all b:ranches of the service be 
fully integrated. Citing the favorable record of black servicemen in past 
wars, Logan alluded to the potential domestic :racial problems if something 
were not done. "At a time when President Roosevelt is urging again, in 
almost the same lar1gu.age as did Woodrow Wilson, that we preserve democracy 
in the world," he wamed, "the United States mu.st not marshal her military 
forces in such a way as to discriminate against some of the most loyal and 
10 efficient soldiers of this country." That ~ame day a statement from 
Charles H. Houston, World War I veteran and noted black attomey, set an 
even more ominous tone. "The morale of Negro citizens regarding national 
defense is probably at the lowest ebb in the history of this country," he 
cautioned. Blacks had no faith in the leadership of the military, he 
added, a fact that the nation's black press made painfully clear. Houston 
concluded on a stern note by telling the senators that the government "can-
not expect Negroes to be valiant defenders in time of war when it ignores 
11 and insu.1 ts them in time of peace." 
Logan's committee accomplished nothing beyond the addition of an 
amendment to the appropriations bill that reiterated existing anti-
discrimination directives. Change in the armed forces policies would come 
10u. s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States 
Senate, on H. R. 9209: A :Sill Making Appropriations for the Military 
Establishment for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1941, and for Other 
Purposes, 76th Cong., 3d sess., 374. 
11Ibid., 372. 
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only when the manpower shortage grew so acute that there was no other re-
course. 
Because 1940 was an election year, the Roosevelt-led Democrats 
needed to woo northern black voters, who had supported him in previous 
campaigns in response to New Deal social and economic policieso The white-
led southern Democrats, however, did not permit blacks to vote in signifi-
cant numbers. On October 25, 1940, as a sop to the Courier and bJack 
leadership in general, Roosevelt appointed William H. Hastie civilian aide 
to the Secretary of War and Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., as the first 
black brigadier general in the United States Army. Later, other blacks 
would be appointed to similar positions with impressive sounding titles 
but which carried little actual responsibility. 12 
In the meantime the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) took shape 
to contest discrimination against bJacks in defense industries. Generally 
regarded as the single most militant action by black leaders during the 
entire war period, the MOWM forced Roosevelt to create the Fair Employment 
Practice Committee (FEPC). Where the Courier group failed (at least tem-
porarily) to gain significant advancement for blacks in the military, the 
MOWM succeeded (at least temporarily) on the civilian front. The movement 
bad been conceived by the militant black labor leader A. Philip Randolph, 
who saw it as a technique to force the administration to give blacks an 
equal oppotunity to participate in upholding the Four Freedoms through 
employment in defense industries. In a January 1941 letter to the Courier, 
12v. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 
1949), 619-43; Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 79-80; Wilma Dykeman and 
James Stokely, Seeds of Southern Change: The Life of Will Alexander 
(Chicago, 1962), 256-58. 
2.5 
Randolph complained that "Negroes are not getting anywhere with National 
Defense. The whole National Defense setup reeks and stinks with race 
prejudice, hatred, and discrimination." To show the nation tbat blacks 
would not be shoved aside, Randolph called for a march on Washington by 
10,000 blacks. 13 
The Courier, even though it had sponsored a committee to lobby 
Congress to integrate the armed forces and bring in 10 percent black ser-
vicemen, dismissed Randolph's scheme as a "crackpot proposal" which was 
i..~ effect a nuisance "organized by publicity hounds, job-hunters and. 
addlepates." The Courier remained the only major black newspaper to oppose 
Randolph's plan. 14 
The march never took place because of a last-minute meeting at the 
White House, resulting on June 2.5 in Executive Order 8802. This order 
created the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, designed 
to prevent employers with federal defense contracts from discriminating 
against minority groups in hiring practices. In theory it looked good, 
but in fact the FEPC had few teeth with which to bite offenderso During 
its turbulent five-year life, the committee was bandied around Washing-
ton like an illegitimate child--no one wanted it. 15 
13Pittsburgh Courier, January 25, 1941. 
14-ibid., June 14, 1941; Finkle, Forum for Protest, 123. F-i_r,..kle 
suggests that the main reason the Courier opposed the MOWM was because of 
personal enmity toward Randolph and bis socialistic views by the news-
paper's editor, P. L. Prattis. 
15u. s., President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, First 
Report, July 1943-December 1944 (Washington, 1945), 104-.5; Garfinkel, 
When Negroes March, 7; Rucha.mes, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 140. 
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Historians since World War II have cited the March on Washington 
Movement and to a lesser extent the Courier committee and other smaller-
scale actions as proof that militancy visibly increased among black Ameri-
16 cans. While militancy no doubt increased, neither the M0WM nor the 
Courier committee had solid grassroots backing. That Randolph was per-
fectly willing to call off a demonstration that had been at least a year 
in the making indicates that he could not guarantee a 10,000 person gather-
ing. Fortunately, blacks who backed the M0WM did not have to show up at 
the Capitol to prove their support. The many claims made for the march 
proved in part nnjus tified. 
Support of these early efforts at black advancement in the prewar 
months remained perceptibly quiet in the South. In fact, southern blacks 
responded to almost everything in whispers. The southern black press, 
along with the scattered southem branches of civil rights organizations, 
had not become forceful. Whites did most of the responding in that region, 
as they had for decades. 
The NAACP, which in 1940 counted a modest 50,556 members in 355 
branches, usually concentrated on legal problems and anti-lynching bills. 
At that time the association bad no real positive program conceming the 
defense effort so it occupied itself in sympathizing with the M0WM and the 
Courier committee. With some exceptions, it remained inactive until after 
the nation entered the war. 17 
16s ee, for example, Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March. 
17Da.lfiume, "Forgotten Years," 99-100; Finkle, Forum for Protest, 
139-40. 
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_The National Urban League proved even more lethargic than the NAACP. 
The NUL was from the beginning primarily a northem-based concern and in 
1940 counted only seven affiliates in the ex-Confederate states out of a 
nationwide total of 45. 18 Both the Urban League and the somewhat more 
militant NAACP experienced severe financial problems, and during the de-
pression neither could afford sweeping reform movements. Significantly, 
these organizations, as well as the southem black press, usually played 
possum in Dixie. 
If southem blacks sympathized with the M0WM or the NAACP, few 
whites knew about it. The black southerner's existence depended upon 
getting along with whites, and while some militants did form ideological 
alliances among themselves and with such white liberals as Will Alexar:der, 
Virginius Dabney, Jonathan Daniels, and ¥ark Ethridge, ordinary folk 
shunned publicity. They coexisted in a separate and unequal society with-
in the bounds prescribed for them. 
Although southern blacks remained outwardly calm, white southemers 
in 1940 took a defensive stance. The vague rumors about the radical Chicago 
Defender, Pittsburgh Courier, and NAACP suggested outside threats to an 
ordered society. As C. Vann Woodward observed, the "southern identity" was 
one of "frustration, failure, and defeat." As such, it bore a defensive 
attitude toward many things, not the least of which was the system of race 
relations. 19 
18 Nancy J. Weiss, The National Urban League, 1910-1940 (New York, 
1974), 246. 
19c. Vann Woodward, "The Search for Southern Identity," in Woodward, 
The Burden of Southem History (Baton Rouge, 1968), 19-21. 
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As American entry into the war drew closer this delicate caste system 
appeared to the white southerner to be in jeopardy. Already, war prepared-
ness affected the southern (as well as the non-southem) way of life. When 
something as historically sensitive as the relationship between blacks and 
whites began to show signs of change, the ordinary white began to wonder, 
as Gunnar Myrdal revealed, whether he would be forced to "relinquish white 
supremacy." Would he have to allow blacks to marry his daughters or build 
good schools for blacks even though the schools his own children attended 
were not adequate? "Is he supposed to retreat from all 'southern tradi-
tions?' He sees 'outside aggression' wherever he turns. 1120 
As the nation shifted to a wartime footing, alterations bad to be 
made in many areas of life, testing the southern system of race relations. 
Population redistribution, previously mentioned, caused potentially critical 
difficulties in war centers. A Senate committee charged with investigating 
this problem estimated in 1941 that because of the growth of defense in-
dustries and military facilities, the populations of some thirty-eight 
"critical" defense areas would rise markedly. For the eight southeastern 
states that formed the Army's Fourth Corps area, the civilian population 
in nineteen defense centers would increase by 296,220, apparently within a 
year. For the same centers, the committee estimated that 72,545 new hous-
ing units and 1,542 hospital beds would be required. All of this l:ad to 
take place in areas with.inadequate transportation (no new buses or autos 
after 1941), inadequate public services, and increasing manpower shortages. 
20Myrda.1, An American Dilemma, 1012. 
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As a result, when blacks and whites began to pour into these areas friction 
mounted. 21 
As war preparedness in the South continued through 1940 and 1941, 
I straining race relations, violence began to appear. Urban riots would 
emerge later, but two forms of violence grew ominously during this period--
lynching and military violence. Both reflected growing racial tension in 
the South, tension which would by 1943 evince such destructive force that 
it would seriously jeopardize the domestic war effort. The violence of 
1940-1941 was a prologue for what was to come. 
·✓ 
Lynching had been a concem in the South for many years. It had 
grown to fearful proportions during Reconstruction and reached another peak 
around the tum of the century. Tuskegee Institute, the NAACP, and the 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching kept statis-
tics for each year, publishing the gory details to gamer support for anti-
lynching legislation. 
Part of the legal difficulty in dealing with lynch mobs lay in the 
conflict between federal and state jurisdiction. If no civil liberties 
had been violated under federal law, the Justice Department could not enter 
a case. The state, in turn, passed a lynching case along to the local law 
enforcement system; this normally resulted in no indictments and no punish-
ment. Lynchings usually occurred in thinly populated areas where everybody 
21The eight Fourth Corps Area states were Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 
U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense 
Migration, Hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National 
Defense Migration, Pursuant to H. Res. 113: A Resolution to Inquire Fur-
ther into the Interstate Migration of Citizens, Emphasizing the Present 
and Potential Consequences of the ~ligration Caused by the National Defense 
Program, pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 4374-77• 
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knew each other; there was a certain amount of risk involved if a grand 
jury indicted a neighbor. Moreover, in many instances local blacks were 
regarded as expendable. Because of the lack of adequate law enforcement 
in rural areas, a lynching could be made into a public spectacle without 
a:ny of the offenders having to worry about reprisals. 
Seeking to solve the jurisdictional tangle, the NAACP had been 
actively committed to a federal anti-lynching measure since 1911, two years 
after its formation. In 1922 the Dyer Bill, sponsored in part by the NAACP, 
passed the House of Representatives but never got to the Senate floor. 
Eleven years later the association tried again--this time with the Costigan.-
Wagner Bill. This provided for the punishment of local officials found 
delinquent in protecting citizens from mobs, stiff penalties for lawmen 
who aided lynchers, and federal intervention in a lynching case if local 
authorities bad ta.ken no action within thirty days after the alleged crime. 
In addition, the bill defined the crime in general terms as any non-labor 
related attempt on the part of a mob (three or more persons) to exercise 
"by physical violence and without authority of law, any power of correction 
or punishment over any citizen" under the pale of the law. Any such vio-
lence "which results in the death or maiming of the victim," the bill con-
cluded, "shall constitute 'lynching' within the meaning of this Act."22 
Although the NAACP sponsored a sizeable publicity campaign to gain support 
for the Costigan-Wagner Bill, its efforts proved fruitless. The 
22Robert L. Zangrando, "The NAACP and a Federal Anitilynching Bill, 
1934-1940," Journal of Negro History, 50 (April 1965), 106-8; U. S., Con-
gress, Senate, A Bill to Assure to Persons Within the Jurisdiction of 
Every State Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of the Laws, and to 
Prevent the Crime of Lynching, 76th Cong., 1st sess., S. 845, p. 2. Copy 
in "Lynching--1940," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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legislation failed in the Senate, and when it was revived in 1940, its 
proponents could not garner enough votes to invoke cloture. 23 
During the course of the 1940 fight over the anti-lynching bill, 
a series of letters between Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, 
and Alben W. :Barkley of Kentucky, Senate majority leader, reflected the 
hostility generated by the controversy. White evidently had a way of 
irritating people, and when in April he accused :Barkley of holding up the 
anti-lynching bill, the Kentuckian hotly denied it, protesting that "this 
statement is so ridiculous and baseless that no one outside an insane 
asylum would believe it, and no one who had any regard for truth would 
make it. 1124 
Yet in October :Barkley found an excuse to remove the bill from con-
sideration when he stated that "I am willing to take the responsibility of 
saying that in the midst of our international situation ••• it is im-
practical at this time to make a futile effort to obtain a vote on the 
bill." Not 'Wltil near the end of the war would another anti-lynching 
measure be seriously considered in Congress. 25 
The overall impact of the anti-lynching effort from 1933 to 1940 
had both positive and negative aspects. The increased attention that the 
debate focused on lynching did much to heighten public awareness of the 
problem. Also the number of reported lynchings declined markedly after 
23zangrando, "Federal Antil~ching :Bill," 108-14. 
24Alben W. :Barkley to Walter White, April 22, 1940, in "Anti-
lynching: Alben Barkley, 1940," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
2SPittsburgh Courier, October 19, 1940. 
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mid-decade, a trend attributed to the publicity given to the anti-lynching 
efforts. 
On the other band, there was a change in the character of lynching 
after the mid-1930s. Beginning around 1936 the typical lynching became 
less a spectator event and more a covert act undertaken by small mobs in 
quick and quiet fashion. Lynching victims were less likely to be hanged 
publicly from a tree and blow-torched and more likely to be fished out of 
a river or discovered in a remote area days after the incident. It became 
increasingly difficult to determine whether black homicides were the work 
of mobs or just individual murdero While the number of reported lynchings 
decreased during the 1930s, the actual number of persons lynched probably 
remained near previous levels. 26 For example, during 1940 and 1941 there 
were eight reported lynchings, but for 1940 alone the NAACP kept files on 
four additional suspected incidents. Moreover, for the two year period 
the NAACP discovered forty-nine "threatened" lynchings. While the authen-
ticity of some incidents and near-incidents may be questioned, there can 
be little doubt that during the war years some lynchings remained undis-
closea.27 
26Jessie Daniel Ames, The Cha.nging Character of Lynching (New Yo:r:k, 
1973 [1942]), 2-5. 
27The eight lynchings during 1940 and 1941 were: Ike Gaston (white), 
March 7, 1940, near Atlanta; Elbert Williams (black), June 20, 1940, 
Brownsville, Tennessee; Jesse Thomton (black), June 22, 1940, Luveme, 
Alabama; Austin Callaway (black), September 8, 1940, La.Grange, Georgia; 
Bruce Tisdale (black), February 15, 1941, Andrews, South Carolina; 
Robert Malker (black), April 13, 1941, Cherryville, North Carolina; 
Robert Sapp (black), May 6, 1941, Blakely, Georgia; A. C. Williams (black) 
May 13, 1941, Quincy, Florida; "Lynching-1940, " GOF, NAACP Papers; ' 
Guzman, Negro Year Book, 302-11. 
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A 1940 lynching in Tennessee illustrated the tensions created in 
many areas by increasing black militance and corresponding white alarm as 
the defense effort quickened. In 1939 some black citizens of Brownsville 
organized a small but active NAACP chapter. As the general election of 
1940 approached, its leaders undertook a voter registration drive among 
the black townspeople. The president of the NAACP branch, the Reverend 
Buster Walker, met on May 6 with some town officials, who, while not 
ecstatic about the idea, remained noncommittal. The next day, however, 
a local deputy sheriff told Walker that he had better stop encouraging 
blacks to register "or there would be troubleo" The whites had reason 
enough to be concemed, for blacks in Haywood County, of which Brownsville 
was the seat, outnumbered whites two to one. 28 
As the days passed more militant whites in Brownsville issued 
threats to the NAACP leaders and in particular harassed Walker, Elisha 
Davis, and Elbert Williams. Periodically carloads of whites drifted 
through town visiting the homes of NAACP officials, asking "what about 
that nigger meeting?" 
At about 1:00 a~m. on June 16 whites forced Elisha Davis, a filling 
station opera.tor and father of seven children, into a car and drove him 
to a secluded area several miles from town. Some fifty whites awaited 
him and threatened to kill him if he did not give them the names of the 
local NAACP members. Davis complied, providing the names of the officers, 
but reminding the whites that the city fathers had approved the fo:cna.tion 
2811statement of Facts in the Brownville [sic] Tennessee, Case," in 
"Brownsville, Tennessee--Dept. of Justice"; ":Brownsville, Tenn., Investi-
gation, June 27th, 1940, 11 in ":Brownsville Tenn. Lynching," GOF, NAACP 
Papers; Memphis Commercial Appeal, June 28, 1940. 
34 
of the branch the year before. The mob then threatened Davis' life and 
told him never to set foot in the county again. He walked the eight or 
nine miles to Jackson, where he contacted the local president of the NAACP. 
Meanwhile, Reverend Walker and a "Professor Outlaw" were also run out of 
town, and eventually every one of the local NAACP officers fled. 29 
Elbert Williams, another NAACP member who advocated black voter 
registration, was not so fortunate. On the night of June 20 a local 
policeman called on Williams at his house and demanded that he get in the 
car. 30 Williams, an employee of the Sunshine Laundry, was not permitted 
to get dressed, so he got into the car containing several white men bare-
footed and clad only in his pajamas. The whites apparently took Williams 
a short distance to the banks of the Eatchie River where he met his death. 
On Sunday, June 23, two fishermen found Williams' body tied to a log float-
ing down the river. The corpse had been severely beaten and there were 
two bullet holes in the chest.31 
As soon as the body had been recovered from the river and local 
blacks realized what had happened, Milmon Mitchell, president of the 
Jackson branch of the NAACP, contacted the national office. On June 24 
Walter White met with officials of the Department of Justice. By July 1 
the Federal :Bureau of Investigation (F.BI) had entered the case in an effort 
29White to William McCla.naban, July 1, 1940, in "Brownsville Tenno 
Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers; Jackson S11-ll, June 26, 1940. 
30There is a discrepancy in the various reports about the date on 
which Williams died. Several sources reported the day as June 15, but 
others, including his widow, said June 20. 
3111statement of Facts in the Brownville [sic], Tennessee, Case"; 
White to McClanahan, July 1, 1940, GOF, N.A.ACP Papers; Nashville Globe and 
Inde~endent, June 28, 1940; Memphis Co:::::1ercial Anneal, Ju_~e 28, 1940. 
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to determine whether federal laws bad been violated in Williams' death 
and in the forced flight of Elisha Davis and the Reverend Walker. At the 
same time Mitchell charged that the U.S. District Attorney in Memphis, 
William McClanahan, a native of Covington (near Brownsville), was a 
"dyed in the wool" white supremacist who would probably do nothing unless 
"pressure is brought upon his office. 1132 
Since the Williams lynching occurred in the midst of the Congres-
sional furor over the anti-lynching bill, Walter White reminded Sena tor 
Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee of his responsibility as an elected repre-
sentative. "During the 1938 debate in the Senate over the Anti-Lynching 
Bill," White began, "you introduced o •• telegrams and other communica-
tions from southern governors stating that a federal law against lynching 
was unnecessary as these governors could and would stop lynching." In 
light of the Brownsville affair, however, "we respectfully inquire what 
steps you and other Tennesseeans [sic] holding office will take to make 
good on the promise made in 1938. 11 Unless such terrorism were stopped and 
the lynchers of Elbert Williams brought to justice, White declared, "this 
incident will prove that the states themselves cannot cope with mob vio-
lence."33 
While the FBI investigation continued in hopes of finding enough 
evidence to prosecute under federal law, a Haywood County grand jury con-
vened. It deliberated for two days, and on August 13 declared its findings: 
320. John Rogge to White, July 10, 1940, in "Brownsville, Tennessee--
Dept. of Justice"; Milman Mitchell to White, July 1, 1940, in "Brownsville 
Tenn. Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
33wru.te to Kenneth McKellar, July 3, 1940, in "Lynching--1940," 
ibid. 
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"The jury has made a careful and earnest investigation, examining people 
from all walks of life, including relatives of Williams, and no evidence 
has been brought out that might place suspicion on anyone as having a part 
in the case. 1134 The NAACP had expected this and would have been genuinely 
surprised at any other finding. The burden thus rested as always with the 
Justice Department. 
In early September a rumor circulated that despite the Williams 
lynching the town's black citizens had successfully registered to vote. 
The NAACP national office cranked out an ecstatic press release claiming 
"complete victory." :But the report proved false, illustrating the NAACP's 
failure to verify this story as it bad occasionally done others, before 
proclaiming it as the truth. Ecstacy gave way to despair as the national 
office received reports from Brownsville to the effect that, in fact, blacks 
had been informed that "the river will be full of niggers" if they tried to 
register for the November election. 35 
As the F.BI investigation continued, despair turned to utter defeat. 
Despite assurances that the identities of the men who lynched Williams 
were known and that there was ample evidence of a violation of federal laws, 
there were no arrests. O. John Rogge of the Attorney Genera.l's office re-
assured Walter White that the investigation was continuing and implied that 
a federal case would ensue. The F.BI was reportedly "actively pursuing its 
leads," but a year passed, then eighteen months without action. Finally, 
34J3rownsville States-Graphic, August 16, 1940. 
35Press release, September 13, 1940, in "::Brownsville Tenn. Lynching"; 
"Statement of Facts in the :Brownville [sic], Tennessee, Case," GOF, NAACP 
Papers. 
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on February 11, 1942, the Justice Department informed NAACP special coun-
sel Thurgood Marshall that it had ended the investigation, explaining 
that "it was the studied opinion of the Department that the facts de-
veloped did not justify prosecutive actions. 1136 
The lynching of Elbert Williams and its aftermath traced pattern.s 
characteristic both of the other lynchings of this period and those of 
the later war years. Perhaps the clearest pattern, ironically, was that 
it coincided with the new trend toward covert violence. It provided a 
vivid eY.ample of small mobs disposing of victims with quiet efficie~cy. 
This new development in techniques was known at the time as "streamlined" 
lynching because it contained all the major elements without the UI1-~eces-
sary frills. 
Local whites perceived Williar.1s 1 NAACP activities as milita.~t, and 
his subsequent lynching for activism characterized other wartime violence. 
Whites saw the racial status quo threatened by black participation in an 
NAACP chapter. For blacks, however, the lynching seemed to contmdict the 
idealistic goals expressed in the "Four Freedoms" slogan under which the 
United States aided her allies in opposition to the Axis powers. Such a 
contmdiction resembled Gunnar Myrdal I s juxtaposition of an "American 
Creed" where "the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of 
high national and Christian precepts," with the heart of the "American 
Dilemma," involving "valuations on specific planes of individual and group 
living" that included "prejudice against particular persons or types of 
3611correspondence with Department of Justice re: Brownsville, 
Tennessee Case," undated; Wendell Berge to Thurgood Marshall, February 11, 
1942, in "Brownsville, Tennessee--Dept. of Justice," ibid. 
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people." Thus, because the nation busily prepared to defend the Four Free-
doms, the lynching of Elbert Williams denied blacks in :Brownsville, in 
Tennessee, or in the South the right to view those freedoms as pertaining 
to them. 37 
In this case as in others, the Justice Department failed to prose-
cute even when federally guaranteed civil liberties under the Fourteenth 
Amendment were clearly violated. True, the department labored under a 
jurisdictional burden, but because grand juries typically failed to re-
turn indictments, the federal law enforcement agencies remained the last 
bulwark of justice. With a few important exceptions, during the war era 
this bulwark proved as flimsy as in the past. 
Although lynching had been typical of southern violence, urban 
racial conflicts bad not. Previous outbreaks such as the Wilmington riot 
of 1898 and the Atlanta riot of 1906 had shown white resistance to black 
advancement, as had the Longview, Texas, affair of 191.9, the last major 
riot in the region prior to World War II. Although another major southern 
urban riot would not take place until 1943, during the prewar defense 
effort a series of outbreaks erupted in Dallas, foreshadowing what would 
happen in southern cities when the exigencies of war strained race rela-
tions to the breaking point. 
From September 1940 through February 1941 street riots wracked the 
southem section of Dallas. The city administration, in an effort to 
support the growing population, bought out several black homeowners in 
the Howell Street section, intending to raze the area and then build low-
rent housing. This plan temporarily displaced a number of blacks, and 
37Myroal, An American Dilemma, lxxi. 
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wily real estate agents sold several houses in adjacent white blocks to 
some of these families. 
On September 3 violence erupted. About two hundred white home-
owners gathered and began throwing rocks and bricks at these houses. When 
police arrived, the mob split into smaller groups and eluded the lawmen 
with ease. As white tempers continued to flare, passing black motorists 
became objects of attention, and police diverted traffic around the area. 
While the fracas continued, a sizeable white woman spied an agent who had 
sold one of the houses in dispute and, in a stroke of revenge, flattened 
him with a "hayma.ker." The police restored temporary order, but sporadic 
violence continued for the rest of the week as hastily formed white home-
owners' committees demanded tmt the city pass a jim crow ordinance for 
the area. 38 
Du.ring the weeks that followed the initial outbreak, homemade bombs 
exploded in various front yards as isolated violence continued. The F.BI 
and Texas Rangers had little influence in denting the terrorism. In mid-
Feb:ruary, five months after the initial violence, the Dallas Housing 
Authority announced that the housing project already underway would be 
rushed to completion and that a second project vrould begin immediately. 
In addition, it persuaded real estate brokers to refund money to blacks 
who were willing to move elsewoore, and in anot:ter section it cajoled 
several white families into selling out so tm t the housing :problem could 
be temporarily solved. Only three days after the housing authority an-
nounced its decision, another bomb destroyed a house in the beleaguered 
38nallas Morning News, September 4, 6, 1940; Pittsburgh Courier, 
September 14, 1940. 
area. 
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Whites bad gotten in the last wora..39 
The real issue, however, proved to be not one of temporary accommo-
dations but of long-term solutions. "Completion of the public housing 
project, a year hence, will give decent homes to 650 Negro families," ex-
plained the New Republic, "but Dallas has yet to decide what, if ar.:.y-thing, 
will be done for the thousands remaining in barbarous shanties and to pro-
vide for orderly expansion of bulging Negro neighborhoods." In Dallas, 
however, the prevailing sentiment rested not upon housing policy but upon 
racial separation. The editor of the Dallas Mo ming News pro clai ::Ed that 
"white neighborhoods do not want Negro residents. No law can eradicate 
p:rsonal prejudice or by mere fiat e::-a.se the color line." Hou.sir.~ prob-
lems and black encroachment on white areas faced many cities as the pace 
of war preparedness quickened. In addition, congestion, confusion, flaying 
tempers, and white backlash to racial change contributed to the later 
and more S?vere urban racial violence in the South and elsewhere. The 
Dallas outbreaks and the Sojourner Truth housing riots in Detroit i...~ 1942 
provided glimpses of what lay ahead for cities where race relations was 
evidently the least concem.4° 
During 1940 and 1941 a facet of racial violence generally peculiar 
to periods of war emerged--the growth of tension and violence between black 
servicemen and whites. As previously noted, black leaders exhibited con-
sidemble concern over the role black Americans would play in the defense 
39Pittsburgh Courier, September 21, 1940; October 19, 1940; January 
25, 1941; February 22, 1941; Dallas Moming News, Feb:ruary 9, 1941; "Racial 
Dynamism in Dallas," New Republic, March 24, 1941, pp. 389-90. 
40"Racial Dynamism in Dallas," New Republic, March 24, 1941, pp. 
389-90; Dallas Morning News, September 6, 1940. 
effort. The Courier committee had protested the continuation of segregated 
units and the failure to utilize maximum black strength, yet during the 
first two years of the war era, the barriers remained. A 1922 Army deci-
sion had set black strength in regular units at the same percentage they 
represented in the total population, but only half of the black troops 
were to be used in combat uni ts. In practice black strength in the Army 
never reached the prescribed 9 or 10 percent, because that service main-
tained only four jim crow units. The Navy restricted blacks to the mess-
men's branch, the Marines excluded them altogether, and the Army Air Force 
deemed it unwise to train blacks as pilots. 41 
The chorus of protests from black organizations and the black press 
reached such a crescendo by late 1940 that President Roosevelt, in an effort 
to keep the black vote that helped put him in office, announced several 
changes in policy. On September 16 a White House statement declared that 
36,000 out of the first 400,000 men drafted under the new Selective Service 
Act would be black. It also reported that the Amy Air Force would begin 
developing black air units. While that reassured a number of blacks, North 
and South, others refused to be mollified. They saw that at least half 
and perhaps a majority of the 36,000 "lucky" draftees would be placed in 
non-combatant units such as supply and maintenance. The men would also 
be segregated. 42 
:Slacks remembered the World War I era with bi ttemess. In a ''War 
to Save Democracy" many of them had assumed that active support of 
41nalfiume, Desegregation of A:rmed Forces, 22. 
42Ibid. , 36-37. 
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America's war effort would result in improvement of their status. When 
the postwar violence against them erupted instead, blacks felt betrayed. 
To them, the First World War contained a hypocritical element, and based 
on that thinking they proved wary as American entry into World War II 
approached. Thus, DuBois' "close ranks" philosophy seemed as improbable 
in 1940 as the likelihood that he would repeat it. 
In the military more than in a:ny other area of the defense effort, 
hope and cynicism pervaded the black mind. As Percival Lo Prattis, a 
black journalist, observed, "the morale of the Negro in tbe anned services 
of the United States is an amalgam composed of his tendency to share the 
general popular reaction to the challenge of war and death and his reaction 
to the special treatment he is the victim of in the Army and Navy."43 Al-
most all blacks, whether enlisted or drafted, shared these sentiments. Yet· 
they could do little to change the situation. The burden of proof lay with 
them, and each instance of failure, such as when the 368th Infantry Regi-
ment failed in one of its assignments during the Argonne Offensive of 1918 
while fighting under conditions that made success impossible, was a fur-
ther indication to the War Department that blacks did not make good soldierso 
Black troops faced pressures that whites did not, and, as it turned out, 
there were limits to how much these men would take. 
Knowing full well black Americans' ambivalent attitude toward the 
impending war, on the eve of the general election Roosevelt appointed William 
H. Hastie civilian aide to the secretary of war. This appointment proved 
43Ibid., 113-15; P. L. Prattis, "The Morale of the Negro in the Armed 
Services of the United States," Journal of Negro Education, 12 (Summer 1943), 
355. 
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as significant to most blacks as the elevation of Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., 
to brigadier general. Hastie, who assumed his duties on November 1, 1940, 
had graduated from Harvard University, served as dean of the Howard Uni-
versity Law School, and sat as a federal judge in the Virgin Islands. 
He faced an unenviable task. On the one hand, the Anny held him at ann's 
length, regarding him as an "NAACP man." On the other hand, civil rights 
groups and much of the black population asked him to perform impossible 
tasks. His failure to do the impossible frequently resulted in his being 
referred to as a puppet for the Armyo 44 
The preparedness effort affected most keenly the men who entered 
the service. Between the invasion of Poland in 1939 and the attack on 
Pearl Harbor in 1941, the black strength of the Anny increased from 3,640 
to 97,725; by 1943 the figure had risen to 467,883. During the entire war 
the Army inducted 920,000 blacks. While the black percentage never reached 
10 percent, the meteoric rise in absolute numbers created tense condi-
tions.45 
Part of the racial difficulty arose from the location of the train-
ing camps. The Amy in 1940 decided to construct a large proportion of 
these camps in the South, and most had to be built within a few monthso 
The temperate climate and open spaces with cut-over pinelands "afforded 
room for maneuvers, resulting in the least damage and delays for faming 
and other civilian pursuits." Also, southem camps could be built with 
44Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 79-80; Da.lfiume, Desegregation 
of Armed Forces, 42. 
45Da.lfiume, Dese re c::.tion of Armed Forces, 44; Jean Byers, "A Study 
of the Negro in Military Service" Washington, 1950), 26 [Unpublished: 
mimeographed copy in Lib:rary of Congress]~ 
fewer vital building materials such as heating equipment and insula-
tion.46 
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A:n estimated 80 percent of the black troops received their t:rain-
ing in the South, in part because the Army still clung to the belief that 
southern whites could best handle blacks. Northern urban black soldiers 
reacted more vociferously than southern black soldiers to southem racism, 
and their negative attitude was contagious. In sum, the black trainees 
in southem camps underwent experiences that "had an impressive uni-
formity. 1147 
In April 1941, shortly after black inductees began to enter the 
Army, the first "major symbolic event in the long chain of :racial vio-
lence" occurred. During the first week of April, Lieutenant Colonel 
Herbert B. Laux, Provost Marshal at Fort Benning (Columbus), Georgia, 
disclosed that positive identification had been made of a body found on 
March 28 hanging from a tree in a wooded section of the fort's confineso 
The victim was Private Felix Hall, a black man from Montgomery, Alabama, 
attached to the 24th Infantry. The Army had kept the murder a secret 
until identification could be made. Hall had died sometime around March 
1, and when a group of soldiers out on a field assignment discovered his 
body, both the Army and the FBI began investigations. The study had 
4~ers, "Negro in Military Service," 62; Lenore Fine and Jesse A. 
Remington, The Co s of ineers: Construction in the United States 
{Washington, 1972, 273-308. 
47For example, as early as June 1941, only a few months after 
blacks had begun to be inducted in large numbers, they were being sta-
tioned mainly in the South. Of the fifteen camps at that time with the 
largest number of black troops, nine were in the ex-Confede:rate states 
and two more were in border states. Pittsburgh Courier, April 12, 191.µ; 
Byers, "Negro in Military Service," 62. 
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not been completed when news of Hall's demise reached the public. 48 
The reaction of the black community proved to be as predictable 
as it was expeditious. The NAACP directed letters to William Hastie, 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and President Roosevelt demanding a 
complete inquiry into the incident. The Southern Negro Youth Congress 
also wrote the President, demanding, among other things, a $20,000 in-
demnity to Hall's family. Southern white liberal Jonathan Daniels, editor 
of the Raleigh News and Observer, used the occasion to militate for an 
anti-lynching law.49 
In spite of this and other protestations, especially vehement since 
Hall was in uniform when he died, the Army appeared to bide its time in 
explaining the mystery. In fact, suicide was not ruled out as the cause 
of death, even though the victim 1s hands and feet were bound. The very 
mention of suicide in this instance sent black organizations and the press 
into a frenzy. Adding to the ten$ion, the commanding general of Fort 
Benning thought it was "a sex murder rather than the result of any race 
feeling."SO 
481ee, Employment of Negro Troops, 349; Pittsburgh Courier, April 
19, 1941; Memorandum, Office of the Chief of Staff, War DeIBrtment, to 
William H. Hastie, April 19, 1941, in "Violence Against Negro Military 
Personnel," Records of the Office of the Secretary of War [Civilian Aide 
to the Secretary of War], Record Group 107, National Archives (hereafter 
cited as CASW Records, RG 107). 
49Pittsbu.rgh Courier, April 26, 1941; "Lynching of Felix Hall, 
Fort Benning, Ga., April, 1941"; Jonathan Daniels, "The Army Camp Mystery," 
in "Ft. Benning, Georgia," GOF, NAACP Papers; Southern Negro Youth Con-
gress to Roosevelt, April 14, 1941, AG 291.21, Records of the Adjutant 
General's Office, 1917- , Record Group 407, National Archives (here-
after cited as AG, followed by the decimal file number under which the 
document is catalogued, RG 407). 
50Ma.j. Gen. L. R. Fredenllall to S. Ralph Harlow, June 11, 1941, 
in "Ft. Benning, Georgia," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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Despite the official pronouncements, the case had all the elements 
of a "streamlined" lynching, in this case of a man in uniform. The in-
vestigation uncovered no motive, and no one was apprehended or charged. 
But the publicity the Hall case generated caused grave concern among 
both blacks and whites over the future of military race relations. 
As the size and the activity of the military camps increased 
throughout the South during 1941, tension between blacks and whites corre-
spondingly mounted. On every base the white soldiers outnumbered the 
blacks, a fact which, when coupled with the Army's policy of strict seg-
regation, predictably led to discriminatory treatment and ill feeling. 
Such was the case at Fort Br-c::.gg, just outsid~ Fayetteville, North 
Carolina. The city had mushroomed in size du.ring the prewar months from 
17,000, a third of which was black, to 40,000, with approximately ~ne same 
black percentage. In addition, the number of troops at Fort Bragg bad 
increased to 52,000, of whom 6,500 were black. Within two years a city 
of 17,000 had been forced to accommodate a population five times th~t size. 
Congestion choked the municipal serYices, housing was at a premiun, and 
recreational activities proved woefully inadequate. 
The pattern of race relations in Fayetteville had in the pa.st been 
fairly peaceable, if segregated. A ghetto area known as "Little E.a.rlem" 
served the blacks of the city as well as those from the base and ~-as the 
only area of Fayetteville where blacks were welcome. In 1940 a local 
NAACP branch had begun operations, a development that displeased local 
whites. In fact, many whites in the city were generally so conservative 
that they regarded Life,·the weekly magazine, as being communist con-
trolled.51 
47 
The standard treatment for black soldiers at Fort Bragg proved de-
grading both at the camp and in Fayetteville. Many of these men, some of 
whom were u.rba._'rl northerners, raised an increasing cloud of complaints as 
they endured this discriminatory treatment. All American soldiers, 
whether black or white, have historically made an avocation out of com-
plaining, but in this case many of the protests were clearly justifiable. 
Recreational facilities, always important in an area with thousands 
of soldiers, remained inadequate for blacks. They could not patronize the 
theaters or the nicer eating places in town, and the small black district 
of Fayetteville furnished the only diversions. On base, the Army did not 
provide even segregated recreation halls. Also, the black troops inhabited 
temporary quarters while the whites lived in more attractive and comfortable 
permanent quarters. The visible differences in living standards made many 
of the black troops sullen and defensive. In addition, friction developed 
over the policy of jim crow transportation for the soldiers, especially on 
the city buses used to shuttle the men between the post and town. The 
morale among the blacks, then, proved less than satisfactory. Many of the 
soldiers, after having stayed at Fort Bragg only a few weeks, wanted nothing 
more than to be transferred to another camp, under the mistaken notion that 
other posts would offer better conditions.52 
5lPittsburgh Courier, August 23, 1941; "Fayetteville, North Carolina, 
Army Camp Impact Area," Report 51, Special Services Division, Bureau of In-
telligence, Office of War Information, Records of the Office of Government 
Reports, Record Group 44, National Archives (hereafter cited as Govem.ment 
Reports Reco:rds, RG 44) • 
.52Interoffice memorandum to White, September 2, 1941, in "Ft. Bragg--
:Bus Killing," Legal File (LF), N.All.CP Pa:oers. 
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The military police supplied the biggest cause of tension between 
the blacks and whites. The MPs reportedly spared nothing to make sure that 
blacks stayed "within bounds" on the base and harassed them while in Fayette-
ville as well. Black troops not only at Fort Bragg but across the South 
were by mid-1941 beginning to resent white MPs and asked for black mili-
tary police in their areas of camp. Yet the Army did not employ many black 
MPs, and the ones it did use were not allowed to carry firearms--only night-
sticks. This state of affairs embittered blacks.53 
The tensions erupted at about 1:00 a.m. on August 6, as a group of 
black soldiers stood waiting at a bus stop in Fayetteville for their jim 
crow bus to take them back to camp. Some were drunk. When the bus arrived 
around 1:15 the soldiers began to clamber boisterously aboard, apparently 
insulting the bus driver in the process. The driver, refusing to move until 
MPs accompanied him to the base, got off and called the police. Within ten 
minutes a contingent of MPs arrived. As four white military policemen en-
tered the bus, a scuffle erupted. Someone grabbed a revolver from an MP 
and began firing wildly. Another MP returned the fire, and within two or 
three minutes two men were dead and five otmrs wounded. Private Ned Tur-
man, black, and Sergeant Elwyn Hargrave, white, lay dead; the wounded in-
cluded two other MPs and three blacks.54 
While the deaths of the two men were tragic and unnecessary, the 
larger significance of this incident lay in its aftermath. Immediately upon 
SJibid. 
5½ayetteville Observer, August 6, 1941; Pittsburgh Courier, August 
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hearing of the shootings, Fort Bragg Provost Marshal Major James W. Mc-
Neer, ordered all black soldiers who were not in their barracks rounded up 
and taken to the post stockade. The official explanation stated that the 
persons responsible for the deaths bad to be found, the necessity of which 
"was not realized by the soldiers at the time and, unfortunately, has been 
largely represented as a measure involving racial considerations. 1155 
The rounding up of five hundred or more soldiers, many of whom had 
later wandered onto the post from a night on the town, did indeed involve 
racial considerations. None of the white MPs were treated in the fashion 
the blacks were, and with the exception of one military policeman, a twenty-
year-old native southerner alleged to have killed Private Turman, none were 
even held for questioning. On the other hand, many blacks reported being 
threatened and beaten as they were forced into the stockade where they 
remained for five hours. When they were finally released, feelings toward 
the Army in general and the MPs in particular had clearly deteriorated.56 
• 
After the large contingent of blacks was released, the post commander, 
Colonel Charles Elliott, called for a complete investigation. The young 
MP alleged to have killed Turman went before a court-martial and within a 
week had been acquitted. Ballistics showed that the MP 1s revolver was not 
the one that killed the black soldier. As a result, no one was ever con-
victed for either of the deaths. 
In the meantime the NAACP sent Curtiss Todd, a Raleigh lawyer, to 
Fayetteville where he circulated among the soldiers and found a feeling 
55Fayetteville Observer, August 6, 1941; Henry L. Stimson to Roy Wil-
kins, November 10, 1941, in "ft. :Bragg--Bus Killing, 11 LF, NAACP Papers. 
56Pittsburgh Courier, August 23, 1941. 
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of gene:ral hatred tqward the Army's discriminato:cy- practices in recreation, 
transportation, and housing, and a complete distrust of the military police. 
In addition, the Army Inspector General's Office sent General Benjamin O. 
Davis as a special investigator; after questioning 128 witnesses, he found 
the same bitterness among the troops.57 
In spite of this, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson told the NAACP 
that "a noteworthy feature of the investigating officers' report is the 
finding that, in no respect did the incident itself, or its after-effects, 
acquire any semblance of a conflict of racial sentiments; and that the 
occurrence did not arise from, or cause any tendency toward racial dis-
crimination.1158 Someone in the War Department must have been agitated, 
though, because the post provost marshal was quickly replaced, and the 
commander, Colonel Elliott, was i~ October transferred to Mississippi 
State College as an ROTC instructor. He resigned from the Army shortly 
thereafter. Perhaps the most telling change at Fort Bragg came when 
William Hastie announced in mid-September that the military police would 
soon contain a large number of blacks and tmt they would be invested with 
the same authority as their white counterparts. The Fort Bragg incident,. 
as the first major disturbance in the amed forces during the war years, 
cast an ominous shadow over the future of military race relations even 
as it showed the War Department's reluctance to flout local patterns 
57Fa.yetteville Observer, August 7, 1941; Pittsburgh Courier, 
August 30, 1941; September 6, 1941; Stimson to Wilkins, November 10, 
1941; Curtiss Todd to White, August 14, 1941, in "Ft. :Sragg--Bus Killing," 
LF, NAACP Papers. 
58stimson to Wilkins, November 10, 1941, NAACP Papers. 
of segregation by making substantial changes in policy toward black 
troops. 59 
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Only a few days after the Fort Bragg episode another incident 
occurred near Gurdon, Arkansas. While the incident in Fayetteville 
affected only soldiers, the Arkansas trouble broke out between civilian 
whites and black soldiers. During August 1941 the Second Army war maneu-
vers had gotten underway, and units from several areas were ordered to 
Louisiana to participate, including the 94th Engineer :Battalion, a black 
unit formed earlier in the year at Fort Custer, Michigan. The majority 
of the men were Chicago and Detroit natives. 
By August the 94th had already experienced southern racial p:.ttems 
in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. During the course of its stay there, it had 
received less-than-cordial treatment, especially from highway patrolmen. 
This initiation set the troops to grumbling. In July the 94th moved back 
to Fort Custer and then to Camp Joseph T. Robinson near Little Rock. While 
there, the presence of the black soldiers provoked yet another incident 
when on August 9 a white policeman and a black sergeant got into a fight 
that received considerable publicity and heightened local tension. The 
neA-t day the unit moved to a bivouac about one hundred miles southwest of 
Little Rock, between the towns of Gurdon and Prescott. On August 11 two 
or three hundred men went to Gurdon on passes, and the greeting accorded 
them again proved less than enthusiastic. In fact, some of the local whites 
went into near-hysterics at the presence of these men and demanded that 
591ee, Employment of Negro Troops, 352; Pittsburgh Courier, Septem-
ber 27, 1941; October 18, 1941; November 8, 1941. 
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they be moved as far from there as possible.60 
This hostility angered the soldiers, and when word came from their 
superiors that they were to be out of town by 10:00 p.m., they became 
vociferous. As they began leaving town, they cuxsed the townspeople and 
blocked traffic. Apparently the rumor that one of their number had been 
beaten and thrown in jail also aggravated their hostile disposition. 
The following night a group of state police harassed the bivouac 
area, injuring no one but making threats and causing a general worsening 
of relations. The white hostility prompted some of the men to ask for 
ammunition to defend themselves (they were regularly kept without it), a 
request that was emphatically denied. The·white reaction bad so frightened 
the 94th1 s comm.anding officers that they decided to seek yet another 
bivouac area in a more isolated location. 
On August 14 the bedraggled 94th set out along Highway 67 en route 
to a new camp several miles further from Gurdon. The troop movement pro-
ceeded normally along the side of the road, but around noon a contingent 
of state policemen appeared and began ordering the soldiers to get off the 
highway. Someone had apparently called the police complaining that a mob 
of blacks was causing trouble along the road. 
The state troopers confronted Companies A and C and began pushing 
soldiers into a ditch beside the highway. Lieutenant Donald Curry, white, 
commander of Company C, tried to persuade the police to leave, but they 
60Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 3.52-.54; Motley, Invisible Soldier, 
40-43; Memorandum, Hastie to the Adjutant General, October 10, 1941; State-
ment of Pvt. Clarence Woods, Jr., September 4, 1941, in "Gurdon, Arkansas, 
Incident," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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instead hit him and told him to "get them black bastards off the con-
crete." At that, several of the soldiers broke ranks and closed in on 
one of the police cars. Their officers managed to restrain them with 
difficulty. This entire episode took place with two truckloads of white 
MPs nearby; they lifted not a finger to keep the civilians from inter-
fering. 
The worsted Curry and other officers managed to avoid bloodshed 
only by persuading the soldiers to march into the woods and get to their 
bivouac as quickly as possible. By the time the 94th reached the new 
campsite its members were totally disheartened. Matters had seemingly 
gone from bad to worse during their stay in the South, with no prospect 
of improvement in the foreseeable future. They were powerless to do any-
thing about it--tbat is, almost po~erless. That night about sixty of the 
men changed into fatigues and went AWOL. Some fled directly north, others 
west, but all got out of the South. One caught freight trains from Texas 
through New Mexico and Arizona to California, then proceeded north and 
east to Chicago. Most of these men eventually turned themselves in at 
Fort Custer. 61 
Public reaction was swift. The NAACP, exhibiting growing confidence, 
asked the War Department to abolish segregation in all military facilities, 
to train immediately a large force of black MPs for general service, to 
protect black soldiers in southem camps, and to prosecute the ·whites who 
61Pittsburgh Courier, August 23, 30, 1941; Hastie to the Adjutant 
General, October 10, 1941; Memorandum, Hastie to the Under Secretary of War, 
October 16, 1941; Statement of Pvt. Woods, September 4, 1941, in "Gurdon, 
Arkansas, Incident"; White to Fiorello LaGuardia, August 26, 1941, in 
"NAACP (War)--1940-47," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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were responsible for the 94th's recent troubles. At least one black news-
paper went a step further and asked that all black troops be withdrawn from 
below the Mason-Dixon Line. Petitions poured in from across the country, 
especially from the Midwest, protesting the treatment accorded the 94th. 
One such protest emphasized that it "would seem ironical if our young men 
should be called upon and expected to defend what in effect is Hitlerism 
in the South."62 
In the meantime the Army had two problems to contend with: what 
to do with the men of the 94th, especially those who had gone AWOL, and 
whether to try to prosecute the state policemen who had interfered with 
the unit on August 14. As to the first problem, Lieutenant General Ben 
Lear, commander of the Second Army, made his feelings lmown in no uncer-
tain terms. "The 94th Engineers have disgusted me," he blared. "You are 
the ones who have started all of ·this trouble and have disgraced the Army 
and your race. I have watched you_ since you first started, and I want it 
all stopped now, not tomorrow, but today." The Army relieved the com-
mander of the 94th of his duties because he "was too easy with his men. 063 
General Lear also ordered a trial for six of the black AWOL sol-
diers involved in the incidents of August 11-14, with himself as head of 
the investigation. The NAACP vehemently protested that action and un-
successfully sought to convince Lear that he could not be impartial in 
any proceedings concerning the 94th. Eventually five of the six men stood 
62wh.ite to la.Guardia, August 26, 1941, CASW Records, RG 107; Pitts-
burgh Courier, August 30, 1941; Petition from NAACP Youth Council, Kansas 
City Branch, to Roosevelt, September 6, 1941; AG 291.21, RG 407. 
63Pittsburgh Courier, September 6, 1941. 
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trial at Fort Custer in December 1941 and ended up being freed. This re-
sult was credited in part to the defense counsel, Major Theophilus Mann, 
who was the first black to serve in such a capacity in a mixed Army 
court. 64 
While the status of the men of the 94th remained uncertain, the 
problem of state police interfering with the military proved a ticklish 
issue. An Army investigation of the Gurdon incidents, especially the 
episode of Augu.st 14, found that the Arkansas State Police had violated 
the following federal laws: illegally invading a military reservation, 
opposing by force the authority of the United States, opposing an officer 
of the United States, an~ conspiracy to prevent the free exercise of 
Constitutional liberties. 65 
A squabble soon ensued over whether the War or Justice Department 
had jurisdiction in the case. Exasperated, the NAACP requested that 
Roosevelt decide the dispute, with the implication that the association 
wanted a prosecution regardless of who got control. The result was that 
nobody prosecuted. The War Department apparently won the jurisdictional 
quarrel but then dropped the whole matter with the explanation that the 
state police and other civilians involved were "not within the classes of 
persons amenable to trial by court-martial for violation of the Articles 
of War. 1166 
64rbid., November 1, 1941; December 27, 1941; Telegram, White to 
Stimson, October 21, 1941, in "NAACP (War)--1940-47," CASW Records, RG 107. 
65"Recommendations in re: The 94th Engineers Battalion," undated, 
in "Gurdon, Arkansas, Incident," CASW Records, RG 107. 
66Pittsburgh Courier, November 1, 1941; December 6, 1941. 
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The Fort Bragg and 94th Engineers incidents were only two of a 
rash of outbreaks involving blacks in the military during 1941. Others 
occurred at Fort Jackson (Columbia), South Carolina, in April; Camp 
Wallace (Galveston), Texas; MacDill Field (Tampa), Florida, in July; and 
Camp Davis (Wilmington), North Carolina, in September. Additional minor 
incidents erupted in and around camps across the nation. 67 
By the summer of 1941 the Amy recognized the dangerous potential 
these outbreaks reflected, yet it reacted haltingly. To its credit the 
Army took two important steps after the violence of 1941. It established 
a Corps of Military Police that included black MPs for service in camps 
with large numbers of black troops (such as Fort Bragg), and createa the 
War Department Special Services Branch to deal with :racial disorders. 
Aside from these changes, which were slow in being implemented, there 
emerged few other altemtions. Segregation continued, white MPs still 
exercised authority over blacks, civilian-military relations in many areas 
of the South worsened, and the possibility of more violence loomed on the 
horizon. Massive policy changes were needed, but the Army evidently re-
garded such a cure as being worse than the ailment. 68 
By the end of 1941 it had become clear that the war would have a 
considerable impact in unsettling southern race relations. The signs along 
the civilian and military fronts were unmistakable, but because of the 
attention placed on the international scene, such omens were either largely 
disregarded or ignored altogether. 




Blacks bad concluded that the Four Freedoms did not apply to them 
and with World War I abuses fresh in many of their minds, they prepared 
to confront discrimination. The NAACP, the black press, and many other 
blacks and concerned whites exhibited an increased awareness of the gravity 
of the situation, but during 1940 and 1941 it did little good. The most 
obvious manifestation of deteriorating race relations, violence, would 
continue to keep blacks down. But its effects would shortly prove dis-
astrous for :race relations. 
CHAPTER III 
"NEARER AND NEARER THE PRECIPICE" 
In a 1942 report on racial tension, Fisk University sociologist 
Charles S. Jolmson observed that "in conflict we have merely a mobilization 
for action in defense of the racial philosophies of the respective groups." 
Jolmson saw the increasing anxiety to preserve segregation and discrimina-
tion among whites and the increasing militancy among blacks to achieve 
equal opportunity, a development that threatened to break the already 
tenuous peace between the two groups. The rift between rhetoric and re-
ality in wartime America appeared clearer than ever to blacks, and their 
intensified dissatisfaction with the ebb and flow of events elicited a 
stiffening of conviction among whites to keep the already confused domestic 
1 situation from working to the blacks' advantage. 
By 1942 assertiveness among blacks had become obvious enough to 
cause concern among whites. The NAACP preached that "now is the time not 
to be silent about the breaches of democracy here in our own land," an idea 
effectively echoed by the black press. In particular the Pittsburgh 
Courier's "Double V" campaign became a rallying cry among black citizens, 
though many whites condemned its implied divisiveness. 2 
As a reflection of the federal government's concem over growing 
black militance the Office of War Information (OWI) began collecting 
1charles S. Jolmson et al., 11A Preliminary Report on the Survey of 
Racial Tension Areas," Charles S. Johnson Papers, Box 373, Special Col-
lections, Fisk University (hereafter cited as Johnson Papers). 
211Now Is the Time Not to be Silent," Crisis, 49 (January 1942), 7; 
Pittsburgh Courier, January 31, 1942, and subsequent issues. 
59 
information on factors increasing black-white tension and instituted a 
regular monitoring of the black press, all of which constituted an effort 
to take the pulse of the nation's thirteen million blacks. The tone of 
such reports clearly indicated that the government held black organiza-
tions and the press responsible for current tension. 3 
The situation was exacerbated by rumormongering among southern 
whites. In 1942 "Eleanor Clubs" emerged as a topic of conversation. A 
figment of the white imagination, these clubs supposedly reflected the 
intent of blacks, encouraged by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, to reverse 
the caste system and provide "a white woman in every kitchen by Cr.tXistmas." 
Just as contrived were the stories of blacks buying and storing ice picks 
and lmives for some future bloodbath. As soon as southern white men joined 
the Army, another rumor insisted, their women would fall prey to great 
hordes of lascivious blacks who would then proceed to mongrelize the raceo 4 
There was no basis for any of these rumors. That they spread like 
wildfire from Virginia to Texas indicated that whites were once again in-
voking a siege mentality in response to what they perceived as growing 
assertiveness on the part of southern blacks. Aside from the actions of 
a few southern black leaders, this militance derived from a trickle-down 
effect from the northem black press, the NAACP, the National Negro Con-
gress, the March on Washington Movement, and northern blacks stationed in 
~emorandum, "Report on Recent Factors Increasing Negro-White Ten-
sion," Special Services Division to R. Keith Lane, November 2, 1942, in 
"Report on Recent Factors Increasing Negro-White Tension," Special Ser-
vices Division, Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Inforrra.tion, Govern-
ment Reports Records, RG 44. 
½>ittsburgh Courier, October 3, 1942; Odum, Race and Rumors of Race, 
96-101. 
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southern training camps. Blacks in the South were growing more militant 
and vocal, and they were accepting the Double Victory idea. Because of 
this and growing defensiveness among whites, the rift between the two 
groups assumed cavernous proportions. The danger, however, lay not in 
the black population's militancy but in the reactionary tendencies of many 
whites. 
This defensiveness became more obvious as the number of black 
troops stationed in southern camps increased. The fear of black officers 
was especially strong. These officers contradicted the stereotype, care-
fully nurtured in the South, of black inferiority and incapacity to assume 
positions of responsibility. Repeatedly during 1942 legislators and 
governors appealed to the Army in an effort to keep black officers out of 
the South. Typical was a letter sent to Chief of Staff George C. }~rshall 
by the Mississippi members of the House of Representatives. Congressman 
John E. Rankin and his_ six colleagues warned that such a practice "would 
tend to create friction that might result in riots, and could not redound 
to the best interest of the Service." Senator John D. Bankhead of Alabama 
echoed this sentiment when he took the liberty of asking Marshall to with-
hold not only officers but all black troops from the South. Apparently 
Bankhead was upset at the news that the all-black 92nd Infantry Division 
was to be activated at Fort McClellan, near Anniston. Marshall politely 
ignored these and similar requests.5 
As the nation entered the war on a full-scale basis following the 
Pearl Harbor attack, racial violence assumed a more threatening role in 
5John E. Rankin et al., to Cl:1ief of Staff George C. Marshall, .April 
30, 1942, AG 291.21, RG 407; Pittsburgh Courier, August 8, 29, 194,2. 
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domestic affairs. Significantly, the first major incident to occur after 
the United States' declaration of war erupted in a camp town and involved 
soldiers and civilians. Black soldiers, smarting at the difference 
between democratic rhetoric and reality, became the cutting edge of 
racial militancy, and the Alexandria, Louisiana, riot of early 1942 re-
flected this situation in microcosmic form. 
Before the war Alexandria was a sleepy town of 25,000. By 1942, 
however, the population had skyrocketed to between 50,000 and 65,000. 
Part of the explanation for this growth lay in the fact that the area 
bristled with military installations. Alexandria's rapid growth was not 
unique, but few towns of comparable size could boast of serving three 
major training camps and three airfields. Camp Claiborne, with a normal 
population of about 50,000, lay seventeen miles south of the city and 
was the largest of all the military camps in the vicinity. Camps Living-
ston and Beauregard were located nine and six miles from town, respectively, 
and although smaller than Claiborne, combined with it to form a military 
population in excess of 75,000, of whom 16,000 were black. Three air-
fields, ·Alexandria, Esler, and Pollock, added to the military congestion. 6 
Du.ring any given weekend or payday it was not unusual for 30,000 
troops to inundate Alexandria. Traditional southern racial segregation 
prevailed--perha.ps even tightened because of the number of black servicemen--
6Hardin H. Nelson, "The Impact of War on Population Redistribution 
in Louisiana" (M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University, 1943), 53-55; 
"A Preliminary Report on Defense Project Area Alexandria, Louisiana, and 
Vicinity, January 11, 1941," in "Alexandria, La., Reports," Series 13, 
Records Relating to the Operation of the Area Offices, 1943-W.h Records 
of the Committee for Congested Production Areas, Record Group 212, National 
Archives {hereafter cited as Congested Production Areas Records, RG 212); 
Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 356-57. 
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so that the black soldiers were restricted to the Lee Street district. 
This area actually amounted to "four indescribably filthy blocks" which 
served as the black community's entertainment center. There were bars, 
nightclubs, and houses of questionable repute where thousands of black 
servicemen were supposed to have a good time. If they strayed elsewhere 
in the city in search of diversion they faced "as hostile an attitude as 
if they were in an enemy country."7 
There were problems even in the Lee Street area. Camp Beauregard 
furnished the military police for the city, both white and black, and the 
usual practice in the black district was to augment the unamed black MPs 
with roving groups of white MPs. White military police and the local police 
force proved notoriously rough on black soldiers and apparently amused 
themselves by periodically overriding the authority of the black MPs. 
Over-zealous black military policemen sometimes chose to be unnecessarily 
harsh with black soldiers to gain a measure of approval from their superi-
ors. In such an atmosphere trouble proved unavoidable, especially from 
blacks who hailed from the North or Midwest and were unaccustomed to the 
oppression they found in Alexandria. 8 
On Saturday night, January 10, the Lee Street district buzzed with 
the usual weekend activity as civilian and military fun-seekers choked 
the streets and bars. Black MPs made themselves conspicuous, and the 
atmosphere was one of restrained gaiety. During the midst of this revelry 
7Byers, "Negro in Military Service," 63. 
8 Memorandum, Col. Lathe B. Row to the Inspector General, July 16, 
1943, AG 291.21, RG 407. 
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a white woman drove along Lee Street and at one point honked the horn and 
yelled for a black soldier crossing the thoroughfare to get out of the 
way. The soldier unthinkingly replied, "would you run over a soldier?" 
At that the woman got the attention of a white city policeman standing 
nearby who proceeded to arrest the soldier. 
Resenting what they considered an unnecessary display of force, 
several black Gis gathered around the policeman and the soldier, intent 
upon rescuing him. Within minutes a band of sixty white MPs appeared on 
the scene, and a free-for-all broke out. Hand to hand combat sent members 
of both sides tumbling to the pavement, but evidently few shots were fired 
until a contingent of state policemen and troops from Camp Beauregard 
arrived. Shooting then began in earnest, and amidst the sporadic c:rack 
of revolvers and dull report of shotguns came the sound of broken glass 
and assorted missiles hitting the street. 
The aff:ray lasted two hours and involved 500 bla9k soldiers. ]3y 
the time authorities restored order, thirty black servicemen had been in-
jured, three of them critically. Officials produced no tally regarding 
civilian casualties, but evidence suggested that perhaps twenty black 
residents of Alexandria were hurt. A handful of white MPs fell victim 
to flying rocks, bottles, and fists, but since the soldiers were unarmed 
casualties among the whites proved minimal. During the riot white police-
men, troopers, and guardsmen entered Lee Street stores and inflicted con-
siderable personal and property damages. 
The end of the disturbance came when officers rounded up 3,000 
black Gis and took them either to Camps Claiborne or Livingston where 
they were placed under confinement and informed that the city was 
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indefinitely off limits. 9 A black native of Wisconsin, a member of Clai-
borne's 91st Engineers :Battalion, capsuled the bittemess felt by the 
soldiers. "You would think Japan had made it to Lee St.," he complained 
in a letter three days after the riot. "I am in the army and cant do 
nothing about it," but because of the discrimination he enconntered in 
the South his despair led him to conclude that "I would almost rather 
desert and be place before a firing squad and shot down before fighting 
for America." If this soldier's grammar left something to be desired, 
10 his message was nonetheless clear. 
As expected, a flurry of activity ensued in an effort to discover 
the causes and nature of the Alexandria riot. · The NAACP affiliate in 
New Orleans contacted some of Alexandria's black citizens despite the 
~rmy's attempt to keep any information from leaking out. Headed by James 
B. La.Fourche, the NAACP's public relations counsel for the southem re-
gional b:ranches, the New Orleans-based investigation served as the main 
source of material for the national office's complaint to the War DeIBrt-
ment. Unfortunately, La.Fourche's report proved sensational and inaccu-
rate. The report charged that ten black soldiers had been killed during 
the violence, an allegation nowhere else corroborated. When repeated in 
the press and sent to the War Department, the report proved embarrassing 
to Walter White and the New York NAACP office. Furthermore, the report 
9Pittsburgh Courier, January 17, 24, 1942; February 7, 1942; Memo-
randum, Hastie to the Secretary of the Gene:ral Staff, January 19, 1942, 
in "Alexandria, Louisiana, Disturbance," CASW Records, RG 107; James B. 
La.Fourche to White, January 19, 1942, AG 291.21, RG 407; New Orleans 
Ti.mes-Picayune, January 11, 12, 1942; Alexandria Town Talk, January 12, 
1942. 
10Anonymous, Co. S, 91st Engineers :Battalion, to White, January 
13. 1%2. in "Alexandria la. Riots." GOF. NAACP Papers. 
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contained such overblown statements as "the attack on Pearl Harbor pales 
into insignificance when comparison is made." A copy of the La.Fourche 
report also fell into the hands of the Adjutant Genera.l's office, a mis-
hap which did nothing to improve the A:rmy's estimation of the N.AACPo 
"This is the kind of 1mullarkey 1 on which Walter White bases his re-
curring letters to the Department, necessitating undue procedures by all 
11 concemed, 11 one staff member grumbled. 
Though the La.Fourche document was in some ways inaccurate and mis-
leading, for the most part its essential points were valid, and Walter 
'White's "recurring letters" to the War Departrrent proved almost always 
valid--especially in this case. He insisted on black MPs with full 
authority, denounced civilian interference in a matter involving black 
soldiers, and demanded an integrated Army. The NAACP did err occasion-
ally, especially when it had to depend on local info:rmants, but it essen-
tially waged a lonely war against racial injustice. For the Army to 
treat the NAACP's statements offhandedly was as unfair in the short run 
12 as it was tragic in the long run. 
For its own part the Army sent General Benjamin O. Davis to Alexan-
dria to investigate. Davis must have realized that he was being used by 
the Army in a distinctly self-serving fashion. To have a black field 
grade officer investigating would presumably pacify black Americans and 
simultaneously lend an increased measure of credibility to these reports. 
11La.Fourche to White, January 19, 1942; Unsigned memorandum from 
the Adjutant General's office to General Adams, January 24, 1942, AG 
291.21, RG 407; Alexandria Town Talk, January 12, 13, 1942. 
12Roy Wilkins to Stimson, January 23, 1942, in ".Alexandria, 
Louisiana, Disturbance," C.ASW Records, RG 107. 
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Davis and others did make inquiries, but their conclusions proved super-
ficial. In one passage the investigative officer came to the understated 
conclusion that "civilian policemen and one military policeman indulged 
in indiscriminate and unnecessary shooting." Another report came to the 
comforting conclusion that insofar as the underlying causes were concerned 
there was "nothing ••• subversive about the disorder in Alexandria." 
Instead, "it all came about as a result of personal attitudes, vice, and 
overpopulation. 1113 
The Army court-martialed no one in connection with the riot. In 
fact, very few persons were brought before courts-martial in cases like 
this prior to mid-1943, apparently because the War De:p3.rtment feared the 
bad publicity that could be generated if it tried black soldiers on the 
basis of inconclusive evidence. At the same time, however, local Army 
officials kept Alexandria off limits to blacks until March 10, and in the 
meantime civilian officials tried to ban northern ~lack newspapers from 
the area because of allegedly infla.mmator.Y remarks concerning the January 
riot. In a denial of responsibility such as the War Deps.rtment customarily 
made following incidents like the one in Alexandria, it declared tmt 
solving social problems was not among its responsibilities. Instead, its 
task consisted of -training a fighting force. The NAACP reminded the de-
partment that it was training a citizens' army and not a professional one, 
13Pi ttsburgh Courier, January 24, 31, 1942; Memor-c:illdum, Hastie to 
the Secretar.Y of the General Staff, January 19, 1942; Memor-cilldum, Thornton 
R. Greene to the Officer in Charge [Camp Claiborne?], March 12, 1942, 
in "Alexandria, Louisiana, Disturbance," C.ASW Records, RG 107. 
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so that social problems by definition were of concern to it. This obser-
vation fell on deaf ears. 14 
The nature of the various investigations, considering both their 
source and content, muddied the overall picture. The NAACP in effect 
blamed the Army for the riot; the Army blamed black soldiers and, in a 
leap of logic, the entire black community along with the exigencies of 
war. Neither proved willing to shoulder the blame. While the agitation 
of the NAACP, the militance of the black press, and the unrest among most 
black citizens was certainly a factor in establishing a volatile atmos-
phere, the Army bore the main responsibility for the riot. By 1942 it rad 
become clear that race relations in the 1!lllitary were deteriorating, a 
development all the more important since the black American community 
looked to the blacks in uniform as the most obvious symbol of their con-
tribution to the war effort. The War Department by 1942 knew the dangers 
of sending segregated units into areas of the South where traditional 
discrimination held sway and where whites were anxious about blacks in 
uniform challenging the racial mores of the region. It also knew that 
trouble could result when it used.inadequate numbers of black MPs with 
inferior authority to police black sections of camp towns and the camps 
themselves. Violence could also result when black soldiers, usually more 
assertive in their new positions of official esteem, did not receive the 
respect they sought. In short, though the black press and organizations 
like the NAACP sometimes appeared to value victory at home mom than 
14w°ilkins to Stimson, January 23, 1942; Greene to the Officer in 
Charge, March 12, 1942, CASW Records, RG 107; Pittsburgh Courier, February 
24, 1942; Row to the Inspector General, July 16, 1943, AG 291.21, RG 407. 
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victory over.the Axis powers, the burden of responsibility fell on the 
official representatives of the fight for democracy. As long as the War 
Department remained insensitive to the rift between rhetoric and reality, 
racial violence in the service would continue. 
And continue it did. Although no other military-related incidents 
the size of the Alexandria riot occurred du.ring 1942, a series of highly 
publicized smaller incidents broke out in various parts of the South. 
While in themselves not particularly noteworthy, together they fonned a 
pattern of increasing militance on the part of black Gis and defensiveness 
on the part of whites. 
By March 1942 relations between whites and black soldiers in the 
Little Rock area had further deteriorated since the previous Augu.st when 
the ill-fated 94th Engineers had been dispersed by the highway patrol. 
Camp Robinson, located eight miles north of the city, in 1942 served the 
92nd Engineers as well as a number of other black and white units. Since 
the events of August 1941, the Army had segregated portions of the city 
for troops on pass in an effort to improve relations by keeping the races 
apart. The decision prompted howls of protest from civil rights groups, 
but the Army did not rescind the order for a year. While in effect, the 
order evidently produced little in the way of thawing race relations. 15 
On March 22, a Sunday, the customary contingent of both black and 
white soldiers on pass filtered around their restricted portions of town. 
One of the black soldiers, Private Albert Glover of the 92nd Engineers, 
l5"Ha.n.dbook of Information, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Arkansas," in 
"Complaints etc.--Soldiers, F-M," LF, NAACP Papers; White to Hastie, 
November 7, 1942, in "Camp Robinson," CASW Records, RG 107. 
was drunk. Late in the afternoon a small group of white MPs arrested 
him and tried to take him back to ca.mp; Glover resisted their efforts 
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so they beat him. This incident attracted considerable attention, and 
one of the onlookers was Sergeant Thomas P. Foster, also of the 92nd 
Engineers. Foster bad received instructions from his immediate superiors 
before leaving Camp Robinson to oversee any difficulties involving black 
Gis. Acting in this capacity Foster approached the corner where the 
authorities had confined Glover while awaiting a patrol car and asked 
the MPs why they were allowing the city police to take h.i1Il to jail. "If 
you don't like it," they replied, "you can investigate it." Foster shot 
back, "I am investigating it now; we are instructed by our superior offi-
cers to look after our men when they are in Little Rock on pass." After 
further argument the MPs placed Foster under arrest. This action so en-
raged the sergeant that he jerked loose from their grasp and engaged in 
a fight with them. The scuffle continued for several minutes until an-
other city policeman, Abner J. Hay, decided to intervene. Either Hay was 
physically imposing or the MPs wanted the civilian police to shoulder 
some of the responsibility for this incident, because the military police 
agreed to let him subdue Foster. The two men then tumbled to the ground 
while an onlooking cohort of Hay's reached in with a billy club and hit 
the black man several times, practically knocking him senseless. Hay 
then sp:rang up and, with Foster lying on the ground dazed and bleeding, 
emptied his revolver. Foster succumbed a few hours later at a local 
16 hospital from the result of fourbullet wounds. He was unarmed. 
1611Investigation Conducted by Mr. Frank H. Patton, Special Assistant 
to the Attomey General of the United States, before the Federal Grand Jury 
for the :Ea.stem District of A-rkansas, Western Division, Conceming the 
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This cold blooded murder was so obvious a breach of justice that 
the civil and military authorities immediately ordered the usual investi-
gation--but not until after all black soldiers had been rounded up and 
taken back to camp. This feature of Army justice had become an automatic 
procedure; no matter where the fault lay in any racial incident, the Army 
assumed blacks were guilty. Since Hay was not in the military, the Amy 
could do little besides ask the Justice Department to intervene. In the 
meantime Little Rock Chief of Police J. A. Pitcock promised to conduct an 
internal investigation of Hay's conduct in the Foster shooting, but he 
ended up exonerating the policeman of a:rry wrongdoing. Echoing this con-
clusion, the local prosecuting attomey announced that Hay "was clearly 
acting in self-defense." 
A "Negro Citizens Committee" made up of prominent blacks in the 
Little Rock area refused to give up. Combined with pressure from the War 
Department, which wanted to keep local authorities from meddling in mili-
tary matters, this committee's badgering finally led Attomey General 
Francis :Biddle to order a U.S. Grand Jury to investigate the case. Sam 
Rorex, the U.S. District Attorney, and Frank H. Patton, special assistant 
to Biddle and former Attorney General of New Mexico, received orders to 
head this probe. Rorex noted that "this killing has been picked up by 
Axis propaganda agencies and a distorted account of it broadcast by Ge:rman 
radio stations" and that "they emphasized tha. t it happened in the home town 
of Gen. MacArthur. 1117 
Death of Sergeant Thomas P. Foster, June 10, 1942," AG 291.21, RG 407; 
Pittsburgh Courier, March 28, 1942; Arkansas State Press, March 27, 1942. 
17 Pittsburgh Courier, April 4, 1942; May 16, 1942; Arkansas State 
Press, April 10, 24, 1942; May 1, 8, 1942. 
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On June 10 the grand jury probe began. Frank Patton warned the jury, 
which included three blacks, th:3.t both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution and a corresponding civil rights statute (Section 52, Title 18, 
U.S. Code) had been violated. He then related the facts in the case and 
in the process attempted to shame the jurors into returning a true bill. 
After two days of hearings, however, the jury failed to return a true bill 
by a vote of nineteen to four. Conflicting testimony, racial prejudice, 
and perhaps the timely induction of Hay into the Army on June 8 contrib-
uted to the jury's decision. Using its last option to prosecute Hay, the 
Justice Department tried to get him discharged from the Army, but in a 
letter to :Siddle, War Secretary Henry Stimson refused. "Inasmuch as the 
Federal grand jury ••• returned a 'no bill,'" Stimson argued, "and as 
it appears there are no charges now pending against this soldier ••• 
there is no reason why he should be discharged • • • at this time. u18 
An incident at Tuskegee Army Air Field, Alabama, quickly followed 
the Foster killing. This installation bad been completed in July 1941 as 
part of the incentives President Roosevelt promised black Americans prior 
to the election of 1940.19 The base, however, was shrouded in controversy 
from the very beginning. The NAACP contested the creation of an all-black 
18Arkansas State Press, June 12, 1942; "Investigation Conceming 
Thomas P. Foster, June 10, 1942"; Wendell :Serge to Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio, 
June 17, 1942; Francis :Siddle to Stimson, May 8, 1943, AG 291.21, RG 407; 
Stimson to :Siddle, May 25, 1943, AG 2247, RG 407. 
19These incentives included training black pilots, inducting the 
proper percentage of blacks into the Army, the appointments of Davis as 
brigadier general and Hastie as.aivilian aide, training of black officers, 
and other steps designed to gamer northern black support for Roosevelt's 
reelection bid. Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 75-79. 
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pilot training center, arguing that black pilots would be denied valuable 
experience in not flying with larger groups. William Hastie tried to 
mollify the association and at the same time extract an explanation from 
the Army Air Force, but both attempts failed. Even thoug--i Tuskegee Field 
graduated almost one thousand black pilots, including the members of the 
famed 99th Pursuit Squadron under Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., it rene.ined the 
20 subject of heated controversy. 
On April 1, 1942, a city policeman arrested a bla~ soldier in the 
town of Tuskegee on charges of dru..."lkenness. Irrrnediately :ive bla~k MPs 
dema.~ded that the soldier be tumed over to them. This led to a verbal 
exchange but came to an abrupt halt when one of the MPs :ook the prisoner 
at gu...~point. Within minutes the city police, a deputy s~~riff, two state 
troopers, a~d fifteen armed ~itizens oo~verged on the~:;:, beat o~e of 
them senseless, a..~d recovered the soldier. A large gro~; of excited white 
and black citizens then gathered, a..~d a general melee was barely avoided. 
The local pblice chief considered it miraculous that nc c~e was killed. 
Black soldiers found in town were confined to the base for at least 
two weeks. A probe of the incident revealed deep-seated racial prejudices 
as well as a worsening of conditions due to the condescending attitude of 
the base commander, Colonel Frederick Kimble. According to published 
accounts, there had been "extreme tension" at Tuskegee Field for some months, 
but the black press had not exposed the problem because it did not want to 
embarmss the darling of all black units, the 99th Pursuit Squadron. 
·•· 
20
Guzman, Negro Year Book, 35.5-56; White to Hastie, January 17, .1941; 
Hastie to White, January 24, 1941; White to Hastie, January 28, 1941, in 
"Tuskegee Air :Base," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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Whether tension existed remained a matter of conjecture. Yet something 
evidently rankled the War Department in connection with the April 1 inci-
dent because it transferred Colonel Kimble later in the year. Morale 
reportedly improved thereafter. 21 
This episode received more publicity than it warranted. It could 
have been a much more serious affray with the likelihood of deaths in-
volved, but no riot occurred. The incident received front page coverage 
because it involved the controversial all-black pilot training center and 
because the first groups of black flier trainees were present when it 
occurred. Significantly, the incident was portentous, for such episodes 
were repeated time and again all _over the nation--and overseas--during the 
war. Though most of these near-riots received little attention, their 
impact on, and evidence of, the deterioration of race relations proved 
real enough indeed. 22 
As blacks in uniform became a common sight in the South, the color J 
line assumed an almost sacred position in the white mind. The difficulties 
of black MP Charles Reco provided a much-publicized reminder not only of 
21 Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 356-57; Pittsburgh Courier, April 
25, 1942; January 2, 16, 1943; "Supplemental Report of Liaison Officer, 
SOS, on Racial Relations in Alabama to Chief of Labor Relations ~ranch, 
Civilian Personnel Division, Services of Supply, September 17, 1942," in 
"Monthly Mopac Area Reports: Labor Mobilization and Utilization, Negro 
Recruitment," Series 11, WMC Records., RG 211. 
22For example, in addition to the military-related incidents de-
scribed in the text, riots and near-riots occurred in the following loca-
tions during 1942, genera.ting little national publicity but, like the 
others, causing bitterness between blacks and whites: Fort Dix, New 
Jersey, April 9; Nashville, Tennessee, September l; New Orleans, Louisiana, 
November 2; Phoenix, Arizona, November 27; Vallejo, Califomia (Ma.re Island 
Naval Ammunition Depot), December 26. Pittsburgh Courier, April 18, 1942; 
September 19, 1942; November 14, 1942; January 9, 1943; Ulio to T:ruman K. 
Gibson, November 27, 1943, in "Phoenix Riots," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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how ~lack military policemen were regarded by white civilians but also 
of how tightly the color line was dmwn. This incident added yet another 
bruise to the already battered race relations between black and white 
southerners. Private Reco, nonna.lly on duty in Nevada, received in late 
July 1942 a furlough to his hometown, ]eaumont, Texas. Beaumont, situ-
ated between Houston and the Louisiana border, served in 1942 as a center 
of petroleum production and had undergone such rapid growth since 1940 
that its municipal services bad deteriorated badly. The city's bus 
system, which had to make do with the equipment on hand at the beginning 
of the war buildup, proved a constant source of friction. Altercations 
bad broken out over blacks standing in aisles ahead of the jim crow 
dividing line because of overcrowded conditions. 23 
On the moming of July 27 Private Reco, in civilian clothes, boarded 
a city bus near bis home but found the jim crow section full. The white 
section contained only five people, so the soldier sat down in the seat 
just ahead of the dividing line. The eagle-eyed bus driver noticed this 
irregularity immediately and ordered Reco either to move back or get off. 
The black GI responded by roundly cursing the driver. The driver then 
called the police, and quickly four city officers arrived. They attempted 
to arrest Reco for using abusive language, but the soldier resisted. After 
a brief scuffle in which one of the policemen broke his hand, the officers 
managed to get Reco into the squad car. Once in custody, however, he 
continued the struggle and reached for the holstered revolver of one of 
the officers. The policeman turned to Reco, and with the soldier's band 
23Houston Informer, August 1, 1942. For stories on bus incidents, 
see Beaumont Enterprise, July 1, 3, 1942. 
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grasping the barrel, shot him three times. Another policeman shot Reco 
once more, and the officer with the broken band managed to club him with 
his nightstick. Instead of proceeding to the hospital, the policemen 
drove first to the station where they booked the perforated but still 
conscious Reco on charges of using abusive language. later in the day 
military authorities removed him to a hospital at Fort Crockett, near 
Galveston, where he eventually recovered. 24 
An avalanche of protest descended upon Beaumont from the NAACP, 
which boasted a chapter in that city as well as in nearby Houston. The 
War Department also protested the action as an unwarranted and reckless 
assault upon a soldier. Beaumont's Chief of Police, Ross Dickey, attempted 
to explain away the incident by asserting that "I am not going to have any 
of my officers cut or beaten by anyone while making an arrest." The War 
Department persisted, however, and on August 14 Attorney General Francis 
Biddle set in motion a federal grand jury hearing on the case to determine 
whether Reco's civil rights had been violated. 25 Meanwhile a local grand 
jury already in session voluntarily picked up the case. Beginning the 
last few days in July, the jury collected depositions from scores of people, 
probably all white, including Chief Dickey and other policemen. On August 
19 the jury failed to return an indictment. It exonerated all four police-
men involved in the case even though the evidence pointed strongly toward 
an infringement upon Reco's rights. The decision reflected the local 
24:Beaumont Enterprise, July 28, 1942; August 15, 1942; Houston 
Info:rmer, August 1, 1942. 
25Beaumont Enterprise, July 28, 1942; August 15, 1942. 
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attitude toward blacks, especially those who tried to assume any authority, 
whether military policemen or not. 26 
After this the federal efforts to secure an indictment expired. 
The F.BI obtained evidence, but the long awaited fede:ral g:rand jury never 
convened. Attorney Gene:ral Biddle announced somewhat lamely that the 
attempt for a fede:ral case had been dropped because there appeared to be 
"no prospect of conviction."27 
As if the Foster, Tuskegee, and Reco incidents bad not been enough, 
the final episode of this nature prior to the spring of 1943 provoked the 
loudest repercussions and acted as a kind of last warning before the 
storm of violence erupted the following year in and around military camps 
across the South. Private Raymond Carr, a black MP from Camp Beauregard, 
Louisiana, bad been inducted into the Army in mid-1942. He hailed from 
Louisiana and thus had by necessity become schooled in the ways of souther.n 
:race relations. On the night of October 31, 1942, Carr and another black 
MP, Private John Spears, were on duty at the comer of 10th and Washing-
ton Streets in Alexandria. Relations between black soldiers and white 
civilians bad been strained since the January riot. At about 1:00 a.m. 
on November 1, a black couple approached Carr and Spears. The two argued 
between themselves and occasionally spoke to the MPs, the woman insisting 
that the man had hit her and asking for protection. The MPs refused to 
get involved since the matter did not lie within their jurisdiction, but 
the couple kept following them a:nyway, arguing incessantly. 
26Ibid., August 20, 1942. 
27Ibid., August 25, 1942; Walter White, "Behind the Harlem Riot," 
New Republic, Augu.st 16, 1943, pp. 220-22. 
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A few minutes later two Louisiana state policemen arrived and, 
hearing the commotion, asked the civilians the nature of their problem. 
After unsuccessfully trying to figure out the cause of the squabble, one 
of the state troopers, Dalton Mccollum, decided simply to arrest all four 
blacks and worry about the difficulty later. Carr and Spears informed 
the troopers that they were not going anywhere until they were properly 
relieved of their duties, since they could be court-martialed if they 
did. At that the two troopers put the civilians in their car, deposited 
them at the station, picked up two more troopers, and returned to the 
scene. A:rmed to the teeth and in a hostile disposition, the troopers 
attempted to arrest the MPs, who had only nightsticks as weapons. Spears 
surrendered readily but Carr fled, heading for a larger group of white 
and black MPs stationed nearby. McCollUIJ! and Trooper R.H. White gave 
chase, firing into the air and commanding Carr to stop. The chase ended 
when the state policemen found Carr surrounded by a group of other MPs 
while a frantic search for the officer of the day progressed. McCollum 
and Carr confronted each other, Carr took a swing at the trooper, and 
Mccollum fired. Carr died within a few hours, technically killed in the 
28 line of duty. 
Since Carr had been in unifo:rm and at his post armed with only a 
nightstick, and since the pretext for his arrest was blatantly racist, 
28Pittsburgh Courier, November 21, 1942; "Report of Investigation 
of Staff Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Julien C. Hyer, JAGD on 
Private Raymond Carr Case, Alexandria, Camp :Beauregard, Louisiana, 
November 1, 1942; Statement of R.H. White, Department of State Police, 
Alexandria, Louisiana, November 2, 1942, in "Violence Against Negro 
~litary Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107. 
78 
it was obvious that McCollum had killed him in cold blood. The next day 
the local Army authorities began to oil the investigative machinery. One 
of their first acts, taking depositions, only clouded the issue since the 
troopers and Private Spears came up with widely differing accounts of 
what happened. When Lieutenant Colonel Julien C. Hyer of the Judge Advo-
cate General's office talked with McCollum, he found him to be the "tn:>i-
cal trooper type, a trifle belligerent, sorry-it-had-to-be-him, could-not-
be-helped attitude, not-grea tly-concemed." And when the Amy asked 
assistant superintendent of the State Police L.A. Newsome to arrest Mc-
Collum until the investigation could be completed, Newsome snapped t1:e.t 
he "would not place any state trooper in arrest for shooti11g a nigger. 1129 
Rebuffed, the Army asked Louisiana Govemor Sam Houston Jones to 
intervene so that a full investigation could be made. Jones responded by 
calling a state grand jury into session. Meanwhile, Hyer recommended that 
the War Department ask the Justice Department to intervene by amendir~ 
Sections 253 and 254 of the United States Code to include civilian inter-
ference with officers and men of the armed forces on duty. Hyer also asked 
that a plain-clothes Louisiana operative of the War Department be sent to 
Alexandria to work up a federal case if the Justice Department amended the 
law. Neither suggestion materialized, so federal prosecution remained 
technically impossible. Attorney General ~iddle offhandedly remarked that 
"this is a case for the state to indict for manslaughter or murder and 
that it becomes a little silly for the Federal Government to prosecute • • • 
29"Report of Investigation on Raymond Carr Case, November 13, 1942"; 
Maj. Gen. Richard Donovan to Govemor Sam Houston Jones, November 13, 1942, 
in "Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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on the ground that the man who was killed was deprived of his life without 
due process of law."30 
In April 1943 the state grand jury investigating the Carr case voted 
not to return an indictment. The Justice Department seemed satisfied with 
the result, noting that only one of the eleven jurors resided in Alex-
andria. Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General, considered the grand 
jury to be "above-the-average," and because this "high type grand jury" 
bad "fully and fairly" investigated the incident no further prosecutive 
action seemed warranted. Yet all of the jurors were from Rapides Parish, 
of which Alexandria was the largest city. Berge ap:i;arently thought preju-
dice against black soldiers emanating from the January riot and the Carr 
case stopped at the city limits.31 
The NAACP availed itself of the opportunity to scorch the Justice 
Department's half-hearted attempts to prosecute in the Carr case as well 
as in those that bad preceded it. Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall re-
minded the Department that "Negro soldiers now present in camps in the 
South are there solely by reason of the fact that they are under the 
jurisdiction of the War Department" and added that none of the 1942 cases 
had been prosecuted by federal authorities. "Failure of the United 
States government to protect these soldiers destroys the morale of Negro 
soldiers and civilians," Marshall wamed, concluding that "it is difficult 
to believe that our democracy has a chance of survival" as long as it 
30"Report of Investigation on Baymond Carr Case, November 13, 1942"; 
Donovan to Jones, November 13, 1942; Biddle to Stimson, December 12, 1942, 
ibid. 
3~erge to Marshall, April 23, 1943, in "NAACP (War)--1940-47," ibid. 
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continued to take such incidents as the Foster, Reco, and Carr cases so 
lightly. 32 
While the Justice Department continued to turn a deaf ear to the 
intensified protests of civil rights groups, the War Department began to 
worry at the thought of open racial violence becoming~ institution in 
and around military camps. Besides the Alexandria riot and the other 
incidents already described, various other deaths had resulted from an-
tagonism between white civilians and black servicemen in the South. In 
October a white bus driver shot and killed a black soldier in Mobile, and 
in November another black GI died at the hands of a Columbia, South Caro-
lina, policeman. In mid-1942 the War Department's Intelligence Division 
prepared a report on the subject of increasing racial violence within 
the service. Characteristically it discussed the possibility of subver-
sive influence amo~.g blacks but admitted it had found none. More to the 
point the report emphasized that the location of the troops, police methods 
(MPs included), and lack of recreational facilities all contributed to the 
worsening situation. It recommended more complete training and supervi-
sion of MPs, closer attention to the relocation of black troops (obvi-
ously northemers), more emphasis on respect for the uniform of the armed 
forces, and control of the "inflammatory and vituperative articles in 
the colored press."33 
The report received a cool response from many staff divisions and 
from command headquarters. Some officers complained that it said nothing 
3~rshall to Biddle, April 1.5, 1943, in "Violence Against Negro 
Military Personnel," ibid. 
33Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 361-62. 
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substantial. Others explai.ped that blacks were loyal enough but proved 
susceptible to propaganda, in this case meaning the black press. Still 
others were of the opinion that whites in many cases found it "difficult 
to alter hereditary feelings and emotions," and no order from on high 
could change them. While the Army adopted portions of the report, they 
were never uniformly enforced and some were ignored altogether. 34 
At a time when the Axis and Allied forces were locked in a grueling 
struggle to the death in which the outcome remained unclear, the War De-
partment obviously relegated domestic :racial disputes to the back burner. 
:But the disruptive potential of this violence was not lost on William 
Hastie. Recounting the incidents of the past year, Hastie cautioned 
Secretary of War Stimson that "this matter has reached the stage where the 
Army can no longer afford to dismiss the situation by saying that these 
cases are beyond its jurisdiction." Suggesting that the Army bad been un-
willing to risk offending white southerners in taking corrective action, 
he emphasized that "this continuing wave of violence may lead to rioting 
at any time and certainly it is raising havoc with the spirit of Negro 
soldiers." To alleviate the problem would involve providing black MPs 
with sideams in places like Alexandria, as had been done at Fort Bragg, 
publicly denouncing such incidents as Raymond Carr's death, and giving 
federal courts jurisdiction over crimes of violence by civilians against 
military personnel on duty. 35 
34Ibid., 362. 
35Hastie to Stimson, November 17, 1942, in "Violence Against Negro 
Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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While the Army bad a serious problem on its bands, very little in 
the way of constructive action appeared. Its mission, it repeated, was 
to win a war and not act as a laboratory for social refonn, but not every-
one was thoroughly convinced that such an excuse absolved it of responsi-
bility in protecting its men. The irony of tyranny at home while fight-
ing tyranny abroad grew starkly obvious against a backdrop of international 
efforts to protect the Four Freedoms. The gap between rhetoric and re-
ality, in short, became most distinct in the service. It would apparently 
take more serious and disruptive racial violence to occasion much in the 
way of genuine concern in the War Department. 
The military; of course, bad no monopoly on discrimination or racial 
violence. In domestic civilian life tension correspondingly heightened as 
the pace of the war effort intensified. Undoubtedly there was an effect 
on civilian race relations that was traceable to military difficulties, 
especially in areas with military camps or large numbers of soldiers. In 
fact the impact of military violence was felt all over the South, and the 
causes and effects of military and civilian outbreaks were intricately 
intertwined. After all, both were based on the same problems and the 
same minority· group. Yet the influence of northern black troops in the 
South, their heightened sensitivity to treatment by white civilians, and 
the impact of such incidents as the Alexandria riot may have served as 
causes of heightened militancy on the part of southern black civilians 
and rising tension in general. 
Perhaps the most serious problem confronting blacks nationwide was 
discrimination in defense employment. In the South the opening of the 
job market to blacks in unprecedented numbers fostered a feeling of 
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defensiveness among white workers and corresponding assertiveness among 
blacks. The manpower shortage and expansion of vital war industries pro-
vided jobs in traditional areas for blacks, such as common laborers, but 
it also opened up jobs previously unavailable to them--skilled jobs in 
steel plants, shipyards, munitions factories and other defense related 
positions. But discrimination continued. For those black men and women 
who got good jobs in the South, others were left to their own devices or 
employed in menial oc.oupations. 36 
This obvious discrimination did not pass the FEPC unnoticed. Since 
its creation in mid-1941, the committee had plunged into its work with 
little fear and little power. It proved ineffectual because those it 
condemned ignored it. Yet it busily pressed on, holding hearings in vari-
ous parts of the nation to uncover flagrant abuses of Roosevelt's Execu-
tive Order 8802. In late 1941 and early 1942 the FEPC conducted such 
. hearings in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. In June 1942 the roving 
hearings went to Binningham where acts of discrimination against blacks 
in southem defense industries received a thorough, if largely nnpopular, 
airing. 37 
At the outset Mark Ethridge, a member of the FEPC, attempted to 
assuage tender feelings about mcial integration by observing that "where 
we get into the field of ·emotional tension is where somebody mentions 
social equality, the abolition of Jim Crowism or segregation." The 
36Lester B. Granger, "Barriers to Negro War Employment," Annals of 
the American Academ.y of Political and Social Science, 223 (September 1942), 
72-80. 
37Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 27. 
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members of the committee might have personal ideas on the subject, he 
conceded, but flatly declared that "the committee has taken no position 
on the question of segregation of industrial workers." All the FEPC 
wanted, Ethridge conclude~ was to utilize all the manpower available 
regardless of race, creed, color or national origin. 38 
From June 18 through June 20 the FEPC heard complaints of discrim-
ination against a variety of industries with defense contracts, among them 
Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company of Mobile, Gulf Shipbuilding 
of Chickasaw, Alabama, the Honeycutt Company of Birmingham, Vultee 
Aircraft of Nashville, and the defense training programs in Atlanta and 
Birmingham. 39 As a result, in January 1943 the committee advised these 
concerns to bring their employment policies in line with Executive Order 
8802. 40 
The hearings gmphica.lly illustrated the plight of southem black 
workers but gave only ~ne dimension of the growing problems of regional 
race relations. They presented what amounted to a superficial look at 
one segment of the non-farm black population and did not shed much light 
on the problems faced by many other black southemers. The most telling 
3811supplemental Report of Liaison Officer on Racial Relations in 
Alabama, September 17, 1942," 'WMC, RG 211. 
39The other large industries accused of discrimiilation were Bell 
Aircraft of Atlanta, Delta Shipbuilding of New Orleans, Macvey Ship-
building and Southeastern Shipbuilding, both of Savannah. Hearings at 
Birmingham, Alabama., the United States of America, before the Committee 
on Fair Employment Practice of the President of the United States, June 
18-20, 1942, Series 19, Records Relating to Hearings, Dec. 1941-Mar. 
1946, Records of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice, Record Group 
228, National Archives (hereafter cited as FEPC Records, RG 228. 
40Rucbames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 49. 
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gauge of deteriorating race relations could be found in civilian racial 
violence. 
Beginning in July 1942 a series of mostly "streamlined" lynchings 
occurred, and the composite result heightened tension in Dixie. They also 
foreshadowed the more intense civilian violence of the summer of 1943, much 
in the same way as the military violence of 1942 forewarned of later, more 
serious outbreaks. Together, the civilian and military violence formed a 
picture of weakening tolerance by whites toward what they perceived as 
dangerous encroachments on the color line. 
During the early moming darkness of Sunday, July 19, .1942, a black 
man named William Vinson allegedly stole into the trailer home of a white 
woman near the Red River Ordnance Depot on the outskirts of Texarkana, 
Texas, and attempted to rape her. The woman's screams brought rescuers, 
and Vinson later found himself in the "negro ward" of the city hospital 
after having been shot in the stomach while resisting arrest. The local 
police proved lax in providing a guard for him. 
Shortly after midnight on July 20 a mob of about fifty whites 
stormed the hospital and easily abducted the wounded prisoner. Someone 
tied a rope around his neck and the other end to the rear bumper of an 
automobile. The car's occupants then dragged the soon lifeless body 
through the streets to the Texarkana Cotton-Oil Corporation plant where 
the mob then finished its grisly work by banging the corpse from the winch 
of a loading platfom.41 
41New York Times, July 13, 1942, p. 17; Memorandum, Berge to J. Edgar 
Hoover, July 24, 1942; Press release, Department of Justice, July 24, 1942, 
in Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (hereafter 
cited as Justice Department Records). The records of the Justice Department 
for the World War II years are in the department's possession at its head-
quarters in Washington, D. C. 
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The Vinson incident was one of the few traditional, or blatant, 
lynchings of the war era. Occasionally a complete disregard for secrecy 
characterized a mob that did its best to make a lynching a public spec-
tacle. Brazen murder, however, did not make the task of the Justice De-
partment a:ny easier in finding witnesses or members of the mob. Apparently 
local feeling held that Vinson got what he deserved, so the city police 
made no effort to find the lynchers though they probably knew their iden-
tity. Mayor William V. Brown spoke for many Texarkana whites when he 
blared, "when rapes stop then lynchings will stop. If you don't play with 
fire you will not be bumed." Accordingly, the Justice Department ordered 
the FBI to Texarkana. The Bureau predictably found a conspiracy of silence, 
and after much fuming and fidgeting finally gave up all hope of prosecuting 
under the federal civil rights statute.42 
Perhaps Vinson's death at the hands of a mob, tragic though it was, 
would not have aro~sed much feeling nationwide bad it been an isolated 
incident, but in October came three more deaths by lynching. The resulting 
indignation exhibited by black Americans showed a further loss of inter-
mcial cormmmication as both groups developed decidedly unfavorable per-
ceptions of each other. The violence showed that blacks in southem 
society faced the dismal prospect of being forcibly held behind the color 
line because the society as a whole proved unable to cope with adversity 
or massive change, and that society's reaction was to lash out at the most 
accessible symbol of its woes. 
42Berge to Hoover, July 24, 1942; Berge to Steve M. King, February 
27, 1943, Justice Department Records; William V. Brown to the Reverend 
Ross D. Brown, August 12, 1942, in "Willie Vinson, Texarkana, Texas," 
GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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On October 12 two fourteen-year-old black boys died at the hands 
of a small mob of whites hear Shubuta, Mississippi, located northeast of 
laurel. The two boys, Charles Lang and Ernest Green, startled a thirteen-
year-old white girl while playing near a bridge. The girl was on her way 
home from school and, while the boys and girl knew each other, it is un-
clear why the boys accosted her. Even assuming that the idea was rape 
or assault, neither Lang nor Green touched her. A passing motorist broke 
up the incident and the girl ran away. Shortly afterward the police 
arrested and jailed the boys. That night four or five white men "over-
powered" the jailer, whisked the two .boys from their cell, and drove them 
to the scene of the alleged crime. There they hanged Lang and Green from 
the bridge, mutilating the bodies in the process. That particular bridge 
had become noteworthy as the scene of four previous lynchings.43 
Reaction was swift. The NAACP sent Madison S. Jones to the area to 
question local black citizens, but no one talked. The implied threat of 
reprisals from whites kept mouths closed. The International Labor De-
fense, a communist inspired organization that had helped defend the Scotts-
boro boys in the 193Os, asked Mississippi's progressive Governor Paul B. 
Jolmson for immediate action in the case. Johnson responded by sending 
an investigator to Shubuta, chastising the local sheriff, and making a 
public statement condemning the violence, saying, "every man who helped 
lynch those Negroes is guilty of murder, and I want the public to know 
that the Governor of Mississippi condemns the act and will exert every 
43Pittsburgh Courier, October 24, 1942; White to Biddle and Victor 
Rotnem, November 9, 1942, in "Mississippi Lynchings," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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effort to see that the violated laws of Mississippi are vindicated." The 
Pittsburgh Courier and the liberal New York publication PM collaborated 
in sending a white correspondent, Victor H. Bernstein, to the area.44 
On top of that the FBI put in an appearance. The conspiracy of 
silence transcended racial lines, so agents collected nothing substantial. 
Local whites displayed a certain amount of resentment toward all the out-
siders who converged on Shubuta and its environs, since the lynching case 
was "a local affair." Said one ruffled citizen, "we got our pride, you 
know ... 45 
While the investigations continued and the protests swamped the 
President, the Justice Department, and Governor Jolmson, another lynching 
occurred near Laurel--only thirty miles from Shubuta. In May a black man, 
Howard Wash, allegedly had beaten to death his employer, Clint Welborn, 
a white dairy farmer living in Jones County. Immediately some 75 to 100 
white citizens signed a petition asking circuit Judge F. Burkitt Collins 
to call a special session of circuit court to try Wash, but Collins re-
fused so the trial had to wait until October. The petition indicated 
that feelings ran high over the alleged murder. Judge Collins scheduled 
the trial for October 15. On the 11th a small group headed by a local 
deputy sheriff tried to get Wash released to their custody. 
The trial began in laurel on schedule, and Wash was found guilty. 
Unexpectedly the jury divided over the sentence, life imprisonment or 
44wlute to Biddle and Rotnem, November 9, 1942; Paul B. Johnson to 
Vito Marcantonio, October 14, 1942; Marcantonio to Wilkins, October 15, 
1942, in "Mississippi Lynchings," GOF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, 
October 31, 1942; Jackson Advocate, October 17, 1942; Memphis Commercial 
Appeal, October 14, 1942. 
45Pittsburgh Courier, October 24, 31, 1942. 
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death. Under state law a split like this automatically resulted in a 
life sentence, and when the news hit the streets on Friday, October 16, 
the reaction proved unsettling. Having decided that the jury had not 
meted out the proper punishment for a black man guilty of murdering a 
white, some citizens took matters into their own hands. 
About 10:00 p.m. on October 16 a group of fifty whites gathered at 
Ford I s Store outside Shady Grove, near Laurel. This was the area where 
Clint Welbom had lived, and at least one relative of the dead man was a 
member of the group. The whites formulated a plan of action and drove 
into Laurel to the county jail where Wash was incarce:rated. By about 
11:JO they had surrounded the jail, and the mob had grown to about a 
hundred. The county sheriff, J. Press Reddoch, arrived shortly thereafter, 
and members of the throng tried to get Reddoch's keys to the jail. The 
sheriff, worried about his job, told the mob he would lose it if he tumed 
over the keys. Several of the men continued to threaten him, however, 
saying that they had put him in office in the first place so he should do 
as they asked. Reddoch refused but then fled to call Judge Collins, tell-
ing the jailer as he left not to band over the keys. The mob then broke 
out a window and about fifteen people got inside where they confronted 
jailer Luther Holder. All Holder bad to do to escape was lock himself 
behind a steel door leading to the cells, but instead he meekly gave them 
the keys. Members of the mob then spirited Wash to a waiting car, and the 
procession motored to an isolated bridge several miles from town near 
Shady Grove. At about 1:00 a.m., October 17, the mob slid the noose 
around Wash's neck and heaved his body over the side.46 
46Toxey Hall to Berge, November 10, 1942, Justice Department Records; 
Affidavit of Allen Welborn Pryor, undated, in "Mississippi L;vnchin&'."S." 
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The next day Laurel was swamped by members of the Govemor's staff, 
state police, and state guardsmen, with FBI agents and Justice Department 
investigators on the way. Govemor Johnson, shocked at three lynchings 
within a week in his state, reiterated his stand by declaring that "I am 
opposed to mob violence and will do everything in my power to see that the 
lynchers are prosecuted." The Justice Department had the same thing in 
mind, and Attorney General :Biddle promised "relentless prosecution" if a 
case developed. 47 Judge Collins quickly called a special county grand ju.r.r 
into session. From the 17th to the 19th the jury presumably considered 
returning an indictment, but it issued a report which contained no mention 
of the incident. 48 
While the Justice Department considered its next step the forces of 
civil rights rose up in arms. One group, the National Negro Council, asked 
President Roosevelt to proclaim martial law in Mississippi, pointing out 
that 10 percent of the na_,tion's population should be adequately protected 
from violence by a federal anti-lynching law. The New Republic editorial-
ized that since whites had begun to lose economic control over blacks be-
cause of the manpower shortage and efforts to eliminate discrimination in 
employment, they were attempting "control over the Negro by violence. 11 
The only remedy, it asserted, was for the federal government to stop 
GOF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, October 24, 1942; New York Times, 
April 21, 1943, p. 52; Jackson Advocate, October 24, 1942; Memphis 
Commercial Appeal, October 18, 1942. 
47Pittsburgh Courier, October 24, 1942; Jackson Advocate, October 
24, 1942. 
48New York Times, October 20, 1942, p. 10; Memphis Commercial 
Anpeal, October 20, 1942. 
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"dodging the issue" and take "a strong and bona-fide approach to the prob-
lem." Lester :B. Granger, executive secretary of the Urban League, com-
plained to Governor Johnson that people of both mces were "revolted over 
this mob reversion from civilized standards" and assured him that "Axis 
propagandists are making as profitable use of this happening as they have 
made of other instances of racial conflict." The persistent.NAACP advised 
the White House that "three lynchings within five days in Mississippi are 
as mu.ch sabotage of our nation's war effort as a bomb in an airplane 
factory or a shipyard." Only swift action by the government, warned the 
association, could relieve the plight of black southerners and boost their 
sagging morale •. And Vito Marcantonio, New York's radical gadfly, created 
the "National Emergency Committee to Stop Lynching," inviting a host of 
organizations to join.49 
These and other expressions of outmge, together with the Justice 
Department's surprising fortitude, carried the Wash case to new levels of 
importance. Following several weeks of FBI probes a break ca.me. Allen 
Welborn Pryor, a cousin of Clint Welborn and a member of the mob that 
lynched Wash, confessed to his part in the crime to two FBI special investi-
gators. Although insisting that he bad not touched Wash nor taken an active 
part in killing him, Pryor revealed the names of other conspirators in the 
crime and gave incriminating details. On December 11, Francis :Biddle 
49New York Times, October 20, 1942, p. 10; "Ba.ck to Lynching," 
New Republic, November 2, 1942, pp. 560-61; "The Mississippi Condemnation," 
Opportunity, 20 (November 1942), 322; Press release, October 19, 1942, in 
"Mississippi Lynchings"; Marcantonio to Arthur B. Spingarn, October 19, 
1942, in "National Emergency Committee--Vito Marcantonio, Chairman," GOF, 
NAACP Papers. 
called a federal grand ju.cy into session to begin hearings in early 
January 1943 at Jackson.SO 
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The prosecution, assisted by special counsel fmm Biddle's office, 
hoped to bring an indictment on two counts: conspiracy to induce the police 
to aid in depriving Wash of legal protection, and conspiracy to deprive 
Wash of his life without due process of law. Their hopes materialized 
when on January 12, 1943, the grand jury indicted four whites on the first 
count and these four and jailer Luther Holder on the second count. The 
five men were only a fmction of the hundred-member mob, but the Justice 
Department proved satisfied anyway since the indictments paved the way for 
the first federal court case since 1903 in which whites were charged with 
lynching a black man.51 
In early April the defendants were armigned in federal court at 
Hattiesburg, and the trial began on April 19. Judge Sidney Mize received 
not guilty pleas from all five men on trial, and amidst extreme tension 
the story unfolded. 52 The prosecution relied on the presentation of highly 
damaging evidence. The defense chose the old ploy of bawling over states' 
rights, and in one instance the chief defense attorney wailed that "the 
people of this great Southland. are on trial •••• It is just another 
50Biddle to Roosevelt, December 11, 1942, Justice Department 
Records; Pryor affidavit, undated, NAACP Papers. 
51Rotnem to Frank Coleman, January 7, 1943, Justice Department 
Records; Transcripts of indictments, U.S. v. Shotts, January 7, 1943, in 
"Wash, Howard, re: Lynching of," LF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, 
January 23, 1943. 
52rt is-unclear why Allen W. Pryor confessed, allowing the F.BI to 
develop a case against him and the others and then pleaded not guilty in 
federal court. 
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effort ••• to see how much further we of the South will pe:cnit inva-
sion of states' rights."53 
For some reason, presumably lack of evidence, the charges against 
two of the men were dropped, so when Judge Mize sent the jury to its de-
liberations on April 23 the fates of Luther Holder, Barney Jones, and Allen 
Pryor were at stake. The next day the verdict came in--not guilty. In 
spite of ironclad evidence and irrefutable testimony the question of 
states' rights clearly affected the jury's decision.54 
If the Wash case had provided the Justice Department with a :rare 
opportunity to test the Fourteenth Amendment against lynchers in federal 
court, the episode that followed it proved even more promisingo Yet the 
lynching of Robert Hall epitomized both the reaction of local whites to 
perceived or real black advancement and the frustration of federal authori-
ties. In early January 1943 Robert Hall, a black mechanic in Newton, 
Georgia (near Albany), fell from the grace of the local law. Claud Screws, 
Sheriff of Baker County, personified the legal system in the predominantly 
rural area. Hall procured a pistol, an act considered dangerous by whites, 
and Screws commandeered it. But Hall committed a further breach of racial 
etiquette when on January 19 he went before the Baker County grand jury 
and got his pistol returned by court order. Screws apparently decided to 
teach Hall a lesson, providing an example for other blacks in the vicinity. 
On the night of January 29, Screws manufactured a warrent for Hall's arrest, 
53Pittsburgh Courier. April 17, 24, 1943; May 1, 1943; New York 
Times, April 21, 1943, p. 52. 
5~ew York Times, April 24, 1943, p. 28; April 25, 1943, p. 37; 
Pittsburgh Courier, May 1, 1943. 
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charging him with stealing a truck tire. Screws• two companions, police-
man Frank Jones and special deputy Jim Bob Kelley, got Ball out of bed on 
this pretext and arrested him. At the courthouse Screws began to beat Ball 
over the bead, and even as be slumped to the ground all three men continued 
to beat him. After fracturing his skull, the whites dragged_ the near 
lifeless body from a pool of blood up the stairs and through the court-
house to the jail. Screws phoned for an ambulance to take the victim to 
Albany, but Hall died en route to the hospital.55 
On February 12, after a Baker County grand jury failed to return 
an indictment, the Justice Department requested an FBI investigation. 
Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge outlined the facts in the case 
to Francis Biddle and added that from the condition of the body Jones and 
Kelley may have tied Hall to the back of their car when they arrested him 
and dragged him the four miles into town. Berge recommended a federal 
grand jury investigation to be undertaken in tandem with the Wash triai. 56 
On April 10 a federal grand jury in Macon indicted Claud Screws and 
his two companions, Jones and Kelley, on charges of violating Sections 
51, 52, and 88 of the U. s. Code. Again, the essential violation was the 
deprivation of life without due process of law. Since there was no federal 
lynch law, the Justice Department stretched civil rights statutes derived 
from the Fourteenth Amendment over a wide variety of criminal acts. The 
55Alba.ny Herald, April 11, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, February 13, 
20, 1943; "Summary of Facts," unidentified report on Robert Hall case, 
Justice Department Records; Francis Biddle, "Democracy and Racial Minori-
ties," Common Ground, 4 (Winter 1944), 9. 
56Pittsburgh Courier, November 6, 1943; Berge to Wilkins, February 
25, 1943, in "Ball, Robert--Lyncbing," GOF, NAACP Papers; Memorandum, 
Berge to Biddle, March 20, 1943, Justice Department Records. 
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Department's chief of the Civil Rights Section, Victor W. Rotnem, alluded 
to perhaps the main reason for so vigorous a prosecution in cases such as 
this when he said that the Hall incident "is being promptly prosecuted and 
so neither Nazi nor Japanese propagandists have had opportunity to make 
international capital of this unfortunate incident. 0 57 
In October a district court convicted Screws, Jones, and Kelley, 
and the three immediately appealed the decision. The prosecution welcomed 
the appeal, for having dropped further prosecution in the Wash case it 
wanted this one to reach the highest court. Assistant Attorney General 
Tom C. Clark even recommended a direct appeal to the Supreme Court for 
expediency's sake. Instead, the case next appeared before the Fifth U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans. At issue was whether or not the 
federal government had jurisdiction in the case. The defense argued that 
the trial should take place solely within the state court system. The 
prosecution, of course, argued that Screws and his cohorts acted "under 
color of law" in depriving Hall of constitutionally guaranteed rights, so 
the case belonged in the federal courts. Here, as in the Wash case, the 
Justice Department wanted to test the federal civil rights statutes before 
the Supreme Court. If they withstood the test, a significant precedent 
could be set. On January 14, 1944, the circuit court of appeals upheld the 
convictions, setting in motion the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 58 
57Pittsburgh Courier, April 17, 1943; Albany Herald, April 11, 1943. 
Prosecutions under the federal peonage statute, 14 Stat. 546, were also 
justified by the propaganda threat. Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: 
Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana, 1972), 179. 
58Pittsburgh Courier, April 17, 1943; November 6, 1943; December 25, 
1943; January 22, 1944; "Memorandum for the Solicitor General," from Tom 
C. Clark, September 9, 1943, Justice Department Records, Screws v. U.S., 
140 F 2d 662 (1944). 
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As the appeal pended, Screws posted $7,500 bond, left his cohorts 
in jail, and returned to Baker County where he ran for and won renomina-
tion as sheriff. Having been renominated he was virtually assured of 
victory in the general election. This action by the voters of :Baker 
County served as a measure of indignant independence against the en-
croachment of the federal goveD'.llllent.59 
On May 7, 1945, in a five to four vote, the Supreme Court reversed 
the convictions and remanded the case to the Georgia state courts. In 
the majority opinion Justice William O. Douglas commented that the real 
problem was one of jurisdiction, noting that "the administration of criminal 
justice rests with the States except as Congress ••• has created of-
fenses against the United States." District Court Judge Bascom J. Deaver, 
moreover, bad not properly instructed the jury in the October 1943 case. 
In the dissenting opinion Justice Frank Murphy complained that "Robert Hall 
has been deprived not only of the right to be tried by a court mther than 
by ordeal. He bas been deprived of the right of life its elf." The ver-
dict should be upheld, he observed, if for no other reason than the fact 
that "not even the semblance of due process has been accorded him. 1160 
After this decision the whole case fell apart. A retrial in Novem-
ber 1945 resulted in Screws, Jones, and Kelley being acquitted of Ball's 
death, which had occurred almost three years before. The Justice Depart-
ment must have been deflated, for tbe civil rights statutes bad failed the 
test. The death of Robert Hall remained unavenged, and though Hall's 
59Pi ttsburgh Courier, March 18, 1944. 
60 
Screws v. U.S., 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945). 
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widow might not have understood the legal jargon and jockeying that sur-
rounded her husband's name, she understood all too clear~y that the men 
who killed him returned to Baker County as heroes for winning over out-
"d . t f 61 s1 e in er erence. ---Together with the rise of violence involving military personnel, 
the rash of lynchings du.ring the last half of 1942 and early 1943 clearly 
showed the further deterioration of southern race relations. No matter 
where the fault lay the increasing incidence of violence by whites against 
blac~s belied whatever attempts people made to soft-pedal the issue. 
Northern violence, such as the Sojourner Truth housing riots in Detroit 
and higlµ.y publicized examples of discrimination in employment, such as 
the labor-related dispute at the Sun Shipbuilding plant in Chester, Penn-
sylvania, proved that racial oppression did not stop at the Ma.son-Dixon 
Line. Yet southerners knew that the situation was worsening, and concemed 
blacks and whites knew action bad to be ta.ken to avoid a bloodbath. 
On October 20, 1942, only three days after the Howard Wash lynch-
ing, a group of southern black leaders met secretly in Durham, North Caro-
lina. These men knew that blacks as the minority would always be the 
losers if relations remained strained or worsened. The conference con-
sisted chiefly of prominent black educators, labor leaders, and representa-
tives. of southern civil rights groups who hoped to find answers to prevent 
the violence from escalating. Philip :B. Young, editor of the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide, served as chairman. The group produced a statement 
61Pittsbu.rgh Courier, November 10, 17, 1945; The other southern 
lynching of 1943 occurred on June 16 when four masked men took Cellos 
Harrison from his Marianna., Florida, jail cell and clubbed him to death. 
Guzman, Negro Year :Book, 302-11. 
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known as the Articles of Cooperation which articulated the views of the 
men regarding such sensitive issues as political and civil rights, in-
dustry and labor, education, agriculture, military service, and social wel-
fare. Essentially conservative in tone, the statement nonetheless recog-
nized that blacks in the South should be afforded the basic rights to 
which they aspired. "The war has sharpened the issue of Negro-white rela-
tions in the United States, and particularly in the South," it declared. 
J...n airing of blacks' views on the problems confronting racial hannony, 
therefore, was both timely and necessary. "The correction of these prob-
lems," the group concluded, proved "not only a moral matter, but a practi-
cal necessity in winning the war.and in winning the peace. Herein rests 
62 the chance to reveal our greatest weakness or our greatest strength." 
The Durham conference probably reflected the southern black point 
of view as well as a:ny other wartime meeting. While not overbearing in 
tone, the conference's statement remained insistent in voicing alam and 
calling for immediate steps to ease the tension. The Articles of Coopera-
tion did not bear the militant tones of the NAACP or the northem black 
press. Bather, it sought.fimly to suggest that black advancement should 
be met with understanding by whites, and the gap between doctrine and 
practice in fighting against oppression should be closed. In short, it 
was not a militant document, but it did carry an air of urgency in the 
wake of racial outbreaks throughout the region. 
Shortly thereafter a more spectacular, if largely symbolic, event 
occurred which further pointed up the effects of worsening race relations. 
62 Johnson, To Stem This Tide, 131-39; New York Times, November 7, 
1942, p. 13. 
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On January 31, 1943, William H. Hastie resigned as civilian aide to the 
Secretary of War in protest against the military's casual disregard for 
his office and treatment of black servicemen. The immediate cause of his 
resignation was the revelation by the Army Air Force in December 1942 that 
it intended to set up a segregated officer training school at Jefferson 
Barracks, Missouri. Hastie had worked hard for the elimination of segre-
gation in officer training programs, and the military had begun to respond. 
With this announcement, all the more difficult to swallow since he had 
been kept in the dark throughout the pla.nn:i.ng stage, it appeared that 
the military was retrogressing. 
The Jefferson Barracks controversy was only the latest in a series 
of problems Hastie had encountered. He grew tired of being ignored since 
his office had been created for the specific purpose of reviewing all 
military actions regarding blacks. He had fought against the creation 
of the all-black Tuskegee pilot training base and for improvements in Army 
camps where blacks were victimized by racism. Yet his efforts appeared 
worthless in the end. His resignation made him a martyr in the eyes of 
many blacks who sympathized with him and knew painfully well of his tor-
ment. Truman K. Gibson, Jr., an assistant under Hastie, replaced him as 
civilian aide. As a result of the publicity generated by Hastie's resigna-
tion, the Amy Air Force quietly dropped the Jefferson Barracks plan. 
Otherwise the military establishment generally shrugged off Hastie's 
complaints or made token changes. 63 
63chicago Defender, February 6, 1943; Lee, Employment of Negro 
Troops, 162-78. 
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As these events transpired during the first months of 1943, white 
southern moderates and liberals attempted to come to grips with racial 
problems. These men, active in their quest for civil rights and noted 
for their moderation, personified a slender tie across the color line. 
By 1943 they perceived the gravity of the racial situation and sought to 
educate the public on the causes and consequences of this critical atmos-
phere. Their rationale, however, differed from that of their black 
counterparts. 
In an early 1943 Atlantic Monthly article, the moderate Richmond 
journalist Virginius Dabney warned that a small group of "Negro agitators" 
and another equally small contingent of "white rabble-rousers11 were pushing 
the country closer to an interracial explosion "which may make the riots 
of the First World War and its aftemath seem mild by comparisono" Part 
of the problem lay in extremism on both sides, and he cautioned extremist 
civil rights groups that "only impractical idealists will contend that 
deep-rooted feelings and attitudes, acquired over centuries of usage, can 
be suddenly done away with." The solution could wait if "the disturbil"ig 
elements on both sides of the color line can somehow be muzzled for the 
duration [of the war], and if the slow but certain processes of evolu-
tionary progress can function. 1164 
Jolm Temple Graves of the Bi:rmingham Age-Herald proved even more 
pointed in his analysis, attributing much of the problem to sensationalis-
tic black northem leaders. "They make it plain that they intended to use 
the war for settling the whole, complicated, infinitely delicate :racial 
64virginius Dabney, "Nearer and Nearer the Precipice," Atlantic 
Monthly, 171 (January 1943), 94, 100. 
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problem," he complained. Under the circumstances, this made as much sense 
to Graves as if they had said that "because America's house was on fire 
America must take the occasion for renovating the kitchen or putting 
Venetian blinds in the pa.rlor. 1165 
The eminent sociologist Howard W. Odum, however, placed the problem 
in a clear and balanced perspective in an analysis of racial tension when 
he observed that "even though there would be no inclination on the pa.rt 
of many southerners to deny the great distance between what the South was 
doing and what needed to be done, nevertheless the psychology of the sudden 
impact of criticism and accusation, when the South bad thought it was going 
forward, was the key to the speed and intensity of reaction."66 
These southern spokesmen expressed explicitly and implicitly the 
lack of understanding between blacks and whites. Both sides knew the size 
and scope of the problem but differed as to its explanation or how to 
approach it. Some, like Dabney and Graves, retreated from fo:rmer convic-
tions by chastising proponents of immediate change as a threat to the 
nation's war effort. They failed, as had others, to see that by primarily 
blaming blacks for the violence and the potential disruption of the war 
effort they were only looking at half the question, because southern 
whites represented a basic part of the problemo 
Their alaxm over worsening race relations was genuine, so on April 
8, 1943, 115 white leaders met in Atlanta to consider both these general 
issues and the Durham Conference's Articles of Cooperation. Ralph McGill, 
65Graves, The Fighting South, 120-21. 
66 
Odum, Bace and Rumors of Race, 16-17. 
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~ditor of the Atlanta Constitution, chaired the session which issued a 
statement agreeing with the articles but reiterated that the solution 
"will be follll.d in evolutionary methods and not in ill-founded revolution-
ary movements which promise immediate solutions." They obviously wanted 
a solution of southern problems generated and carried out by southerners 
without a:ny outside interference. 67 
The Durham and Atlanta conferences brought the ticklish race prob-
lem into the open. While the viewpoints varied, both conferences recog-
nized the ominous racial situation and offered suggestions. These meet-
ings convened in direct response to the violence which had escalated since 
1940 and which, if ignored, could seriously damage the war effort as well 
as the livelihood of southerners. later in the year members of the two 
groups would meet together, and the result would be the creation of the 
Southern Regional Council in early 1944. 
Yet time was running short. Such incidents as the Alexandria riot 
and the Mississippi lynchings had by the spring of 1943 painted a graphic 
picture of frightening proportions. Steps by the War Department, Justice 
Department, civil rights organizations, and interested _parties failed to 
stop increasing racial violence. Violence involving military personnel, 
lynchings, rural tension, friction in public t:cansportation, Negrophobic 
southem politics, the breakdown of local law enforcement, and the spectacu-
lar displays of an increasingly powerful NAACP and like-minded groups all 
contributed to a tension-ridden atmosphere by mid-1943. Race relations 
steadily deteriorated during 1942 and the first few months of 1943 to the 
67Jobnson, To Stem This Tide, 140-42. 
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point that general and widespread violence, earlier of no concern,became 
a real and disturbing fact. The United States was moving, in the words 
of Virginius Dabney, "nearer and nearer the precipice." 
CHA.Pl1ER IV 
"S:HX;REGA.TION ALWAYS MEANS DISCRIMINATION" 
By the spring of 1943 the United States reached a decisive juncture 
in its pursuit of victory. The Japanese offensive had been checked and 
with the defeat of the Imperial Navy at the Battle of Midway and the re-
capture of Guadalcanal Island the war outlook brightened. At the same 
time the Allies had soundly defeated the "Desert Fox,'' Erwin Rommel, in 
North Africa. Heartened, the nation awaited the next move--the invasion 
of Sicily. Concurrently, the "arsenal of democracy" worked furiously to 
supply its men overseas, _and by mid-1943 war production for the first 
time ran efficiently. In the midst of this din the nation's race relations 
reached the precipice. From May through August, cities, towns, and mili-
tary installations in the South and across the country suffered from 
:racial explosions. Racial violence reached the point that, for the first 
time, it threatened to disrupt the war effort, though the signs of its 
coming had been clear enough since 1940. The first of these conflagra-
tions came on May 25 in a choked war production center, Mobile, Alabama. 
Jolm Dos Passos, the well-known literary figure whose radicalism 
mellowed during the war, passed through Mobile in March 1943, providing a 
graphic description. "The mouldering old Gulf seaport with its ancient 
dusty elegance of tall shuttered windows under mansard roofs and iron lace 
overgrown with vines, and scaling colormades shaded by great trees, looks 
1 trampled and battered like a city that's been taken by storm." The storm 
1 Jolm Dos Passos, State of the Nation (Boston, 1944), 92. 
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had mged since 1940 in the form of tremendous population growth. In April 
1940 metropolitan Mobile contained 114,906 people, 42,518 (37 percent) of 
whom were black; by the end of 1943 the population soared to 201,369, of 
whom 57,372 (29 percent) were black. This represented an overall growth 
of 60.9 percent, a rate unmatched by a:ny other metropolitan district in 
th t . 2 e na ion. 
As a measure of the federal government's alarm over Mobile's condi-
tion, the new Committee for Congested Production Areas declared the city 
a member of its "most critical" list, a dubious distinction it shared with 
sixty-seven other cities. The committee, established on April 7, 1943, 
consisted of, among others, members of the Bureau of the Budget, War and 
Navy Departments, War Production :Soard, and War Manpower Commission. Cre-
ated to coordinate the activities of various federal agencies in congested 
areas and in so doing to alleviate the most pressing difficulties, the 
committee must have developed a collective headache when it looked closely 
at Mobile's problems. 3 
In the first place, the city had drawn "primitive, illiterate back-
woods people" from surrounding rural counties. These individuals, facing 
a mode of life quite different from the one they had been mised in, became 
2u. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Wartime 
Changes in Population and Family Characteristics, Mobile Congested Pro-
duction Area: March, 1944," Population--Special Reports, Series CA-2, 
No. 1 (Washington, 1944), 2. · 
3111ist of Areas Certified by Federal Agencies as Critically Con-
gested," Series 14, Records Relating to Undesignated Congested Production 
Areas, 1943-44, Congested Production Areas Records, RG 212; U.S., Con-
gress, House, Hearings before the Committee on Labor, House of Representa-
tives, on H. R. 3986, H. R. 4004, and H. R. 4005: :Sills to Prohibit Dis-
crimination in Employment :Because of Race, Creed, Color, National Origin 
or Ancestry, vol. 1, 78th Cong., 2d sess., facing p. 134. 
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"hostile, defiant, suspicious and terrified." Of the "undisciplined 
hordes" that inundated the city du.ring the first two years of the war, 
most swarmed in from southem Alabama, western Florida, and southeastern 
Mississippi. The thousands of blacks who made up a goodly proportion of 
this growth hailed from the same areas as well as from Louisiana and 
Tennessee. 4 
Additionally, wartime production within Mobile's boundaries bad 
ballooned to sizeable proportions. From 1940 to 1944 defense contracts 
in these industries totaled almost $397 million, 99 percent of which went 
for shipbuilding and repair. The largest single beneficiary, the Alabama 
Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company (ADDSCO), saw its employment rolls rise 
from less than 2,000 to about 30,000 by mid-1943. Similarly, the smaller 
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation increased its employment from 240 to 11,600, 
and a variety of light industrial plants that produced fabricated steel, 
ammunition, and lumber produqts grew proportionately. The percentage of 
those employees who were black, however, varied from 8 percent to 21 per-
cent, with an average of only 16 percent, despite the government's efforts 
to utilize all sources of manpower. ADDSCO counted about 7,000 blacks 
on its rolls but, as in most other area industries, virtually all served 
in unskilled positions such as janitors and helpers. Finally, a new Army 
Air Force installation, Brookley Field, added to the congestion since it 
4Agnes Meyer, Joumey Through Chaos (New York, 1944), 202-3, 210; 
Charles s. Johnson and Clifton R. Jones, "Memorandum on Negro Internal 
:Migration, 1940-1943," Johnson Papers, Box 376; unidentified memorandum 
in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 28, Office Files of Wilfred C. 
Leland, Jr., Consultant, Oct. 1943-Aug. 1945, FEPC Records, RG 228. 
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represented a source of employment for 16,000 persons by mid-1943.5 
This tremendous growth, generated mainly by the expansion of war-
related activities, created severe difficulties in Mobile (Figu.re 1). 
At large industrial plants like ADDSCO, the amount of labor turnover some-
times reached the alarming figure of 2 percent or more weekly. In such 
instances the workers filtered in and out of town, creating confusion in 
housing, transportation, and manpower allocation. Housing proved one of 
Mobile's most critical problems. One government report complained that 
living conditions "have not been conducive to efficient operations. Work-
men sleep in automobiles, trailers or crowded rooms," and the rthot bed" 
system, whereby different people slept in the same bed at different shifts, 
proved common. The bus system and other transportation modes carried 
thousands more than they were designed for, and about 20 percent of the 
autos used by workmen in war plants lay idle because of their inability 
to get tires. Recreation facilities became increasingly crowded, and 
many workers and their families clogged the streets in search of diver-
sions. The fuel problem at times grew so acute t:tat some war workers 
applied for releases from their jobs because of it. The disease rate 
remained a matter of concern. The number of hospital beds in late 1942 
averaged only 1. 7 per thousand when the war standard was 4.0, and a short-
age of physicians and other medical personnel also prevailed. The water 
511Mobile Area, Alabama, February 18, 1944," in "Negro Problems--
Mobile," Series 28, FEPC Records, RG 228; "Survey of the Mobile Employment 
Stabilization Plan, July 26, 1943," in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports, Labor 
Mobilization and Utilization Employment Siabilization--Alabama," Series 
11, WMC Records, RG 211; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statist.ics, Employment and Outlook Bmnch, Impact of the War on the Mobile 








Figure 1. ~p of Mobile, Alabama. 
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supply, sewer system, and condition of streets languished under the heavy 
burdens imposed by the war. The police force consisted of only 125 men 
to serve a population that had skyrocketed by 61 percent. In short, con-
ditions proved pitifully inadequate, with many of the most essential ser-
vices crumbling under the weight of the war boom. 6 
Amidst this situation the city's black population attempted to eke 
out an existence. Blacks composed about 30 percent of Mobile's population 
in 1943. The working force within this group bad been pulled out of the 
depression (in a manner of speaking) by the war boom. While jobs existed, 
however, most blacks found themselves in unskilled or semi-skilled posi-
tions, since whites feared black economic advancement and the loss of 
their cheap labor force. The policy of hiring blacks for menial jobs 
proved widespread in most of Mobile's war industries, a problem the FEPC 
and War Manpower Commission (WMC) sought to correct with mixed results. 
Living conditions, bad enough for whites, were worse for blacks. Housing 
was at a premium since the city bad not built enough low-cost housing to 
accommodate the influx of working class citizens, and the available hous-
ing in 1943 sometimes appeared unfit for human habitation. As usual, 
black residents were restricted to certain portions of the city, in this 
case the traditional areas north and south of the downtown district. 
6"La.bor Market Developments Report for the Mobile Area, State of 
Alabama, October 28, 1942," in "Labor Demand and Supply Reports, Mobile," 
Series 12, Reports, Analyses, Compilations, State and Area Reports and 
Analysis Divisions, 1943-1945, WMC Records, RG 211; "Developing Situa-
tion--War Production Area, Mobile, Alabama, October 21, 1942"; "Mobile 
Area, Alabama, February 19, 1944," in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 
28, FEPC Records, RG 228. 
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Transportation and other public facilities remained inadequate for 
the large number of blacks, and segregation ordinances prohibited them from 
even standing in aisles ahead of the jim crow dividing line when the buses 
became crowded. In fact, the bus system in Mobile had been a sore spot 
since the war began. In Augu.st 1942 Private Henry Williams, a black sol-
dier from Brookley Field, got into a verbal altercation with a bus driver, 
whereupon the driver shot and killed him. Acts of beating and abusing 
blacks became so common aboard buses that in late 1942 the city forced 
the drivers to dispense with carrying firearms as bad been their recent 
practice. Anti-black sentiment bad grown during the war, especially since 
the influx of rural whites brought more provincial attitudes to the area. 
Congestion forced the two groups to coexist in closer proximity to each 
other, so heightened tension automatically resulted. 
Though seen by many blacks as highly beneficial, the city's NAACP 
chapter also increased friction. Founded in 1925, the Mobile branch by 
1940 had developed into a highly visible symbol of black pride. John 
LeFlore, a singularly fortitudinous individual who served as executive 
secretary of the branch and as chairman of the Regional Conference of 
Southern Branches, provided the driving force of the organization. He 
doubled as a correspondent for the Chicago Defender and the Pittsburgh 
Courier and was among a handful of prominent southern black leaders who 
widely publicized their drive for the abolition of segregation and dis-
crimination. LeFlore ceveloped contacts not only with other black organi-
zations but also with members of local offices representing federal 
agencies. He mastered the art of being conciliatory when necessary yet 
forceful when provoked in an effort to gain political and economic 
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advancement for black Mobilians during what many perceived as a period of 
opportunity. 7 
One of LeFlore's chief projects was the elimination of job discrim-
ination in local defense industries. Yet he did not wage this struggle 
alone. The FEPC, the Maritime Commission, and the WMC had paid consider-
able attention to hiring and employment practices in Mobile's largest 
industry, ADDSCO, since the June 1942 FEIPC hearings in :Birmingham. Since 
1938 the shipyard's workers had been represented by the CIO's Industrial 
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (IUMSWA). It re-
mained one of the few southern yards where the IOMSWA had won bargaining 
rights, and with the CI0 1 s moderate policy toward minorities the labor 
situation there seemed more tolerant of blacks. Very few of the ship-
yard's 7,000 blacks, however, worked in skilled positions; instead, they 
served mainly as janitors and helpers, and occasionally in semi-skilled 
jobs. The ADDSCO management implied that a lack of training for blacks 
provided the main reason for the dearth of skilled black workmen, but in 
fact the yard actively imported white skilled workers from other areas 
while the large number of potential black workmen, many of whom were skilled, 
languished in menial positions. 8 
70some Problems of the Negro in Mobile, October 9, 1942," Surveys 
Division, Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Infomation, Government 
Reports Records, RG 44; Melton A. McLaurin, "Mobile :Blacks and World War 
II:· The Development of a Political Consciousness," in Gulf Coast Politics 
in the Twentieth Centu , ed. Ted Camgeorge and Thomas J. Gilliam 
Pensacola, 1973, 47-50; Pittsburgh Courier, September 12, 1942. 
8Herbert Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro (New York, 1944), 
225; Frederic C. Lane, Shi s for Vic to : A His to of Shi build· Under 
the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II Baltimore, 1951, 252-53• 
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On November 19, 1942, as a result of the Birmingham hearings, the 
FEPC ordered ADDSCO to upgrade and train black workers. A])DSCO responded 
by increasing the number of blacks on its payroll but did little more. 
In the meantime the FEPC officials responsible for working on the problem 
of job discrimination in the South monitored the situation. As 1943 
appeared, the manpower shortage in Mobile had grown so acute that the 
Maritime Commission, whose responsibility included overseeing the pro-
duction of ships at yards like ADDSCO, and the WMC joined the FEPC in 
urging the upgrading of black workers. The IUMSWA endorsed this plea, 
though the white membership at the yard appeared less than enthusiastic 
about the idea. 9 
On May 3, 1943, Burton R. Morley, area director for the WMC, wrote 
A])DSCO General Manager John Griser about a plan he and members of other 
agencies had fo:rmu.lated for training and employing skilled blacks on the 
shipways. The plan called for two ways to be manned exclusively by blacks, 
with skilled workers included. Morley added that the WMC "is not in a 
position to urge that you do assign two ways to colored men, but it does 
feel that the proposal is a step in the right direction." He concluded 
by asking Griser to confer with him, representatives of the union, and 
91a.wrence M. Cramer to Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corpora-
tion, November 19, 1942; "Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," in 
"Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co.," Series 25, Central Files of the 
FEPC, Aug. 1941-Apr. 1946, FEPC Records, RG 228; Northru.p, Organized 
Labor, 225-26; Merl A. Reed, "The FEPC, the Black Worker, and the Southem 
Shipyards," South Atlantic Quarterly, 74 (Autumn 1975), 454-55. The 
union leadership accepted the use of black skilled workers as a matter 
of practicality in employing all available sources of manpower. Many 
white union members, however, proved hostile to the prospect and apparent-
ly triggered considerable friction within the union's local membership. 
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other groups before actually implementing the plan. 10 
Days passed without a response. Irked, Morley wrote Griser again 
on May 20, reminding him that "we did ask ths.t you let us know if it were 
to be done," and wondered "if the Company has reached a decision in the 
matter." In a curt reply, ADDSCO informed Morley on May 22 that the ship-
yard planned to place black welders with whites on four ways at its Pinto 
Island yard beginning May 24. This contradicted Morley's original pro-
posal, and it involved the risk of reprisals if the white workers objected 
to skilled blacks in their midst. Fu.rthermore, ADDSCO did not announce 
the forthcoming change, so when twelve black welders appeared on the 
graveyard shift, they came as a complete surprise to the whites. 11 
The next morning, May 25, the shift changed, and the welders were 
replaced by other blacks. Word spread across the yard as daylight ex-
posed what had happened, and grumbling began. At about 9:30 a.m. violence 
erupted. Rather than the black welders themselves being the victims, the 
janitors and helpers who ordinarily flocked around the hulls found them-
selves being beaten and chased. Since this part of the shipyard lay on an 
island, the blacks did not have the opportunity to run away. Instead, the 
drawbridge, tunnel, and ferryboat system connecting the island with the 
other part of ADDSCO's operation on the mainland afforded the only means 
of escape as 500 to 1,000 whites struck at fleeing blacks with pipes, 
tools, and fists. 
10Morley to Griser, May 3, 1943, in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports: 
Labor Mobilization and Utilization, Women, Alabama," Series 11, WMC Re-
pords, RG 211. 
1~orley to Griser, May 20, 1943; B. C. Knerr to Morley, May 22, 
1943, ibid. 
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In many cases, such as that of Alice Gamble, workers knew nothing 
of the riot until black people began streaming past their work areas. M:cs. 
Gamble stood gawking at the sight when a white man struck her in the back 
and warned, "get going, nigger. This is our shipyard. 11 L. T. Welch, 
working in an engine room on one of the hulls, knew nothing until he 
clambered to the ground and beard the command, "nigger, jar the ground"; 
someone smashed a board across his face for good measure. Zenith Dock 
experienced the full force of the affray. While Dock was busily engaged 
in his duties as a chipper, a group of whites pounced on him and beat him 
senseless. A white foreman intervened and saved bis life. 12 
Others shared similar vicissitudes as they fled from their attackers. 
A good many blacks, seeing wba t was happening, managed to escape wi thou.t 
being injured. Thomas Johnson, for example, saw eight or ten whites 
chasing a black man, then another group beating a black woman. Without 
investigating further, he fled with a trail of flying objects close behind. 
During the episode about fifty blacks received injuries. Reports of blacks 
being thrown into the Mobile River and drowned circulated widely, but no 
one cou.ld substantiate them. The riot ended only when law enforcement 
officials arrived, and ADDSCO sent the black employees home, leaving the 
whites in the yard. 
As soon as word reached the city and state governments that the 
riot bad broken out, members of various groups rapidly converged on the 
scene. Police Chief Dudley McFayden and Sheriff William Holcombe mobilized 
their scanty forces to assist the beleaguered blacks in getting out of the 
yard. Apparently the yard police either stood by or participated in 
1211Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228. 
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chasing blacks, so they proved worthless in containing the violence. The 
state police sent in about forty officers, but they were inadequate as a 
protective force even when coupled with the 140 city and county authori-
ties. Since the violence endangered government property, Govemor Chauncey 
Sparks issued orders to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Joerg of the Alabama 
State Guard at 10:30 a.m., and within a short time five companies had 
embarked for the area from Andalusia, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa to rein-
force the Mobile contingent. This represented an increase in the force 
of about 200 men. Officials also called in federal troops from Breckley 
Field, while the small Coast Guard unit in Mobile began plying the waters 
between Pinto Island and town, prepared to board the ferries if trouble 
developed. 13 
By noon the riot had ended, and over 400 enforcement officers were 
on band in the shipyard. The troops from :Brookley Field erected signs 
reading: "United States troops are here to protect government property 
and to see that there is no interference with the war effort." They re-
mained as conspicuous as possible, even though no blacks dared retum to 
the yard. To keep tempers from flaring anew, an AFL official issued a 
statement telling all black AFL-affiliated workers in other parts of the 
city to go home for the time being. The city closed all liquor stores in 
Mobile and :Baldwin counties and shut down all bars until the crisis passed. 
1311confidential Survey Report on Manpower Utilization at Alabama 
Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corporation, Mobile, Alaooma," in "Manpower 
Utilization Report--Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corp., Mobile, 
Alabama," Series 21, Regional and State Office Manpower Utilization and 
Occupational Analyses, Reports, and Case Histories, 1943-1945, WMC Records, 
RG 211; "Report on Riot Duty, Mobile, Alabama, June 10, 1943," in "Report--
Riot Duty Mobile, 1942-45," Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal 
General, Record Group 389, National Archives (hereafter cited as Provost 
Marshal General Records, RG 389); Mobile Register, May 26, 1943. 
116 
Most officials recognized the intensity of local tension and took these 
protective steps to avoid a repetition of the Pinto Island riot elsewhere. 
Clearly, an affmy not geographically restricted to an island could assume 
much more serious proportions. 
Govemor Sparks sent two representatives to Mobile with the authority 
of the govemor's office to act as coordinators in maintaining stability. 
D.R. Dunlap, President of ADDSCO, issued an ameliomtive statement saying 
that "armngements have been made to guard the yards with an ample force 
and military personnel if necessary. No further trouble is expected." 
Meanwhile, Charles Hansen of the IlJMSWA complained that the riot "was 
wholly unnecessary. We claim there were some agitators out to sabotage 
the war effort. All I can say is that it was a great day for Hitler and 
the Mikado." Finally, two city commissioners issued a fmntic appeal in-
tended to assuage feelings, directing Mobilians to "go about your business 
unexcited, remain calm on the home front and refuse to join crowds that 
try to congregate about the streets or in public places." Several sources 
urged the governor to declare martial law but he declined. 14 
Although in the immediate wake of the violence utter confusion 
prevailed, by the next day various offices and agencies began to collect 
themselves. At ADDSCO work continued but at a slackened pace, since none 
of the yard' s black workers retumed. In fact, within a few days the 
local office of the WMC received applications from about 1,000 black 
employees asking for release from their jobs and transfer to other locations. 
1~obile Register, May 26, 1943; New York Times, May 26, 1943, 
P•. 25. 
117 
One a:ngry citizen capsuled the mood of many black Mobilians when he com-
plained that "it's pitiful to see what we colored workers have to go 
through with in Mobile. We colored workers are buying bonds, paying 
victory tax, income tax, and taking all kinds of chances with our lives"; 
but, the shipyard worker concluded, violence seemed to be the only re-
ward.15 
John LeFlore of the NAACP busied hilnself during the immediate after-
math of the riot by taking depositions from injured blacks and assisting 
the efforts of two FEPC field investigators, Clarence Mitchell and Ernest 
Trimble. This inquiry lasted from May 27 through Jv.1ay 31, and during tba t 
period the agents held meetings with a variety of prominent black leaders 
as well as with victims of the violence. At the same time Franklin O. 
Nichols of the National Urban League undertook his own investigation in 
mu.ch the same manner as did the FEPC officials. He spent a week in Mobile 
talking with black citizens and with representatives of management, labor 
and the federal agencies involved. In a summary to the national office 
he assigned a large share of the blame for the violence to ADDSCO, noting 
that the management should have been aware of heightened tension and acted 
accordingly. Dismissing subversive influence as a cause of the outbreak, 
Nichols noted that a conspiracy by some reactionary organization like 
the League to Maintain White Supremacy could have been responsible, but 
1"Anonymous letter to "News Editor of the Pittsburgh Courier, 11 May 
28, 1943, in "Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co.," Series 25, FEPC 
Records, RG 228; Press release, May 27, 1943, in "Speeches by Members of 
Regional Office Staff and Other Material: Negro Manpower--Inactive File--
FEPC, 11 Series 17, Speeches by Members of Regional Office Staff and Other 
Materials, WMC Records, RG 211. 
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certainly no alien influence was at work. Other investigations ca.me to 
similar conclusions, though the rationales varied somewhat. 16 
While inquiries continued the FEPC, Maritime Commission, WMC, and 
IUMSWA frantically sought both stability and a solution to the problems 
that bad caused the riot. 17 The first action from the WMC's office came 
on May 26 when in a less than cordial letter to ADDSCO, :Burton Morley 
disclaimed responsibility for the riot. "Since this office was not con-
sulted at all in regard to the present proposal," he complained, "I 
think it only fair to say that the responsibility for its adoption rests 
entirely with the Company." Having absolved himself and the WMC of com-
plicity, Morley proceeded to cooperate with ADDSCO in trying to rectify 
the situation. That same day blacks met under police protection and with 
the city's permission in a mass meeting to discuss the prospects of getting 
back to work. Speaking for ADDSCO, C. Y. Hall of the personnel department 
assured the workers that the situation bad calmed considerably. Police 
Chief McFayden also spoke, emphasizing that the police would continue to 
18 protect them. The general consensus reflected a desire to get back to work. 
1611Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228; 
Guichard Parris and Lester Brooks, Blacks in the Cit : A Risto of the 
National Urban League (Boston, 1971, 298; "Summary of a Report on the 
Race Riots in the Alabama. Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company Yards in Mobile, 
Alabama," in "Mobile, Alabama, Riot, 1943 (Report)," Papers of the National 
Urban League, Series I, Box 34, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as 
Urban Leagu.e Papers). The League to Maintain White Supremacy was a :Bir-
mingham-based organization created in 1942 to oppose the equal opportunity 
efforts of the FEPC and other federal agencies. Its activities we.re con-
fined to Alabama. 
17on May 27 the President issued Executive Order 9346 which created 
a new FEPC as an independent agency within the Office of Production Manage-
ment. Its new head was Monsignor Francis J. Haas. The new committee re-
ceived its baptism quickly in dealing with the Mobile incident of the 25th. 
Rucba.mes, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 56, 58-59. 
1~obile Register, May 27, 28, 1943. 
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On the 27th when a number of blacks reported for work, several 
hundred whites walked out of the yard. Hostility had apparently not sub-
sided, and likely only the presence of federal and state troops prevented 
another outbreak. Having already lost over 160,000 manhours to the vio-
lence, officials shuddered at the thought .of more disruptions. 19 Accord-
ingly, on May 28 representatives of the WMC, FEPC, Maritime Commission, 
and Navy met to discuss a solution that ADDSCO might find acceptable. 
This meeting featured a discussion of the riot and its causes and then 
some bandying about of ideas to alleviate the problem. Captain W. K. 
Graham of the Maritime Commission commented that in his opinion whites 
simply would not accept skilled black workers "even if they are 10 miles 
away." The discussion then degenerated into a squabble over authority 
20 and jurisdiction, so nothing of substance emerged. 
That afternoon federal officials met with representatives of the 
shipyard and union. Captain Graham, Jolm Griser, and Burton Morley joined 
Charles Hansen of the IOMSWA and FEPC investigators Clarence Mitchell and 
Ernest Trimble, among others. Graham, presiding, reviewed the various 
suggestions and noted that he personally favored Hansen's proposal to re-
move the black welders until an educational program for the whites could 
be completed. The FEPC representatives protested that there was no time 
for such a program, that .A])DSCO bad had since late 1942 to develop a pro-
gram, and that the FEPC would insist on immediate upgrading of the blacks. 
19Morley to Griser, May 26, 1943, in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports: 
Labor Mobilization and Utilization, Women, Alabama," Series 11; Press 
release, May 27, 1943, WMC Records, RG 211. 
20Mobile Register, May 28, 1943; "Field Investigation Report, 
June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228. 
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Morley, on the other hand, wanted segregated shipways where blacks would 
completely man a certain number of the ways and whites exclusively man the 
others. Griser objected, complaining that such a project was impractical. 
Yet, he admitted, if the company pulled the welders off the ways and an 
educational program were started, the whites who had opposed the promo-
tion of blacks would interpret this as a victory. When skilled workers 
were reintroduced in the future, therefore, the same thing that occurred 
on May 25 might happen again. 
Realizing that the FEPC was not going to retreat from its stance, 
Griser then proposed that a mass meeting be held without delay to announce 
a plan of segregating the four ways at the north end of the yard. These 
ways lay isolated from the other construction areas, so that if the plan 
were implemented skilled black workmen could be employed without risking 
further white reprisals. This in effect represented a compromise posi-
tion, for it would not constitute integration. Griser asked the FEPC to 
"close its eyes" to this technicality, for skilled blacks would still be 
used in ship construction in accordance with FEPC wishes. To underscore 
the necessity of prompt action, G:rabam stressed that the White House "did 
not want any back-tracking" on the issue of skilled blacks on the ways 
and wanted the matter cleared up as soon as possible. After more dis-
cussion involving technicalities, the committee drafted a proposal embody-
ing the four-shipway solution for Washington's approval. The meeting then 
adjoumed, having lasted six hours. 21 
21~fobile Register, May 28, 1943; "Field Investigation Report, June 
8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228; "Report on the Situation at Alabama Dry-
dock and Shipbuilding Company," in "Monthly Mopac Area Reports: Labor 
Mobilization and Utilization, Women, Alabama," Series 11, WMC Records, 
RG 211; Reed, "Black Worker and Southern Shipyards," 456-57. 
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On May 29 the FEPC investigators met with R. :B. Chandler of the 
Mobile Register and received from him a pledge of full cooperation. In 
fact, Chandler had, since the 26th, run editorials that castigated the 
rioters, implored the rumormongers to stop aiding Hitler, and criticized 
local judges for not fining more heavily a variety of persons charged with 
misdemeanors in connection with the riot or with failing to obey the "move 
on" ordinance recently passed by the city to avoid loitering near the 
shipyard. For this last act a judge cited Chandler for contempt of 
22 court. It was Chandler's bard-bitting editorials that helped bring many 
people back to their senses, especially when on May 29 he offered $1,000 
to anyone who could prove that a:ny deaths had occurred during the riot. 
"Rumors and lies, spread by idle tongues and empty heads, continue to whiz 
over the telephone wires, across the back fences and up and down the 
streets," he charged. His paper was putting up the money as a reward "to 
a:nyone who can present proof. o • that a single person was killed in the 
racial conflict," and he stood confident "that this reward will never be 
collected because the rumors ••• have been thoroughly investiga.tedo 1123 
The next day, May 30, the mass meeting at ADDSCO took place. Some 
300 or 400 workers heard pleas and assurances from Colonel Joerg of the 
State Guard, Franklin Nichols of the Urban League, John LeFlore of the 
NAACP, Charles Hansen of the union, and Clarence Mitchell of the FEPC, 
2211Field Investigation Report, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228; 
Mobile Register, May 26-31, 1943. Chandler refused to apologize to Judge 
Tisdale J. Touart, so in mid-June Touart fined him $10 and sentenced him 
to six hours in jail as a mild rebuke. 
2~obile Register, May 29, 1943; June 8, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, 
June 19, 1943. 
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among others. A show of hands revealed that most workers wanted to get 
back to their jobs. 24 
The text of the segregation agreement, however, was not made public 
either to the workers or to anyone else while officials awaited approval 
from Washington. This caused considerable acrimony among the shipyard's 
management, WMC, and the Maritime Commission, the last of which for some 
reason remained adamant about maintaining secrecy. On June 2 approval 
came. In a confidential telegiaII1 to John Griser, FEPC chairman Francis J. 
Haas agreed to the proposal to segregate four shipways as "a practical 
settlement of the existing situation." Haas couched the approval in terms 
which made it clear that the FEPC expected A.DDSCO to employ blacks in all 
skilled positions and not simply stop at the minimum requirements. l3u.t 
the proposal even then remained shrouded in secrecy. Some authorities 
charged that ADDSCO did not want the workers to know that the agreement 
bad not kept the full spirit of the FEPC's original wishes, while the WMC 
complained that Captain Graham wanted the agreement kept secret until the 
workers had somehow been informed. Of course, the latter had become rest-
less since everyone knew an agreement had been reached but no one gave 
out details. 25 
In a June 4 press release the War Manpower Commission unexpectedly 
disclosed the outlines of the agreement which naturally came over the 
wires to Mobile and ended up in the Register. ADDSCO officials, incensed 
2~ltimore Afro-American, June .5, 1943; "Field Investigation Re-
port, June 8, 1943," FEPC Records, RG 228. 
2511Report on the Situation at Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Com-
pany," WMC Records, RG 211; Haas to Griser, June 2, 1943, in "Negro Prob-
lems--Mobile," Series 28, FEPC Records, RG 228; New York Times, June 13, 
1943, p. 34. 
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at this move, issued a bulletin that same day which, incredibly, forbade 
employees, whether on or off the job, from reading any newspaper except 
the company's publication, Fore and Aft. "You are paid by the United 
States to bend every effort to win the war and there is no excuse what-
ever for defrauding the government in this manner," the bulletin charged. 
This outrageous order naturally heightened interest in discovering the 
details of the proposal to solve the yard's racial problems. Finally, 
on June 8 the Office of War Information (OWI) released the full text of 
the ADDSCO-FEPC agreement, but instead of renewing tension the ship-
yard's workers promptly accepted the proposal and returned to their 
. b 26 
JOS. 
In the meantime city and state officials and the White House were 
inundated with protests. Everyone, it seems, proved ready to wag an 
accusing finger, but no one accepted the responsibility. Mobile police 
eventually booked three whites on felony charges, two for assault with 
intent to murder and the other for complicity in inciting the riot. Aside 
from this and the fining of a few others, Mobile's law officers failed to 
take responsibility for seeking out the guilty and meting out punishment. 
In a variety of official and unofficial investigations, the blame was 
directed at ADDSCO, the FEPC, the union, subversive influence, or con-
gested conditions. Assigning blame, however, did not alter the fact that 
a race riot bad occurred or that segregation had been approved by the 
26Tennie Dejarnette to Morley, June 4, 1943; Undated memorandum by 
Harvey Allen, in "Speeches by Members of Regional Office Staff and Other 
Material: Negro Manpower--Inactive File--FEPC," Series 17, WMC Records, 
RG 211; New York Times, June 13, 1943, Po 34; Mobile Register, June 8, 
1943. 
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federal agency created in part to oversee equal employment opportunities 
for blacks. 27 
John LeFlore led the protesters in a telegram to Francis J. Haas. 
"Your letter June seventh keenly disappoints in that you indicate approval 
of plan meaning little or nothing toward providing equal opportunity," he 
complained, adding sarcastically that acceptance of the proposal "obvi-
ously shows a different policy than the ••• Committee when composed of 
former members." The NAACP called on Haas and WMC head Paul V. McNutt 
to revoke the agreement, maintaining that any such compromise "would be 
disastrous at this stage of the war." The Pittsburgh Courier, upset over 
the dangerous precedent that the FEPC had set, charged that the "four 
jim-crow" shipways constituted a surrender "to the Nazi racial theory 
and another defeat for the principle embodied in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence." The segregation proposal limited the number of skilled posi-
tions to approximately two hundred, as well as the type of skilled work 
required, chiefly welding and shipfitting, because only bare hull con-
struction was slated for the all-black ways. Interior and superstructure 
construction would be done elsewhere. "Here is proof," reproved the 
Courier, "that segregation ALWAYS means discrimination. 1128 
Haas replied to this storm of criticism by meekly observing that 
"the committee cannot give its approval to the complete segregation of 
27Mobile Register, May 28, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 19, 1943; 
July 31, 1943; Birmingham World, June 8, 1943. 
28LeFlore to Haas, June 11, 1943, in "Alabama Dry Dock and Ship-
building Co.," Series 25; G. F. Floyd to John A. Davi_s, February 10, 1944, 
in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 28, FEPC Records, RG 228; "Along the 
NAACP Battlefront, 11 Crisis, 50 (July 1943), 212; Pittsburgh Courier, 
June 19, 1943. 
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Negroes• four ways and does not consider that as a precedent." The 
fact remained, however, that despite an overall increase in the number of 
skilled blacks from none to about two hundred, the foremost federal agency 
in the realm of equal job opportunities had approved a proposal which did 
not square with its enunciated aims. The FEPC had simply bowed to local 
pressure and in so doing lost a measure of respectability. 29 
On June .5 Govemor Sparks relieved the seven state guard companies, 
and five days later, over the objections of Jolm LeFlore, the federal 
troops moved back to Brookley Field. As far as the state was concemed, 
the danger had passed, and the shipyard's activities retumed to normal. 
The term "normal," however, meant the bustle and congestion of an essenti-
ally abnormal era. Within three weeks after the May 2.5 disturbance, ADDSCO 
was clamoring for 5,200 additional workers in an area unable to serve those 
who had already migmted to the city. 30 
ADDSCO had the last word on the segregation proposal. The north 
end of the shipyard, where blacks had been relegated in the controversial 
decision of May 28, never contained four full ways. In early 1944 the 
FEPC leamed that the "four shipways" consisted in reality of two full 
ways and two half ways. Because of the difficulties encountered in con-
structing stem sections on the half ways and full hulls on the others, 
29statement by Haas, July 8, 1943, in "Speeches by Members of 
Regional Office Staff and Other Material: Negro Manpower--Inactive File--
FEPC," Series 17, 'WMC Records, RG 211. 
30"Report on Riot Duty, Mobile, Alabama, June 10, 1943," Provost 
Marshal General Records, RG 389; Boyte Austin Presnell, "The Impact of 
World War II on Race Relations in Mobile, Alabama, 1940-1948" (M.A. Thesis, 
Atlanta University, 1972), 14; LeFlore to Brig. Gen. James A. Mollison, 
June 10, 1943, in Papers of the Mobile Branch, NAACP, University of South 
Alabama Library, Mobile; "Estimate of In-Migration into the Mobile, Ala-
bama Labor Market Area During the Six Months Beginning June 1, 1943," in 
"In-Migration--Alabama, Mobile," Series 12, WMC Records, RG 211. 
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construction moved slowly. Griser placed the blame for this problem on 
the black workers and not on the shipway arrangement. Yet the FEPC could 
do little about the situation. The black press, disgusted at the news, 
accused AI>DSCO of reneging on its agreement, but the complaints fell on 
deaf ears. 31 
An ironic footnote to the Mobile story occurred du.ring the last 
week in May 1944, a full year after the riot. Elack workers established 
an ADDSCO record when they completed the tanker S.S. Tu.le Can..yon in 79 
days, and in disgust a number of white workers quit their jobs. Rumors 
of another riot floated across the area since blacks had bettered the 
white record, and AJ)DSCO alerted Erookley Field and state forces in the 
fear that one might materialize. It did not, but tension lingered in the 
shipyard. Mobile bad not seen the end of interracial violence. 32 
As events were to prove, the Mobile riot began the storm of out-
breaks that enveloped the South and much of the rest of the nation during 
the summer of 1943. The foreboding clouds bad begun to build up in 1940, 
and the next two years witnessed isolated yet significant incidents. Con-
ditions in Mobile were replicated in dozens of other production centers, 
and by May, though few saw it coming, widespread and destructive discord 
proved inevitable on both the civilian and military scenes. Elacks bad 
not only begun to achieve a modicum of economic advancement but they bad 
3111confidential Survey Report on Manpower Utilization at Alabama 
Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corporation, Mobile, Alabama," \a/MC Records, RG 
211; "The Industrial Front: Employment," Monthl} Summary of Events and 
Trends in Race Relations, 1 (February-March 1944, 3-4; Davis to Malcolm 
Ross, February 18, 1944, in "Negro Problems--Mobile," Series 28, FEPC 
Records, RG 228. 
32chicago Defender, June 19, 1944. 
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also grown more assertive in their demands for equal opportunity and, 
whether southern or northern, had actively pointed up the difference 
between the nation's enunciated aims of liberating the oppressed overseas 
while tolerating racial oppression at home. The Mobile riot sparked a 
violent period in which whites would attempt to disabuse southern blacks 
of any notions concerning equality. The spectre of a nation torn by in-
ternal strife came close to reality as the summer progressed and as the 
experience of Mobile was repeated in more destructive fashion in both 
large and small cities. 
The Mobile riot illustrated not only white intolerance but also 
the fumbling actions of the federal government in trying to keep control 
of a volatile situation. The FEPC, WMC, and others lacked the fortitude 
necessary to effect permanent gains for blacks, apparently out of fear 
that such changes might spark violence of catastrophic proportions. In-
stead, the federal agencies involved seemed to prefer temporary solutions 
as a way of ridding themselves of complex problems. Admittedly, the FEPC 
did not possess the clout it needed to enforce permanent solutions, but 
it, along with other governmental representatives, surrendered to segre-
gation and in effect subverted the quality of human life to the production 
of war goods. Perhaps the situation was really too critical to try to 
effect permanent changes for southern blacks, but, more to the point, the 
FEPC and the others failed to press for even moderate advances when the 
opportunity to do so appeared. 
The chief question in the wake of the Mobile riot was not why it 
occurred, but why it was not more destructive and why the incident was 
not duplicated again and again in the city during the vra.r. Perhaps the 
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physical restriction of Pinto Island prevented the violence from spilling 
into other sections. Violence did continue in Mobile, producing the 
Brookley Field riot of 1944. Yet in the final analysis the situation 
could have been much worse. Conditions prevailing in Mobile could have 
spawned a series of incidents that might have disrupted the city from 
mid-1943 to the end of the war. That this did not occur was largely due 
to the strong and effective leadership of men like R. B. Chandler, who 
risked being sent to jail in order to help stifle dangerous rumors, mili-
tate for strong legal action, and defuse a volatile situation. Other 




"THERE EXISTS A DANGER" 
In the immediate aftermath of the Mobile riot a number of racial 
clashes occurred in and aronnd military camps in the South and across 
the nation. These incidents reflected the same causal patterns as 
civilian violence in that they occurred largely in response to extremely 
tense conditions created by the war effort. The summer of 1943 provided 
the most intense violence of the war era in both the civilian and military 
spheres, as each fed on the other to form a general situation of crumbling 
race relations. Civilian violence emanated from the determination of 
southern whites to reverse the advancement of blacks and to stop the 
growth of black assertiveness which had become increasingly evident and 
presumably dangerous since 1940. In military violence, however, another 
aspect of the same general problem emerged. Black soldiers, especially 
those stationed in the South, reached the brink of impatience in response 
to steadily worsening conditions. As the cutting edge of racial mili-
tance, they led the assault against the "savage ideal." Military racial 
violence during mid-1943, then, proved to be another outgrowth of the 
overall tension which threatened to disrupt the American war effort. 
Military violence emerged from a variety of causes, not the least 
of which was the War Department's "hydra-headed racism" that sprang from 
ignorance of and insensitivity toward the special problems black Gis 
faced. On the one hand, it assumed black inferiority, at least in 
soldiering, responsibility, discipline, and command. This produced a 
general assessment that since blacks did not make good soldiers they 
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should not be utilized as combat troops, but inst~ad, most should serve 
in non-combatant roles. On the other band, the War Department expected 
blacks to perform equally with whites and at the same time to accept im-
plicit and explicit discrimination. For blacks to perfonn on the same 
level with whites, therefore, demanded that they ignore prejudice, racism, 
inferior training, hostile white officers, stationing in southern camps 
where traditional racial mores held sway, and the Anny's attitude that 
blacks could not succeed because of their inferiority. Although the War 
Department realized the need for black manpower, it minimized the role of 
black troops, and the black soldiers knew it. In their estimation, each 
instance of white civilian violence attracted little more than passing 
glances from the Anny, despite the efforts of William Hastie, Truman 
Gibson, Benjamin O. Davis, and a handful of others to make black soldiers 
believe they constituted an important element in the war effort. When 
mutinies began to erupt in 1943, however, the Anny reacted with great 
alacrity to such an internal threat, and invariably placed the blame for 
such incidents solely on blacks' shoulders. By 1943 black Gis increas-
ingly took matters into their own bands, and while they intended their 
protests to show their dissatisfaction with discrimination, in the estima-
tion of the War Department it only reinforced the negative view of black 
troops. 
Revenge against racism formed :part of the explanation for the mu-
tinies of the war era but not all of it. In some cases blacks reacted 
with violence almost as if it constituted the only recourse; in reality, 
more peaceable measures might have effected changes. The perpetrators 
of the mutinies cannot be absolved of responsibility. Yet the War 
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Department chose to stereotype black soldiers as troublemakers and in the 
process did the vast majority of them an injustice. Desperation among ~7 
many blacks in the military seemed to provide the key to explaining the 
upsurge of mutinous conduct during and after mid-1943. Such incidents as • 
the Raymond Carr and Thomas Foster shootings, the Fayetteville and Alexan-
dria riots, and the innumerable acts of degradation against blacks· pro-
pelled many to resort to violence in utter desperation. For them violence 
did not embody radicalism; it represented a struggle for self-respect and 
even survival. Whites, however, including many in the War Dep:i.rtment, saw 
such violence as a distinct threat to the war effort. Southern whites, 
moreover, believed that mutinies endangered not only the war effort but 
also the color line, contra.dieting the ingrained notion of black passivity 
and inferiority. Once again, two sepa:rate and alien perceptions of the 
same problem prevailed along racial lines. 
The disorders of mid-1943 and afterward differed from those of the 
preceding war years. As the nation's race relations deteriorated, mili-
tary violence proved more likely to involve larger numbers of men. It 
also tended to occur more in the camps themselves than in nearby towns. 
The violence and its afte:rmath reflected not only the breaking point of 
black Gis toward the southern racial system but also the end of the War 
Department's passivity as it watched military violence escalate. Courts-
martial resulted though they bad been used rarely for such incidents 
earlier in the war. The most important and telling difference, however, 
was that black soldiers were more likely to be the aggressors; in many 
cases they reached the point where violent outbursts seemed the only 
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recourse against real or perceived oppressive conditions. 1 
Black aggression in military violence during the twentieth century 
had few precedents. Until recently the Brownsville raid of August 1906 
appeared to be a matter of black military aggression against the racial 
oppression forced upon them by white Texans. Even though recent scholar-
ship on the subject has absolved the 25th Infantry Regiment (Colored) 
of complicity in the raid, the conditions it underwent at Fort Brown 
proved similar to the situation in southem camps during World War II. 
The Houston affray of August 1917 proved a clearer example of black mili-
tary violence against blatantly oppressive conditions. Men of the 24th 
Infantry Regiment (Colored) descended upon downtown Houston in retalia-
tion against a series of incidents that had driven them to despair. Even-
tually sixty-three men faced court-martial, and the War Department exe-
cuted thirteen of them on the basis of a controversial trial and review. 2 
The same t:ragic situation recurred during World War II from the ., 
i 
spring and summer of 1943 through 1944. These incidents did not command V 
the publicity given the Brownsville and Houston episodes, because the 
nation's eyes were riveted on the international scene; no isolated inci-
dent emerged to attract people's undivided attention. During mid-1943, 
scores of military-related racial incidents erupted from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific, most of them in the South. From May through July the riots 
in Camp Van Dom, Camp Stewart, and near Camp McCain g:raphically illus-
trated the despair black Gis displayed. 
1 
Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 366. 
2 
See Weaver, The Erownsville Raid, and Haynes, A Night of Violence. 
I! 
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The military violence of the preceding years, the Gurdon incident, 
the Alexandria riot, and the Raymond Carr case, had aroused considerable 
attention. Unfortunately, the War Department expressed little interest. 
Concerned whites and blacks saw the dangers that lay ahead, and no one 
was in so unique a position to perceive these dangers as the former 
civilian aide to the Secretary of War, William H. Hastie. On May 29, 
1943, Hastie reported to the National Lawyers Guild that "civilian vio-
lence against the Negro in unifom is a recurrent phenomenon. It may well 
be the greatest single factor now operating to make 13,000,000 Negroes 
bitter and resentful." Hastie also pointed out that the Army "is ag-
gressively engaged in teaching our soldiers how to treat people abroad--
the people of India, the South Sea Islanders, the Arabs, every one but 
their own fellow American soldiers," and he warned that "there is no 
reason to believe that the 1943 record will be any better. 113 
' I 
Hastie's report presaged the resumption of violence in the military 
by only one day, for on May 30 discord erupted at Camp Van Dom, Missis-
sippi. The camp lay near the small town of Centreville in the extreme 
southwestern section of the state, cradled to the west and south by 
Louisiana. Designed to house and train a division, about 6,500 black 
troops formed part of Van Dom's complement. Among the black uni ts was 
the 364th Infantry Regiment, activated in March 1941. The regiment had a 
history of trouble, beginning with its initial training at Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina. Though its members were chafing to go overseas, the 364th 
' 3wnliam H. Hastie, "A Report on Civilian Violence Against Negro 
Soldiers, Submitted to the National Executive Eoard of the National Lawyers 
Guild, May 29, 1943," in "Judge Hastie," LF, NAACP Papers. 
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bounced around the country. While stationed at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 
in May 1942, local officials charged three of its members with raping a / 
white woman. A court-martial convicted them and sentenced them to death. 
Although the sentences were later commuted, the storm of protest sur-
rounding the case and the corresponding publicity inflamed the feelings 
of many 364th soldiers. In November 1942, while at Papago Parle in Phoenix, 
Arizona, soldiers of the 364th got into a fight with a group of black MPs, 
resulting in three deaths and fifteen injuries. The regiment then re-
ceived a new commander and executive officer. In May 1943, in a move that 
the men of the 364th considered as punishment for their past record, the 
Amy sent the llllit to Camp Van Dorn for retraining in preparation for 
overseas duty. Ey this time the unit had developed a negative attitude, 
and the War Department correctly regarded it as a problem outfit. 4 
The 364th arrived at Camp Van Dorn in two separate contingents, the 
first on May 26, the second on the 28th. Immediately the men looked with 
disdain upon their new assignment. Centreville contained only 1,200 people, 
and the nearest cities were forty or fifty miles away. The area lacked 
adequate recreational facilities, and prevailing segregation patterns 
both on and off base consigned blacks to the worst areas. As soon as the 
troops began to arrive, trouble developed. Some of the men reportedly 
bragged about how they were going to "take over" the camp, Centreville, 
4John Ray Skates, Jr., "World War II and its Effects, 1940-1948, •(~) 
in A Histo of Mississi i, vol. 2, ed. Richard Aubrey McLemore , _ ./ 
(Hattiesburg, 1973, 122; Motley, Invisible Soldier, 60; Capt. Elmer P. 
Gibson to Truman K. Gibson, Jr., July 14, 1943, in "Camp Van Dorn, Miss.," 
CASW Records, RG 107; Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 366-67; Pittsburgh 
Courier, June 12, 1943; September 5, 1943; October 23, 1943. 
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and the whole state. This kind of talk understandably ala:rmed the in-
habitants of the town as well as other troops at Van Dorn. 
On May 27, a day after the arrival of the first contingent, members 
of the 364th invaded the jim crow service club and rendered themselves 
obnoxious by refusing to remove their hats, wearing their uniforms in 
illegal fashion, swearing, and drinking beer. The next night a group from 
the 364th broke into the post exchange and ransacked it, causing several 
hnndred dollars damage. The exchange had been temporarily closed because 
of previous interracial difficulties, and the troops apparently retali-
ated by breaking in. On the night of May 29, members of the 364th drifted 
through Centreville cursing the townspeople, and MPs escorted them back 
to camp. From an administrative point of view, these incidents reflected 
the reprehensible actions of a group of misfits, while from the soldiers' 
point of view they served notice that blacks would no longer accept suf-
focating degradation as long as they were in uniform. They apparently 
thought that the only way to get the attention of higher-ups was to act in 
a boisterous manner.5 
The breaking point for the 364th came on Sunday, May 30. late 
that afternoon a group of about seven soldiers from that unit went AWOL. 
The men were walking along Highway 24 toward Centreville when two white 
MPs drove by in a jeep. Sergeant Charles Hix, one of the MPs, upbraided 
the blacks for their sloppy attire, ordering several of them to put on 
their ties and otherwise straighten up; he then ordered Private William 
5Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 368; Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Virgil 
L. Peterson to the Deputy Chief of Staff, June 8, 1943, in "Violence 
Against Negro Military Personnel," CA.SW Records, RG 107. 
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Walker to roll down his sleeves and button them, but Walker re.fused, say-
ing "I don't think I have to." Hix repeated his order, and once again 
Walker refused to comply. The MP then reached for his billy club and 
started to get out of the jeep, later recalling that "I was either going 
to make him straighten his unifo:rm or arrest him." Walker realized that 
he was in for a beating, so he punched Hix in the mouth and grappled 
with him in the jeep. The other MP alighted from the jeep but was re-
strained from aiding Hix by the other blacks who asked him to let them 
fight it out. Hix, receiving the worst end of the fight, admonished the 
other MP to "shoot this damned nigger," but he did not intervene. 
About one hundred yards down the road, Sheriff Richard Whitaker, 
Chief of Police R. J. Knighton, and a deputy sat in their car talking. 
They noticed the scuffle and decided to investigate. Whitaker offhandedly 
remarked that "it looks like some drunk, I guesso" When they arrived on 
the scene, Knighton drew his gun and ordered Walker to get out of the jeepo 
He complied but then started toward Whitaker who waited until the soldier 
was two or three steps away and then shot him. After loading the dead man 
into the jeep and transferring him back to camp, Hix reportedly_bragged, 
"I just got me another nigger and now I reckon I get my transfer." The 
other MP replied, "you ought to get a gold medal for that."6 
As word spread around camp, tempers began to flare. The J64th's 
commander, Colonel John F. Goodman, quickly realized the gravity of the 
situation, especially in light of past events. He immediately ordered 
6Testimony of R. Whitaker, R. J. Knighton, Sgt. Charles E. Hix, 
Pvt. Leslie H. Milburne, Pvt. Arthur L. Owens, and Pvt. Morgan Franklin, 
June 1, 1943, in "Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records, 
RG 107. 
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all company commanders to keep a close rein on their respective units 
and then went to the barracks of Company A, Walker's unit. He found the 
company in an uproar, with men milling around and threatening to break 
into the supply room. Goodman ordered the firing pins removed from all 
rifles in the supply room and a strengthened guard stationed there. 
\. While he tried to calm the men of Company A, a group from Company C 
stormed the supply room before the firing pins could be removed. These 
men, along with several hundred others, gathered and threatened a gerleral 
outbreak. A detachment of black MPs arrived and were ordered to fire 
into the crowd in an attempt to stand them off. Only one man was woundedo 
Good.man and the regimental chaplain, Captain Elmer Gibson, rushed to the 
scene and through their presence averted open rebellion. Goodman's high 
reputation among the men proved itself, and his pleas calmed them down. 
The soldiers returned to their barracks and were confined to the campo 7 
Thoroughly alamed, whites armed in preparation for a bloodbath, 
while the Inspector General of the Anny, Virgil L. Peterson, ordered a 
complete investigation. The War Department recognized this instance of 
I,/ 
black aggression as a dangerous development, so it determined to take more 
severe action than it had in earlier incidents. While the investigation 
progressed, white Mississippians complained. The townspeople of Centreville 
agreed that the 364th and perhaps all black soldiers should be removed from 
the South without delay. The War Department assured Senator James O. Fast-
land that the situation was under control and that "the worst possible 
solution of this problem would be to transfer this organization to another 
7Peterson to Deputy Chief of Staff, June ~.8, 1943, ibid. 
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station" as the senator requested. The 364th would not cause further 
trouble since "a t:raining progmm is being prescribed for this organiza-
tion which will keep the men exceedingly busy." A white citizen of Drew, 
Mississippi, complained to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that "the negro 
soldiers stationed in Mississippi have been raping our women and murder-· 
ing our men" and that "the only safe course for us to pursue is to secede 
again from the United States and join Mexico." This individual concluded 
by advising Hull that "when the North gets ready for another Civil War--
give the negro the vote in the South. 118 
On June 8 the Inspector General in a memo:randum to the Deputy 
Chief of Staff revealed the results of the investigation. The action of 
the 364th was technically a mutiny. This brought the incident clearly 
within the jurisdiction of the War Department, unlike previous incidents 
of white civilian aggression against black soldiers. Yet General Peterson 
assumed in his recommendations that the blacks gene:rated the Camp Van Dom 
discord by themselves, ignoring injustices by whites. Eecause of this 
assumption and the fact that Peterson could punish no one outside the 
military establishment, he made the unusual recommendation that the 364th 
be placed "in such a disciplinary state that it will make known the re-
maining ringleaders and trouble-makers within the unit." Such action, he 
concluded "will bring home to other colored organizations where unrest is 
prevalent and mutinous conduct is smouldering that the Army is prepared 
to take vigorous disciplinary action to suppress such cond.uct. 119 
8
Ibid.; Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney to James O. Eastland, June 9, 
1943; R.R. Green to Cordell Hull, June 10; 1943, AG 291.2, RG 407; 
Pittsburgh Courier, July 10, 1943. 




Hearing of this report, Truman Gibson, the acting qivilian aide to 
the Secretary of War, lodged a complaint with the department. Gibson 
naturally sided with the Inspector General in his condemnation of the 
364th1 s mutinous action and in the punishment meted out, but he strongly 
disagreed with the implication tmt blacks in the Army were generally 
mutinous and unruly. "Despite the very high regard and respect I have 
for the Inspector General," Gibson observed, "I wish to respectfully 
disagree with his sentiments, particularly because they represent, per-
haps, the majority opinion in the Army." Harsh and repressive measures 
constituted no solution to a very complicated problem. "Such an approach 
assumes that Negroes are primarily to blame for all disturbances," an atti-
tude that Gibson did not share. Black troops were on the one hand being 
trained as combat soldiers, he declared, while on the other hand "they 
are generally told to 'remain in their places' in the South. This warning 
bas a meaning bitterly clear to most Negroes." Blacks would no sooner 
accept discriminatory treatment than would any other group. 10 
As soon as the men of the 364th realized their punishment would - ,? 
keep them in Mississippi, their foul disposition turned even more hostile. 
On the night of June 3, men from this unit and others broke up a dance at 
the service club by refusing to pay admission, overwhelming the club 
assistants, and pouring in through doors and windows. Black MPs and a 
white detachment from the 99th Infantry Division cleared out the mob which 
numbered about 2,000. Upon hearing of this incident, the War DeIS,rtment 
restricted the 364th to Camp Van Dom and in early 1944 transferred the 
1°i1emorandum, Truman K. Gibson to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Jnne 
15, 1943, ibid. 
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unit to the Aleutian Islands where it performed garrison duties for the 
rest of the war. 
The Camp Van Dom mutiny and the other actions by members of the 
364th reflected indefensible terrorization and misconduct and did nothing 
to improve the public or the Army's estimation of blacks as soldiers. 
This unit had a history of troublemaking before it came to Mississippi, 
and while the Amy_clearly made a mistake in assigning the unit to a deep 
South post, the actions of the regiment reflected more than a protest 
against discrimination and racism. The regiment's impatience with second-
class treatment while serving in the armed forces of the "arsenal of 
democracy" certainly affected their thoughts and actions. Yet the 364th's 
conduct perhaps reflected an adolescent state of mind, a general disregard 
of the law, and even a concerted effort to get out of the Amy by breaking 
military regulations whenever possible. A few habitual law-breakers with-
in the unit could have affected the actions of other men, or the 364th's 
actions may have emanated from a consuming hatred of some of its white 
officers, who in tum might have tried to make life miserable for their 
men. Fortunately, the 364th represented the exception rather than the 
rule among black units. Yet its conduct tainted others with the reputa-
tion of misfits and malcontents. Regrettably, the 364th reinforced the 
War Department's low estimation of black soldiers. Such an attitude died 
bard, for it bad been the conventional wisdom since the American Revolu-
tion. What a recent work on World War I concluded about that era certainly 
carried over to World War II, that the official judgement of black 
soldiers was founded on "the ambivalence of racism, the double-barreled 
desire to use the black man like an inferior yet have him perform like 
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an equal; to deal with him according to a double standard but judge him 
by a single standard. 1111 
While the investigation of the Camp Van Dorn mutiny continued, an..'... 
other violent incident occurred at Camp Stewart, Georgia. Tension had 
increased there for several months. Located forty-three miles from 
Savannah, Stewart lay in an isolated area. The closest town, Hinesville, 
proved too small to provide the usual services to military personnel, so 
Savannah represented the only place of diversion. The city, a congested 
production center, had mushroomed in size, partially because of the proxim-
ity of Camp Stewart and its complement of nearly 50,000, but also because 
of two shipyards, the Savannah Army Air :Base, and Parris Island, a Marine 
training center. On weekends shipyard workers, marines, airmen, sailors, 
and soldiers all converged on the town, creating a tense atmosphere. 
Black military personnel faced a number of difficulties that were 
outgrowths of the separate and unequal practices applied in Savannah and 
in the rest of the South. Black troops formed 40 percent of the Camp 1✓ 
. 
Stewart population, but the facilities and t:ransportation provided for 
them proved woefully inadequate. For example, there were six buses for 
whites to every one for blacks. In addition, the ticket counters in 
Hinesville and Savannah were segregated, and this aggravated the situation 
since one man worked both windows and invariably served whites first. 
One sergeant was docked five days• leave for being six hours late in-re-
porting back to camp for this very reasono Also, the recreational facili-
ties for blacks in Savannah proved inadequate. The black USO in that city 
11 Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 369-70; :Barbeau and Henri, 




had a maximum capacity of fifty, while the white USO was a spacious two-
story building. On base conditions were congested for the fourteen black 
anti-aircraft battalions, and in some cases the situation worsened when 
white officers made ill-advised decisions based on racism. In one case 
a white lieutenant decided to ban five leading black newspapers from Camp 
Stewart, an act that was so obviously discriminatory that the War Depart-
ment quickly rescinded the order. Complaints by blacks at Stewart, 
especially northerners, referred to harsh and discriminatory treatment ✓-
at the hands of white MPs and generally degrading experiences both at the 
base and in Savannah. 12 
Complaints from blacks stationed at Camp Stewart had dribbled in 
to the War Department since 1941-, but in early 1943 the department began "'ill' 
receiving an alanning number of letters protesting conditions there. Mem-
bers of the 369th Coast Artillery, a New York outfit, began a letter-
writing and petition campaign to get the attention of the War Department 
and, they hoped, to elicit enough concern so that they might be trans-
ferred out of the South. The 369th had seen service in Hawaii and on the 
Canadian border, but when confronted with southern racial etiquette, its 
members responded negatively. One such letter sought to 11denounce and 
condemn the atrocious treatment accorded the men of the 369th Coast 
Artillery in Camp Stewart." Its author complained that "these fine Negro 
young men, all originally from New Yo:ck City, are not at all accustomed 
to the perverted and ignorant perspective of the South in regard to 
12 Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 370-71; :Byers, "Negro in Mili-
tary Service," 55, 64. 
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colored people and therefore should certainly not to be subjected to it." 
An immediate investigation into the situation at Camp Stewart, then, 
"would be a sensible and very timely recourse. 1113 
The letter campaign attracted the War Department's attention but 
failed to get the soldiers out of the South. On the basis of the letters 
and various other complaints, the department sent General Benjamin O. 
Davis and Lieutenant Colonel Davis G. Arnold to Camp Stewart where they 
conducted an investigation from May 17 through May 21. The inspectors 
V 
found dissatisfaction rampant among the black Gis and especially within 
the 369th and the 100th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. These men, as 
well as members of other units, were well educated and intelligent. They 
looked with disfavor upon the racial separation of base facilities and 
upon the oppressive discrimination practiced in transportation, recrea-
tion, housing, police treatment (including MPs), and other aspects of 
Savannah's racial customs. In fact, they proved so boisterous in pre-
senting their grievances to General Davis that he bad to upbraid them for 
speaking rudely to an officer and remind them of the conduct expected of 
them as soldiers. 
Davis and Arnold reported their findings to Inspector General Peter-
son, who in a subsequent memorandum outlined several recommendations de-
signed to help rectify the situation. In particular Peterson advised 
close observation of the 369th and 100th since these units appeared to be 
the most disaffected. He also recommended an increased effort to obtain 
l3Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 370; Kenneth Ancrum to the Adju-
tant General, May 16, 1943; Unidentified memorandum, May 15, 1943, AG 
291.2, RG 407. 
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additional entertainment and recreational facilities in Savannah, the 
staggering of pass privileges to black personnel in an effort to avoid 
"excessive overcrowding" of the buses between camp and town and the jim 
crow facilities in Savannah, greater use of black MPs with limited authority 
at crucial locations on and off base, close coordination between the Ser-
vice Command and Training Center to defuse potentially explosive situa-
tions, and "the institution of measures to ascertain the names of leaders 
inciting unrest so that they may be known and appropriate disposition may 
be made of them." These recommendations reflected once again the Army's 
attempt simply to keep the lid on a volatile situation in the hope that 
it would calm down by itself. It did not. 14 
Only five days after the Inspector General made his recommendations, 
violence broke over Camp Stewart like a thunderclap. On the night of 
June 9 a rumor floated around the black area that white soldiers had raped 
and killed a black woman after murdering her husband; one version cited 
military policemen as the murderers. This report brought resentment to 
the boiling point not only because of long-standing problems but also be-
cause of two recent incidents of white civilian violence against black 
soldiers. At about 8:30 p.m. a mob began to form in the black area of 
camp, and one hundred black Gis a:r:med with rifles turned deaf ears to 
their officers' pleas to disband. Someone fired a wild shot. Officers 
then called MPs into the area, and shortly thereafter the mob broke up. 
Within a short while a second mob fomed, breaking ipto gun racks and 
1½,ee, Employment of Negro Troops, 371-72; Memorandum, Peterson 
to the Chief of Staff, June 4, 1943, in 11Violence Against Negro Military 
Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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supply rooms to obtain rifles and submachine guns. Other black soldiers 
joined the mob, intent on venting their pent-up hostility while still 
others took to the woods for safety or remained in their barracks. The 
men continued to mill around until about ten o'clock when more wild shots 
precipitated a pitched battle between black soldiers from the 458th Anti-
aircraft Artillery and white MPs. Du.ring the riot four MPs received 
womids, one of them serious, and an approaching civilian was injured. 
Ju.st before midnight a small group of white MPs tried to cross a parade 
ground and were fired upon. One of the MPs, Private Ronie Lindsey, was 
killed. Finally, at about 12:30 a.m. two white battalions in half-tracks 
moved into the area, and the shooting ceased. Shortly afterward the 
blacks leamed that the :rumor of :rape and murder that had sparked the 
violence was false. 15 
Without delay the War Department lamiched an inquiry, professing 
surprise that the mutiny had occurred. A board of officers convened, in-
cluding Lieutenant Colonel DeMaurice Moses, a black who commanded one of 
the Ca.mp Stewart battalions. The board fomid that the disturbance re-
flected pent-up emotions and resentments. The black soldiers, the board 
leamed, were convinced they wer~ not receiving fair treatment at camp or 
in neighboring towns, and many feared for their safety. Some of the men 
had simply decided to fight out of desperation without regard for the 
consequences of such mutinous conduct. Incredibly, despite its findings 
and those of the earlier Da.vis-Amold report, the board disregarded the 
real issues in its conclusion when it fell back on old explanations. It 
'v 
l5Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 372; Savannah Tribune, June 17, 
1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 19, 1943. 
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ascribed part of the problem to the stationing of northern blacks in 
southern areas and to the "average negro soldier's meager education, 
superstition, imagination and excitability" which led to "a mass state 
of mind." The board then recommended disciplinary action against those 
who could be identified as having ta.ken :pa.rt in the mutiny, special train-
ing for MPs, an educational program to teach black soldiers the "dangers 
of rumor mongering, acceptance of rumors as truth, avoidance of 'chip 
on shoulders' attitude," and the disbandment of the 458th, with its men 
distributed to other units. Of course these recommendations did not 
really get to the crux of the matter since white civilian intimidation, 
the double standard used by the Army toward black Gls, and its insistence 
that northern blacks acclimate themselves to deep-South racial customs 
were not recognized as factors that helped create the disturbance. In 
the end the Army did not disband the 458th, although courts-martial did 
ensue. By the middle of July, eight black soldiers had been convicted 
in connection with the disturbance.
16 
Civil rights groups knew that mutinies might occur in southern 
camps if conditions did not improve. The NAACP, as a matter of course, 
sent an investigator to Camp Stewart, probably hoping to get the eight 
blacks being held for court-martial released or the charges against them 
reduced. The findings came as no surprise. Such unfavorable conditions 
as what the association termed "Nazi-racial attitudes" among whites, the 
transportation system, bigoted white MPs and the lack of black military 
16Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 372-73; Pittsburgh Courier, June 
19, 1943; Memorandum, Lt. Col. Robert E. Kinter to Gibson, July 7, 1943, 
in "Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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police with full authority, recreational facilities, and numerous cases 
of individual insults and violence against blacks proved prevalent. To 
the NAACP and most blacks it seemed highly unjustified for the Army to 
punish black soldiers who revolted against conditions the War Dera,rtment 
blithely ignored. The NAACP did not believe that the Army was really sur-
prised at Camp Stewart's violence or that the mutiny came about because 
of the soldiers' alleged "superstition, imagination and excitability." 
The NAACP forwarded its report to the Amy in hopes of intervention, but 
nothing came of it except Secretary of War Stimson's pledge to look into 
the matter. 17 
Perhaps the boldest act of mutinous conduct on the part of black 
soldiers during mid-1943 involved neither death nor combat between whites· 
and blacks. Yet the Camp McCain mutiny of July 5, 1943, showed clearly 
the breaking point of both black toleration and War Dep:1.rtment inaction. 
The background of this episode reflected a common set of experiences by 
black soldiers stationed in the South, because the basic problems were 
similar to those that led to the explosions at Camp Van Dorn, Camp Stewart, 
and elsewhere. 
Camp McCain lay eight miles south of Grenada, Mississippi, in the 
north-central part of the state. The closest cities were Greenwood, 
thirty-five miles southwest, and Starkville, eighty miles southeast. 
Grenada proved too small to furnish sufficient recreation or entertainment 
for an installation housing as many as 50,000 troops. Local whites were 
1711Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 50 (July 1943), 213-14; 
Pittsburgh Courier, July 17, 1943. 
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antagonistic, even hostile, toward black Gis from the ca.mp whether in the 
neighboring villages like Duck Hill or larger towns like Starkville. 
The area had been the scene of a lynching within recent memory, and rela-
tions worsened with each act of individual violence against blacks as the 
war progressed. In an area where white troops were considered "outsiders," 
the experience of black soldiers proved to be unpleasant indeed. 18 
On Saturday, July 3, four black soldiers from Ca.mp McCain--Sergeant 
Harry Jones, Sergeant Aaron Taylor, Private George Starks, and a Private 
Edwards (or Edmonds)--all of Company L, 470th Quartermaster Truck Regiment, 
received over.night passes and went to Starkville. After enjoying them-
selves Saturday and Sunday morning, they walked over to the bus te:rminal 
shortly after noon to get tickets back to camp. Each was accompanied by 
a woman. While waiting for the bus the soldiers engaged in some horse-
play, and Sergeant Jones accidentally knocked a pop bottle from a sill 
and broke it. The ticket agent inquired as to which of the "niggers" 
broke the bottle; Jones banded the man a nickel in payment. The agent 
then tu.med to one of the other soldiers and, saying "you are a smart 
nigger aren't you," slapped him in the face. As the ticket agent herded 
the blacks out of the station, the teminal manager arrived and began 
hitting them with his walking stick. The blacks wandered down the street 
where two city policemen accosted them, asking, "where are you niggers 
going?" They replied that they were trying to find a way to get back to 
camp. Then, without provocation, the officers beat the soldiers with 
18 Skates, "World War II and its Effects," 122, 125; Pittsburgh 





their nightsticks, took them to jail, and beat them again. A military 
detachment took the men back to camp the next day. Their officers con~ 
sidered the two sergeants to be "about the top in the Company," and when 
they related their experiences to the company commander, he had no reason 
to doubt their truthfulness. A subsequent Inspector General's inquiry 
confirmed their story. 19 
As soon as the beaten soldiers got back to camp and reported to 
their superiors, their friends in Company L inquired about their condition 
and after learning of the incident became thoroughly disgusted. Some 
called it "a dirty shame," while others opined that "something ought to 
be done about it." The beaten men, their heads throbbing, simply replied 
that "our Company Commander is going to look into it" and either went to 
bed or, like Sergeant Jones, sat on the barracks steps and held his aching 
head. 
Company L had been on the rifle range that afternoon and kept i:ts 
firearms overnight for cleaning. As word of the Starkville incident spread 
around the company area, men formed a crowd, and the discussion grew more 
heated. Some decided they would go to Starkville and teach the town a 
lesson, but Sergeant Jones tried to talk them out of it, saying "it's ✓ 
suicide to go over there with a bunch of boys, to go over and try to 
raise a disturbance." Apparently some of the men still entertained the 
19Memorandum, Louis R. Iautier to Lt. Col. William L. Dinning, 
July 21, 1943; Peterson to the Adjutant General, September 11, 1943, in 
"Violence Against Negro Military Personnel," CASW Records, RG 107; 
Testimony of Sgt. Harry P. Jones, August 23, 1943, U.S., v. Pvt. Roy 
Brookshire et al., Case 239977, Records of the Office of the Judge Advo-
cate General (Army), Record Group 153, National Archives (hereafter cited 
as JAG Records, RG 153). 
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thought, however, because one of them procured a truck for that purpose 
but later returned it. After dark the situation seemed to grow more calm, 
but underneath tempers raged. Shortly before bed check about twenty fully 
anned men from Company L decided to walk to the village of Duck Hill, 
about a quarter of a mile from camp, to vent their emotions there rather 
than travel the eighty miles to Starkville. Duck Hill had been a sore 
spot for the troops a:nyway because of white hostility. 
The contingent began marching toward its objective, but almost 
immediately several of its members had second thoughts. Privates James 
Harris and Elijah Outlaw in turn warned these men that "if you tum back, 
I've got something for you" and patted their rifles ominously. Two or 
three of the men continued to ride herd on the others in this fashion, 
and shortly before midnight on July 5 the group approached the outskirts 
of Duck Hill. They stationed themselves on a railroad track about 300 
yards from the town and began firing. The shooting lasted for ten 
minutes and several buildings were riddled while the residents trembled. 
No one was injured, largely due to the fact that nobody ventured from his 
house to investigate the source of the shooting. Satisfied, the blacks 
tu.med back toward camp. The firing had been clearly audible from McCain, 
and when the group returned, officials interrogated some of its members 
and threw them in the stockadeo The consequences would be harsh, but 
these men had gained a symbolic measure of revenge against the local 
whites who di.scrimina. ted against them. 20 
20Pittsburgh Courier, July 17, 1943; Testimony of Jones, August 23, 
1943; Memorandum, Capt. Julian E. Weisler, JAGD, to Commanding General, 
Third Army, August 30, 1943, U.S. v. :Brookshire, JAG Records, RG 153. 
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On August 23 a court-martial convened at Camp McCain to try thir-
teen men accused of having taken :i;art in the Duck Hill raid. Captain James 
L. Nolan, Trial Judge Advocate, presided. Before the arraignment the de-
fense counsel, Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Horger, asked the court to 
sever the cases of seven of the men because of differing elements in their 
defense. Nolan granted the request, so six were arraigned for violation 
of the 89th Article of War, which prohibited rioting; the other seven 
apparently never came to trial. Arraigned were Privates Roy Brookshire, 
Thomas Decker, James Harris, Elijah Outlaw, LaRue Steele, and Thomas Webb, 
all of Company L, 470th ~ Truck Regiment. Before the trial the prosecu-
tion managed to obtain confessions from five of the six who admitted they 
had been members of the mob, though some denied firi,ig. Brookshire denied 
ta.king part in the incident, but others implicated him. In a change of 
tactics each of the six, after having been arraigned, pleaded not guilty 
and tried to uphold a conspiracy of silence among themselves. The prose-
cution, however, asked that the confessions be admitted as evidence, and, 
over the defense's objections, Nolan agreed. This proved to be the end of 
the case for the defendants. A summary of the incident, the confessions, 
and other incriminating evidence constituted a strong case against the men, 
so the prosecutor did not have to rely on the defend.ants for testimony. 
The court found all six guilty as charged. All were dishonorably 
discharged, forfeited all pay, and sentenced __ to hard labor. Brookshire, 
Decker, and Webb received ten years imprisonment, while Harris, Outlaw, 
and Steele received fifteen years. Although some protested being forced 
to participate in the mutiny, either the court could.not determine who 
went voluntarily and who was coerced, or it did not care. The Judge 
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Advocate General's office in Washington approved the disposition of the 
cases, and the men were sent to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Some did not 
21 serve complete te:rms. 
The Camp Van Dorn, Camp Stewart, and Camp McCain incidents were 
only three of a number of major and minor clashes involving military per-
sonnel during the spring and summer of 1943. Damaging racial incidents 
occurred during this period at, among other places, Camp Breckinridge, 
✓ 
Kentucky; Camp Claiborne, Louisiana; Camp Forrest, Tennessee; Camp Phillips~ 
Kansas; Camp San Luis Obispo, California; Camp Shenango, Pennsylvania; 
Fort Bliss, Texas; Lake Charles, Louisiana; MacDill Field, Florida; March 
incidents and simultaneous civilian violence indicated that race relations 
especially in the South, had been strained by the pressures of waro 
During and after this series of racial clashes, the War Department 
decided that to avoid even more widespread violence something would have 
to be done, and quickly. The department expressed a genuine fear that 
civilian and military incidents would interfere with training and war 
production and at the same time provide damaging propaganda to the enemy. 
The Army still tended to place the blame for racial violence on such time-
worn factors as inadequate recreational facilities, inadequate command, 
and outside interference, the first two of which contained some validity. 
But it ignored the fundamental cause of the violence--a racism that 
21weisler to Commanding General, August 30, 1943; Findings of Board 
of Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, September 15, 1943; Memorandum 
by Col. George A. Hadd, September 20, 1943, U.S. v. Brookshire, JAG 
Records, RG 153. 
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treated black soldiers by a double standard. In a constructive move, the 
Army Service Forces, which had the basic responsibility for posts and 
camps, placed the continuous examination of policy toward black soldiers 
at the top of its priorities. Also, the Inspector General's office in 
m.id-1943 began a series of surveys on conditions in camps with large 
numbers of blacks. 
During the last few days of August and the first week in September, 
Colonel La.the B. Row surveyed conditions at Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, 
Camp Shelby, and Camp Van Dorn; all had experienced racial disorders. 
Row conducted interviews with the commanding officers, provost marshals, 
chaplains, and other officers at each camp and administered question-
naires to a random sampling of black officers and men. He familiarized 
himself with certain potential trouble spots: transportation, recreation 
facilities, security of arms and ammunition, the use of white officers in 
black units, the frequency and effect of racial slurs and insults toward 
blacks, and relations with military police. Only 21 percent of black 
soldiers considered MPs fair in their treatment of them, while the corre-
sponding figure among whites was 46 percent. Row found that "there 
exists a danger of racial disturbances in the general vicinities" of all 
four posts, that white officers in black units should be relieved as soon 
as black officers were trained to replace them, and tt·"the influence 
of Negro newspapers continues to be one of the greatest deterrents to 
the development of harmonious relations between white and black personnel." 
He requested that something be done to rectify the acrimonious relation-
sltj.p between black soldiers and white MPs at each of the camps. 22 
22Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 377-78; Memorandum, Col. Lathe 
B. Row to the Inspector General, October 13~ 19L3; Memorandum. Gibson 
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The Inspector General's office digested this and similar reports 
and produced a series of overall recommendations designed to correct a 
variety of race-related problems. These included tighter discipline 
over black troops, utilization of more black MPs, expanded recreation 
and entertainment facilities, equal treatment of black officers, and 
increased use of courts-martial to stop fomentation of racial violence. 
In addition, the recommendations advised furnishing black newspapers ~~th 
official press releases, exercising censorship on them if racial outbreaks 
threatened to occur, providing better lodging for black troops in camp 
towns, and curiously, greater control of venereal disease among blacks. 
All nine recommendations bad come before the War Department in the past, 
mostly from William Hastie, but the Army at last appeared to take the 
situation more seriously. While not calling for any fundamental changes, 
the recommendations in effect tried to put clamps on the lid rather than 
check carefullY: to see what was boiling and how to reduce the tempera-
ture.23 
Shortly thereafter the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies, 
headed by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, attempted to trans-
form some of these recommendations into reality. McCloy wanted to show 
that the Army was ahead of the rest of the nation in dealing with racial 
matters, though he admitted the need for considerable improvement in a 
variety of areas. In reality the Army still practiced segregation, 
assumed that blacks were the perpetrators of racial incidents, and tried 
to Brig. Gen. :B. 0. Davis, June 30, 1943, in "Reports--Racial Tension," 
CASW Records, RG 107. 
23Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 378-79. 
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either to suffocate them through tighter control or gain their respect 
through highly visible but peripheral changes in racial policy. Among 
its first actions, the McCloy Committee urged Chief of Staff George C. 
Marshall to circulate a memorandum stating official Army policy concern-
ing racial matters. Marshall issued the statement on July 13, 1943, and 
he forcibly asserted that command responsibilities included the fair treat-
ment of all troops and that disaffection among blacks must be curbed. 
"Adequate facilities and accommodations will be provided negro troops," 
he disclosed, but in physically improving the situation, officers needed 
to recall that "under no circumstances can there be a command attitude 
which makes allowances for the improper conduct of either white or negro 
soldiers." Marshall concluded by reiterating that maintenance of disci-
pline and order among troops and with civilians remained a top priority. 
"Mutinous conduct will be dealt with as such and violations of the prin-
. ciples of military discipline will not be countenanced in any element of 
the Army," he warned. Specific recommendations did not accompany the 
directive. 24 
In addition to Marshall's letter, the McCloy Committee executed 
other plans. The Bureau of Public Relations, as a result of the committee's 
advice, began issuing regular press releases to black newspapers that 
dealt with the participa. tion of black Gls in the war effort. The bureau 
gradually became the object of regular visits by black reporters. The 
Office of War Information, which conducted weekly surveys of the black 
24:rbid., 380-81; Memorandum, Gen. George C. Marshall to Commanding 
Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces, 
July 13, 1943, AG 291.2, RG 407. 
press, found this tactical move gained black support when the number of 
articles unfavorable to the military declined while those favorable in-
creased. The black newspapers proved to be "hungry for news of Negro 
soldiers" and used "almost every item which the bureau could supply." 
Articles critical of the War Department, of course, did not disappear, 
but this trend seemed heartening. 
The McCloy Committee also persuaded the Special Service Division 
of the Anny to p~oduce a closely edited film entitled The Negro Soldier. 
After the film was completed in the fall of 1943, an editorial board com-
posed of blacks and whites deleted the potentially offensive and "just 
plain corny" sections, and it proved to be a considerable success when 
released. Less than 3 percent of the black soldiers and 5 percent of the 
whites objected to it. At about the same time the committee sponsored the 
publication of Command of Negro Troops, a handbook containing the recom-
mendations and findings of previous surveys with specific instructions 
of action for officers in certain situations. Many officers, however, 
either partially or totally disregarded it. The Army instituted another 
committee suggestion when it created tea.ms of investigating officers 
whose primary function lay in conducting periodic inspections of military 
camps and making recommendations designed to improve race relations. 25 
The Army's reiteration and clarification of its segregation policy, 
issued on July 8, 1944, proved the most noteworthy of the committee's 
actions. Mainly because the order was never enforced, most people did 
not realize that the Anny had a policy prohibiting segregation of some 
25Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 383-97, 401. 
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facilities on the basis of race. But the July memorandum spelled out the 
anti-segregation order with such forthrightness that it temporarily became 
the hottest item in the black press. It specifically forbade segregation 
in post exchanges, transportation owned or operated by the mili tarj, and 
theaters, and warned that "effective compliance with War Department poli-
cies enunciated herein will be obtained through inspection by responsible 
commanders and inspectors general." If inspection revealed discri:D.ination 
caused by segregation, "the commanding geneml of the service will initi-
ate action to insure full coopliance with the announced policy." ·J.:ne 
order "did not immediately affect all of the enumerated services at all 
posts." In fact, enforcement proved less than uniform, and especially 
in the South, segregation of facilities continued if only by custo~. The 
black press, hungry for good news, bailed it as a milestone and de~oted 
d bl t ·t 26 consi era e coverage o 1. 
If blacks welcomed the anti-segregation order, many southern whites 
condemned it as a flagrant effort on the part of outside forces to obliter-
ate the color line. Alabama's Governor Chauncey Sparks and Senator John 
:Bankhead, along with Congressman Joh_~ E. Rankin of Mississippi, led the 
blast against the order. Sparks moaned that "it breaks down an essential 
principle of race relations in the South and grievously handicaps those of 
us in leadership positions who are trying to bring about a better relation-
ship between the two races." Rankin, dubbed by the black press as the 
leader of the "white trash bloc" in Congress, predicted that the order 
26Toid., 397-99; Memorandum, Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio to Commanding 
Generals, Army Air Forces, All Service Commands, Military Districts of 
Washington, September 1, 1944, in "War Memorandum #97 Banning Ars:zy Post 
Jim Crow," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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would precipitate widespread violence. In addition, Congressman A. 
Leonard Allen of Louisiana informed Henry Stimson that the order "is a 
blow at the Southland and it is a slap at every white man from Dixie 
wearing the uniform." Finally, a private citizen from New Orleans ex-
plained that "every true friend of the Negro and their more sensible 
leaders know that such actions as this only serve to retard sincere 
efforts that are being made in his behalf. 1127 
Overall, the policy changes generated by the military violence of 
1943 and the McCloy Committee lessened tension. Yet they did not reduce 
tension below the danger point, nor did they stop violence. Racial clashes 
involving military personnel continued to the end of the war. These 
changes occurred not only in response to racial violence but also because 
1944 was an election year, and the administration counted on the northeI_:1: 
black vote. What occurred, then, amounted to a balance between pacifying -
blacks and care not to alarm southern whites who maintained a strong faith 
in the color line and all it represented. 28 _) 
The War Department was f creed into making a number of changes in j j~ 
its policies toward black soldiers because of the alarming increase of 
violence during mid-1943 and also because the nature of the violence 
shifted to embody black aggression. If this shift had not ta.ken place, 
perhaps these belated changes would never have emerged. The Army recog-
nized, finally, that blacks could only tolerate so much maltreatment and 
27Pittsburgh Courier, September 2, 1944; A. Leonard Allen to Stim-
son, September 1, 1944, AG-OSW-291.2, RG 407; T. C. Holmes to Marshall, 
September 6, 1944, AG 291.2, RG 407. 
28Dalfiume, Desegregation of Armed Forces, 89. 
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degradation. The frequency and intensity of the violence was significant 
because prior to 1943 that kind of violence had proven rare. Then it 
assumed epidemic proportions. The Camp Van Dorn, Camp Stewart, and Camp 
McCain mutinies signaled the beginning of a new set of problems for the 
War Department, even as they reflected the height of black assertiveness 
in the South. Though such mutinies continued to the end of the war, 
white reaction to perceived threats against the solidarity of southern 
society became more intense during and after mid-1943. From then on the 
.... ; 
crest of black militance would begin to recede, at ·least publicly, while 
the weight of the white majority's reaction continued to build. Southern 
whites displayed the ultimate in racial provincialism by riding roughshod 
over the basic rights of the black soldiers, forcing them to fight back 
through mutinies, -and then professing that the violence was their fault. 
Part of the problem arose from the fact that members of black Ar.my 
units, lilce all others, were young, and younger blacks tended to be out-
spoken and impatient. Elacks also equated service in the anned forces ) 
with achieving full citizenship, a notion whites did not accept. When 
the black composition of the Army never reached the prescribed 10 percent, 
when the overwhelming majority found itself in service rather than combat 
units, when blacks found conditions in the military not unlike civilian 
life, they expressed resentment. In the military blacks underwent dis-
crimination roughly in conformity with their civilian status, and each 
instance of assertiveness, which included mutinous conduct, naturally 
brought howls of indignation from Washington. The mutinies of 1943 repre-
sented a dangerous trend that th~ War Department was determined to con-
tain. Without evoking much sensitivity toward the special difficulties 
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black Gis faced, the department sought to make a number of changes that 
would both help pacify blacks and avert mutinies in the future through 
internal preventive security. Because the War Department could or would 
do little to contain white civilian violence against black soldiers, it 
tried to make the situation on bases more stable while at the same time 
avoiding major alterations in the southern racial system. Mutinies by ' 
blacks continued to erupt throughout 1944, however, revealing that most 
of the Army's policy changes either proved ineffective or were not en-
forced. 
CHAPl'ER VI 
"AN EPIDEMIC OF INTERRACIAL VIOLENCE" 
The Mobile riot and racial violence in southern military camps 
! 
during the spring of 1943 signaled the beginning of a three-month crisis 
in American race relations. It reached its vertex in the eruptions that 
occurred in the seven-week period from mid-June to early August. Major 
race riots in Los Angeles, Eeaumont, Detroit, New York, and hundreds of 
smaller incidents caused more disruption, confusion; concern, and bitter-
ness than at any other time between World War I and the 1960s. The 
Social Science Institute at Fisk University counted 242 such outbreaks 
during 1943, producing what a later observer labeled "an epidemic of 
interracial violence. 111 
In the course of these incidents the nature of the major riots 
completed a metamorphosis from white to black aggression that had been 
in the making since World War I. In 1919 evidence of black assertiveness 
emerged in the devastating Chicago riot of July. In 1935 black Ha.rlemites 
rioted against the twin ravages of economic depression and racial dis-
crimination in what proved the first "new style" or "modern" civilian 
race riot. Elacks attacked white-owned property in and around the ghetto, 
foreshadowing similar patterns during World War II. Elack aggression in-
creased in the 1943 Detroit riot, and during the Harlem riot of that 
year it bad become a trend--at least in the North. Shooting, bunti..ng, 
and looting caused property damages to replace the number of deaths as 
1Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 671. 
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the chief indicator of the seriousness of the incident. The same form of 
l 
black aggression would typify race riots in the 1960s. The change in the/ 
I 
nature of :race riots from World War I to World War II, however, proved a / (,, 
/ "-i() 
non-southem phenomenon. The "southem style" riots of World War I, in r ',, 
which whites attacked blacks and their property without encountering _) 
significant resistance, carried through the 1940s. In 1943 the Mobile 
and Beaumont riots retained the old characteristics, indicating that 
race riots differed in the South. 
Reacting to the riots in the spring of 1943 the NAACP held its 
":Emergency Conference on the Status of the Negro in the War for Freedom" 
in Detroit. The conference, meeting from June 3 through 6, featured 
panels on blacks in the a:rmed forces, the press, radio, motion pictures, 
and industry. Even as these discussions took place, about 25,000 white 
workers walked off their jobs at the local Packard plant in opposition 
to the promotion of three blacks to skilled positions. This action came 
only a week after the more violent response of Mobile shipyard workers 
to black promotion and thus caused grave concern among both civil rights 
leaders and labor spokesmen.· While the whites gradually drifted back to 
work a few days later, some observers attributed the strike to Axis in-
fluence, while one black newspaper editor termed the incident an outgrowth 
of "Dixie in Detroit." Labor competition, :racial attitudes, and the city's 
sudden wartime growth, however, provided the main reasons for the Packard 
strike. 2 
2 Progxam for the Emergency Conference on the Status of the Negro 
in the War for Freedom, June 3-6, 1943, in "Emergency Conference Resolu-
tions, Detroit, 1943," GOF, NAACP Papers; "Hate Strikes," Monthly Summary 
of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1 (August 1943), 4; Pittsburgh 
Courier, June 12, 1943. 
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As the Packard strike continued and Detroit's citizens 
scapegoats for the,walkout, the second major race riot of the season 
(".·:· \ 
erupted. Racial tension had bu.il t up in Los Angeles for at least a year. ,--:·:')·-<, .,. 
,{,p _-.!~ 
The servicemen in Army and Navy installations in the area flocked to the 
city in search of diversion from military routine or relief from the ten-
sion that stemmed from impending shipment to combat areas. The presence 
of a large Mexican-American population served as another source of ten-
sion. As was the case with blacks in the South, Mexican-Americans usually 
received the blame for adverse conditions or crime waves in the city. 
Since the beginning of the war, the local press had engaged in stereo-
typing Mexican-American youths in particu] ar as the perpetra. tors of 
criminal activities that, by implication, hindered the war effort. The 
Hearst press led this development as its front pages carried sto~~es of 
a "Pachuco Gangster" or "Zoot-suit Hoodlums," and this gradually built up 
resentment q.mong whites. 3 
The "zoot sui t'1 proved a favorite among underprivileged youths, 
perhaps because of the instant recognition that came from wearing such an 
outlandish costume. Its long coat with overly-padded shoulders, pegged 
trousers that ballooned at the knee, and stand.am. accoutrements such as 
four-foot-long watch chains and wide-brimmed pancake hats provided a 
visual stereotype. Because of unusual press coverage, zoot suiters repre-
sented in many minds a combination of negative aspects long attributed to 
Mexican-Americans, specifically the vision of vagrant youths whose 
3Guzman, Negro Year ~ook, 236; Carey McWilliams, North from Mexico: 
The Spanish-Spea.k.iP..g Peoples of the United States (Philadelphia, 1949), 
238. 
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livelihood came from criminal actions. A number of incidents from the 
spring of 1942 through early 1943, in which Mexican-American youths served 
as the alleged instigators, gave further rise to tensions both in the city 
and in neighboring military bases.4 
On the night of June 3, zoot suiters and sailors clashed, provoking 
five successive nights of rioting against Mexican-Americans. The press 
and local police openly sided with the aggressors, helping produce well 
over one hundred injuries during the violence that climaxed on the night 
of Ju.~e 7. Military authorities eventually took responsibility for end-
ing the riot and declared the city off limits to all servicemeno Offi-
cial-pronouncements from state and federal authorities cooled the rioting 
fever as the Mexican ambassador to the United States lodged a formal 
complaint with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Clearly, the riot showed 
that racial and ethnic intolerance was not confined to one specific region, \ 
and further indicated that violence was escalating to dangerous proper- , 
/ ,.. . \ ,'(! '. 
5 / - I ft . ., 
tions. \/· v·' ~: ./ 
In the wake of the Los Angeles riot, racial violence again erupted 
in the South, The third major race riot of the year occurred in Beaumont, J,/ 
Texas, only one week after the California outbreak. It provided perllaps 
the clearest example of a "southem style" riot during the war era. In 
4R. H. Turner and S. J. Surace, "Zoot-Suiters and Mexicans: Symbols 
in Crowd :Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, 62 (July 1956), 14-20; 
Ruth D. Tuck, ":Behind the Zoot Suit Riots," Survey Graphic, 32 (August 
1943), 315. 
5McWilliams, North from Mexico, 244-53; "Zoot Suits and Service 
Stripes: Race Tension Behind the Riots," Newsweek, June 21, 1943, P• 36; 
Pittsburgh Courier, June 19, 1943. 
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terms of the deaths and destruction it created, the Beaumont incident 
served as the single most severe southern racial outbreak of the war, 
and it was the most shocking illustration of southern determination to 




'. l' / 
In 1943 Beaumont's metropolitan area proved to be the "Number One 
Boomtown of Texas." The city lay eighty miles east of Houston within a 
short distance of the Louisiana border. A number of smaller cities sur-
rounded it, and along with Beaumont ballooned in size during the war to 
produce an area that bulged with war production. In 1940 Beaumont con-
tained 59,000 citizens, of whom about one-third were black; by 1943 the 
population stood at over 80,000, with blacks remaining about a third of 
the population. Surrounding towns underwent similar growth: Orange from 
7,500 to 38,000; Port Arthur from 56,000 to 70,500; and Port Neches and 
Nederland from 5,500 to 9,100. As in other areas, these cities bad to 
support population increases of as much as 500 percent with prewar ser-
vices and facilities. 
In Beaumont, for example, a Congested Production Areas survey re-
ported that only one house in the entire city was available for rent, while 
in Orange and Port Arthur "there was not a single house, apartment, or room 
available." This forced many workers to improvise, sleeping in autos or 
in "hot beds" while others commuted from as far away as fifty miles each 
day. Such conditions in turn produced high rates of absenteeism and turn-
over. Within the cities, bus systems staggered along as they tried to 
carry wartime popu.la tions with inadequate prewar equipment. Autos proved 
scarce, and as a result many people walked to and from their jobs. Health 
facilities in the area proved similarly inadequate, with only one physician 
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available for every 5,000 citizens as compared to a wartime standard of 
one per 1,700. This problem was compounded by Beaumont's inability to 
dispose properly of its garbage, so that one section of the city experi-
enced the nauseating smell of an exposed dump while flies bad to be 
swept out of nearby rooms daily. The city ad.ministration placed hogs 
on the huge piles of waste, but this bad little effect. Other problems 
included shortages of food and ice, recreational facilities, nurseries 
for working mothers, and police forces. 6 
The area contained a number of war industries, and sbipbu.ildiri.g 
was by far the largest. In Beaumont the Pennsylvania Shipyards employed 
about 8,000 people and held govenunent contracts in excess of $100 rilliono 
Du.ring 1943 the yard produced eighteen Liberty (CIA) ships, four Navy 
minesweepers, and eight oceangoing tugboats. Neighboring Orange harbored 
the larger Consolidated Steel Shipyards, built in 1940 under the auspices 
of the Mari~ime Commission as part of the prewar production expa.~sion. 
Consolidated held govenunent contracts totaling $240 million, employed 
about 20,000 workers, and produced destroyers and destroyer escorts. 
Several smaller shipyards dotted the area, along with plants that pro-
duced lumber goods, bombs, anmrunition, and petroleum. The Beaumont area 
had been the scene of the spectacular Spindletop oil field of the early 
twentieth century, and during World War II the "Little Big Inch" pipeline 
that ran from Beaumont to Linden, New Jersey, testified to the area's 
611Report on Adequacy of Services and Facilities in the Orange-
Beaumont Area, Texas, November 15, 1943," in "Orange-Beaumont, Texas--
Report on Conditions"; "Report on Orange, Texas, March 7, 1944," in 
"Port Neches, Texas--Report on Conditions," Series 13, Cone-ested Produc-
tion Areas Records, RG 212; Meyer, Journey Through Chaos, 174-75-
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importance as an oil-producing region (see Figure 2). 7 
The city's wartime congestion was not unique--on the contrary, it 
proved fairly common in urban centers across the nation. Yet this East 
Texas city underwent a deterioration of race relations so severe that it. 
spawned a major riot. Much of the friction in Beaumont I s interracial J 
affairs stemmed from the crowded public transportation system. A city 
ordinance prohibited blacks from sitting ahead of the jim crow dividing 
line, and drivers strictly observed the law. The Charles J. Reco inci-
dent of July 1942 resulted in part from this situation, and similar 
episodes increased as the war continued. Frequently, when buses became 
crowded, blacks stood in the aisles ahead of the dividing line, a situ-
ation that many whites did not tolerate. Beatings and shootings esca-
lated, and with each incident racial tension grew. To blacks such out-
breaks reflected the narrow-mindedness of whites, while conversely many 
whites regarded them as dangerous threats to the separation of the races. 8 
On January 24, 1943, in a move that stemmed from the previous incidents 
of violence as well as the negative publicity generated by the Reco shoot-
ing, the Beaumont bus system inaugurated all-black and all-white coaches 
which lessened interracial contact and apparently satisfied all interested 
parties, at least for the time being. With the situation dangerously 
71a.ne, Ships for Victory, 34-35; Ray Lacy to James A. Burran, 
April 10, 1973; Beaumont Enterprise, November 7, 1943; "Report on Ade-
quacy of Services and Facilities in the Orange-Beaumont Area, November 
15, 1943," Congested Production Areas Records, RG 212; Tindall, Emer-
gence of the New South, 6980 
8For stories of interracial incidents aboard Beaumont buses, 
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Figure 2. Map of Beaumont, Texas. 
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tense, such groups as the Beaumont branch of the NAACP registered no 
protest. 9 
169 
As the spring of 1943 approached, Beaumont encountered a problem 
that, though not racial in nature, heightened overall tension. In April 
a local attomey circulated a petition to force a recall election against 
the city's mayor, Leslie Lowry (whom the Army had claimed), the acting . 
mayor, George Gary, and five other city officials. Because of Beaumont's 
reputation as a haven for vice, some citizens thought replacement of these 
officials would help improve the situation. Ross Dickey, a former state 
policemen who had been chief of police since May 1942, immediately arrested 
nearly twenty persons on gambling charges, and the city manager, G. Hughes 
Petkovsek, announced that "gambling will never again be tolerated as long 
as I am city manager." This brief flurry of activity failed to produce 
the desired results, however, because in May petitions bearing the required 
182 signatures were certified and a recall election set for June 19. The 
acrimony that accompanied this political feud did nothing to assuage 
feelings, and while many war workers may have cared little who governed 
the city, the general tension that came from congestion and worsening 
race relations was further compounded by the furor surrounding the recall 
1 t . 10 e ec ion. 
As the atmosphere in Beaumont grew more volatile, almost any spark 
could have ignited it. An interracial rape on June 5 increased strain to 
the breaking point, and the tension and congestion that had built up over 
9rbid., January 23, 1943; Beaumont Jou__T'Ilal, January 23, 1943. 
10 Beaumont Journal, April 15, 17, 1943; May 6, 1943. 
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the months threatened to produce violence. Shortly before mid.night on 
the 4th, a nineteen-year-old white telephone operator left work and be-
gan walking home along Laurel Street. As she approached the intersection 
of Laurel and Magnolia, Curtis Thomas, a twenty-four-year-old black ex-
convict, accosted her. Apparently Thomas lmew the woman's daily routine 
and had carefully planned the crime, for after grabbing her he carried 
her to a loading platform at a nearby storage plant where he had laid 
out a quilt. As he reached the platform the woman, who had fainted, re-
gained consciousness and began resisting him. Thomas then stabbed and 
beat her, and then raped his victim three times. During the assault, he 
reportedly said to her, "the army is going to get me, and if I do this, 
I' 11 get killed for this and I won't be going to the army. 1111 
After the assault Thomas fell asleep, permitting the woman to es-
cape. She reached her home about 4:00 a.m. on June 5, and her parents 
called the police. Two squad cars immediately :raced to the scene, and, 
as they approached, the lights and noise aroused Thomas. He fled into 
a dead-end alley where policemen shot him four times. Critically wounded, 
he was taken to the "negro ward" of Hotel Dieu ·Hospital. The next moming's 
newspaper reported the incident and made it clear that doctors did not 
expect Thomas to survive. 12 
11Ibid., June 5, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 6, 1943; Memor-
andum, Houston FBI to Frank L. Welch, June 16, 1943, Records of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (hereafter cited 
as FBI Records). A Freedom of Information Act request by this writer 
yielded a body of previously classified material from the F.BI's files, 
which are separate from those of the Justice Department, previously cited. 
12:aeaumont Journal, Jrme 5, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 6, 
1943. 
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His condition, however, was irrelevant to some people, and before 
light on Sunday, June 6, a mob of about 150 men collected at the ji.w crow 
section of the Hotel Dieu. Only one policeman guarded the dying prisoner. 
Lacking a leader, the mob did not enter the building but simply milled 
around. Chief of Police Dickey and other officers sped to the scene, 
and while Dickey pleaded with the mob not to lynch Thomas, other policemen 
secretly spirited the alleged assailant to the city jail and placed him 
under heavy guard. Dickey, who did not recognize any members of the 
throng, reminded them that Thomas would die at any moment and asked them 
to let the law take its course. He could have had the impending recall 
election in the back of his mind as he spoke, for he knew that if mob 
action developed many would blame the city administration. Dickey's 
efforts succeeded, for after twenty minutes of admonitions, the mob d.issi-
pated.13 
Thomas' death on June 8 probably precluded another lynching attempt. 
Feeling against him ran extremely high, especially after he admitted raping 
the white woman, and the fact that a riot did not result from this inci-
dent proved remarkable indeedo Yet the Thomas episode pointed out that 
many Beaumont whites were ready to take matters into their own hands if a 
similar crime occurred againo The tinder had begun to smoulder, and the 
spark that would set it off came a week later. 14 
On Tuesday aftemoon, June 15, the Beaumont police received a tele-
phone call from a twenty-five-year-old white woman stating that a black 
l3Beaumont Enterprise, June 7, 1943; Beaumont Journal, June 7, 1943. 
14:Beaumont Journal, June 8, 1943. 
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man had raped her. The police sprang into action, knowing that this 
incident could prove disastrous. Within a few minutes members of the 
city police, sheriff's force, and Department of Public Safety (DPS) high-
way patrolmen reached the scene on the outskirts of town. Blocking off 
traffic, they began searching nearby woods with the aid of interested 
neighbors, and conducted a preliminary investigation. According to the 
woman's story, a dark-complexioned black man wearing brown pants and a 
pink or purple shirt, had approached her about mid-moming and asked for 
work; she told the man to weed the garden and later fed him lunch. As 
she put her three small children to bed for their aftemoon nap, the man 
entered the room, threatened her with a sharp file, and took her to an 
adjacent bedroom where he raped her. The man then fled into the woods, 
and s~e walked half a mile to the nearest telephone and called the police. 
After hearing her story officers searched the house for clues but found 
none. They hoped that the manhunt would produce the culprit. 15 
Y..ixed reactions greeted the news of another interracial rape, the 
second such incident within two weeks and this one involving the young 
wife of a war worker and mother of small children. Many whites complained 
while others counseled patience and calmness, believing that the police 
would surely apprehend the rapist. An outward calm prevailed as the 
afternoon gave way to evening. The situation at Pennsylvania Shipyards, 
however, proved more explosive. Many workers ca.me from outlying areas, 
chiefly East Texas and Louisiana. The same lower class, rural, or small 
l5Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1943; War De:partment memorandum, 
Office of the Director of Intelligence Division, Eighth Service Command, 
Dallas, Texas, July 1, 1943, FBI Records. 
I 
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town whites who had inundated Mobile and its shi"pyard likewise made up 
/.-·-.......__, ', 
the bulk of Pennsylvania's wom force. They brought provincial racist 
\ ·, 
'·. 
attitudes into a congested area already suffering from a multitude of 
difficulties. Many detested blacks and placed a high reliance on extra-
legal action against threats to the color line. As outsiders, they felt 
little allegiance to Beaumont, and as people whose lives were fraught 
with tension, congestion, and confusion, they proved the first to react 
to the news that a black man had committed the cardinal sin of inter-
racial rape. As the night shift began to replace the day workers, con-
versation turned to the aftemoon's crime, and many heard fabricated or 
inflammatory versions. 
Around nightfall over 2,000 workers angrily dropped their tools 
and marched out of the shipyard. Foremen pleaded with them, but one womer 
articulated the mood when he explained that "our duty is for the protec-
tion of our homes." Production halted as the mob began the short walk 
downtown to the police station. As the men marched they att::ra.cted atten-
tion, and others swelled the ranks. As the crowd neared the police sta-
tion, it numbered around 3,000. 16 
B. O. Craft, in charge of the station that night, heard the approach-
ing mob and ran outside. "They came out of the shipyards over there," he 
later related. "They came right up to the police station and flooded in. 
We tried to talk to them and reason with them but they took chargeo" Pan-
demonium broke out within the station as one officer hurriedly called Chief 
Dickey and the off-duty men. In the meantime the mob surrounded the 
16Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1943. 
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station which contained the city jail. Fearing that the crowd might storm 
the building, Dickey sent for the woman who had allegedly been raped that 
afternoon. After she arrived and inspected the prisoners she addressed 
the mob, saying that her assailant remained at large and urging the mem-
bers of the crowd to search for him in the woods near her home. This ploy, 
designed to get the crowd to disperse, failed, for at that point a black 
trusty returning to the station from an errand was beaten severely before 
Dickey could rescue him. A few minutes later some of the would-be lynch-
ers broke out a wind.ow and tried to snatch a black prisoner, but policemen 
pulled the terrified man back to safety. 17 
Meanwhile several hundred people broke away from the mob a_nd walked 
two blocks to the Jefferson County courthouse where Sheriff W.W. Richard-
son met them. They asked if the county jail contained the culprit; to 
avoid a confrontation Richardson permitted several men to tour the cells. 
Of course no one would have recognized the alleged assailant, but the 
group satisfied itself that the man indeed was not there and rejoined the 
main part of the crowd. About midnight the frustrated mob heeded the 
admonition of one of its members who shouted, "let's go to nigger town." 
Part of the throng, which by this time totaled between 3,000 and 4,000, 
headed for a black residential district in the northern section of the 
city on Gladys Street. The remainder ransacked a second black district 
on Forsythe Street in the downtown area. The rioting lasted about six 
hours and continued until d.awn. 18 
17Ibid.; Houston Post, June 17, 1943; PM, June 17, 1943. 
18Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943; Chicago Defender, June 26, 
1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 17, 1943. 
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During the outbreak the small bands of rioters set fires, over-
turned cars, and looted both houses and stores. Along Forsythe Street 
the mob burned down three funeral homes, a jewelry store, and a pha:cmacy 
owned by Sol White, who had distinguished himself among black citizens by 
purchasing $11,000 in war bonds. Several houses in the vicinity caught 
fire but were saved either by the BeaUI!lont fire department or the build-
ings' inhabitants. In the Gladys Street area the activity proved similar 
as burning and looting were rampant. Autos could be seen speeding through 
town filled with stolen goods, oa.ir.:.ly clocks, radios, jewelry, clothing, 
liquor, cigarettes, and other property. In this area rioters caused 
extensive damage to a radio shop, two cafes, and a number of other stores 
and houses. P. G. Thomas, owner of the Dew Drop Inn on Gladys Street, 
related that when the rioters approached his business, he retreated to a 
back room and peered through a service window as they broke down the front 
door and ransacked the building. He fled out a back door and escaped in-
10 
jury.-/ 
With the night lit only by bun1ing buildings and occasional street-
lights, rioters sometimes mistakenly shot other whites. Fortunately, they 
did not bother the firemen who worked feverishly to extinguish bu.ming 
buildings and autos in the area. One fireman, however, expressed his 
disgust at the mob as he watched fires being set. "If we'd start after 
the man setting the blaze," he complained, "he'd dodge into the darkness 
and we couldn't tell him from anyone else." If rioters did not harass 
19Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 
1943; Houston Informer, June-19, 26, 1943; Dallas Moming News, June 17, 
1943; Chic~go Defender, June 26, 1943; P. G. Thomas to James A. Bu.rran, 
March 1, 1973; Memorandum,J. Edgar Hoover to Wendell :Serge, July 9, 1943, 
FBI Records. 
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firemen, however, they continued to wreak·havoc with the black popula-
tion. All night gangs of whites assaulted blacks, beating and robbing 
them. Many escaped injury by retreating to the innermost areas of the 
black sections, but others suffered the full force of the violence. 20 
One of the most concentrated outbreaks of violence occurred at the 
Greyhound bus station on Pam Street, where fifty-two black draftees 
awaited a bus to their homes in Port Arthur. After mid.night a mob of 
over 300 whites fell upon them, crying, "here they are, a whole bunch of 
them. Let's get them." Only a few of the blacks escaped injury. Irvin 
Collins was severely beaten as he mn from the building and narrowly es-
caped being shot. To avoid the mob, he crawled under a nearby house and 
remained there until dawn. Roy Ford escaped further beating as he dashed 
out of the lobby and climbed atop the bus stationo From there he witnessed 
the terror below. Eotha Jones was in a phone booth when the whites attacked 
and ran outside only to m ve a police car shine its spotlight on himo A 
group of whites beat him thoroughly. Alex Mouton was less fortunate, for 
the beating he received caused injuries so severe that he died from them 
on October 4. 21 
Two other people died du.ring the riot. Jolm Jolmson, a black man 
who womed for the American Ice Company, died after a group of whites shot 
him as he left work. Ellis C. :Brown, a white carpenter, died from head 
wounds inflicted by unknown assailantso Police found him dead near the 
shipyard, and speculation pointed to blacks as the murderers. This may 
20chicago Defender, June 26, 1943; Houston Infonner, June 26, 1943. 
21 Houston Informer, June 26, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, October 6, 
1943; Hoover to Berge, July 9, 1943, FBI Records. 
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have been the case, for some blacks took advantage of the white invasion 
of the black districts to retaliate. Equally plausible, blacks may have 
killed Brown in self-defense. Whatever the cause, he remained the only 
white person to die during the outbreak. Many people, ma.inly blacks, 
suffered injuries during the rioting though records do not reveal the 
exact number. Hospitals reported eleven persons admitted for severe in-
juries, but they made up only a small portion of the woi.mded. Many blacks 
either treated their own wounds or left the city for aid; some feared for 
their lives and others thought they might be arrested. Considering the 
length and intensity of the violence, two hundred injuries would be a 
conservative estimate; the toll may have reached foux hi.mdred. 22 
Meanwhile, local law enforcement officials faced a desperate situa-
tion. During the period from midnight to daybreak, Chief Dickey could muster 
only his own force of under fifty, the 150-member police auxiliary, a hand-
ful of state policemen, and the small sheriff's department. City officials 
tried to get additional help by mobilizing the 18th Battalion of the Texas 
State Guard, but this unit never made it to the front. Hav.iP..g never before 
been called into an emergency, the two hundred guardsmen spent most of the 
night at Beaumont High School, locating and distributing their firearms. 
Instead of dispatching his men directly to the riot areas, Major Fred C. 
Stone, a local architect who served as the battalion's senior officer, 
moved the unit to the lawn of city hall. There the men pitched pup tents 
and unrolled barbed wire along the ground as if they expected an invasion. 
The arrival of a Salvation Army mobile canteen provided the highlight of 
the operation. 
22~ t En· . Deaumon .~erorise, June 17, 1943. 
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Since few guardsmen actively aided in the struggle to restore order, 
Dickey simply scattered his officers throughout the black sections and 
major intersections. Although the police arrested so many people that 
the city and county jails soon bulged with prisoners, this had little 
effect on the riot. The authorities frantically sought an interim deten-
tion center, and finally commandeered the Harvest Club, a large building 
on the county fairgrounds. In spite of the utter pandemonium that pre-
vailed and the relatively few officers on hand, policemen still managed 
to apprehend 225 whites and six blacks. Most remained at the Harvest Club 
while city officials wondered what to do with them. 23 
When the riot broke out, city administrators placed a hurried tele-
phone call to the governor's office in Austin, only to find Governor Coke 
R. Stevenson on his way to Washington and Lieutenant Governor John Lee 
Smith in the Midwest. In their place the president pro tempore of the 
Senate, A. M. Aikin, Jr., served as acting governor; he bad occupied the 
office only one day when the riot broke out. Aikin proved reluctant to 
take drastic action and asked city officials to wait and see what the 
next few hours would bring. Meanwhile, he approved of sending extra 
state guardsmen to Eeaumont, and within a few hours 1,600 men were on their 
,,.ray from Baytown, Conroe, Houston, Nacogdoches, Port Arthur, and elsewhere. 
At the same ti.me Aikin ordered large quantities of ammunition sent to 
Eeaumont from Orange and Port Arthur. Neither the 1,600 guardsmen nor 
the ammunition arrived in time to quell the disturbance. Highway patrol-
men and Texas Rangers simultaneously filtered into the city, so that by 
23Ibid., June 17, 22, 1943; Houston Post, June 17, 1943. 
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the evening of June 16 over 2,400 law enforcement personnel occupied 
Beaumont. State officials finally contacted Govemor Stevenson, but he 
appeared to take the matter casually. He remarked that "they can do in 
Austin what I would do. I have confidence in the adjutant general and 
director of public safety acting wisely in the situation." The unper-
turbed govemor then continued on to Washington. 24 
At daybreak on June 16 the major violence ended. As state guards-
men and Texas Rangers poured into the city and local officials tried to 
maintain order, however, another outbreak threatened. Around mid-moming 
a group of 200 men, mainly shipyard workers, collected in front of the 
courthouse and confronted Sheriff Richardson. They insisted that the 
county jail contained the assailant. The sheriff, however, had been up 
all night and appeared on the courthouse steps armed with a pistol and 
submachine gun in a decidedly foul humor. "I'm damn tired of all this," 
he shouted. "Break up and go back to building ships like you should be 
doing." Someone jeered. "Let the damn fool that said that step up here," 
Richardson threatened. "Fact is, I'll take you all on--one at a time. 
And let me tell you, I'm going to keep law and order in this county." Re-
buffed, the mob began walking toward the smouldering Forsythe Street area, 
apparently bent on causing trouble. Texas Rangers sprayed the throng with 
tear gas, however, and with that the threatened violence ended. 25 
24:aeaumont Enterprise, June 16, 17, 1943; Dallas Moming News, 
June 17, 1943; "Sen. Aikin has Busy Time Pinch-Hitting for Stevenson 
as Martial Law Reigns," State Observer, June 21, 1943, pp. 1, 5. 
25Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943. 
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The Beaumont race riot claimed three lives and hundreds of casual-
ties. Some of those wounded were white, mainly because of mistaken iden-
tity during the darkness and confusion and partly because of isolated 
black retaliation. Yet the bulk of the injuries involved black people. 
There was also the hurried exodus of about 2,500 blacks from the city, 
most retuming to hometowns in East Texas and Louisiana. The riot also 
resulted in the partial or total destruction of two hundred buildings 
and at least ten autos. Personal property losses from looting also 
proved considerable. And the loss of war production totaled 210,000 
26 manhours. 
In the wake of the violence Beaumont stood paralyzed, but city 
officials took steps to insure stability. They cancelled the June 19 
"Juneteenth" celebration, a holiday for blacks in Texas which commemo-
rated their emancipation. The fact that the city recall election also 
fell on that day hastened their decision. Chief Dickey ordered all city 
buses off the streets and stopped interstate bus service. Major General 
Richard C. Donovan of the Eighth Service Command proclaimed the city off 
limits to military personnel. An 8:30 p.m. curfew was instituted, and 
Dickey closed all bars and liquor stores; other officials closed swimming 
pools, parks, baseball games, and other places where people might congre-
gate. Downtown stores closed their doors for several days to avoid 
crowds. The failure of black employees to go to work immediately following 
the riot crippled cafes, hotels, laundries, and other establishments. 
26Beaurnont Enterprise, June 17, 1943; War Department memorandum, 
July 1, 1943; Hoover to Berge, July 9, 1943, FBI Records. 
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Mail service was similarly disrupted since one-third of Beaumont's mail 
carriers were black. 27 
The impact of the rioting also affected neighboring towns and cities. 
Small disturbances occurred in Kountze, Nome, and Silsbee, and on June 16 
officials sent home all black employees of Orange's Consolidated Steel 
Shipyards. State guardsmen protected the yards while Orange officials 
closed liquor stores. In Port Neches a rubber plant sent its 1,200 black 
employees home, and Port Arthur and Baytown took similar precautions. 
A rumor of rioting in connection with Juneteenth floated across Houston, 
prompting that city's mayor to place a full page advertisement in the 
Houston Post which urged residents to stop doing "Hitler's woix• Stop 
circulating rumors which create tenseness and interfere with war produc-
tion and attend to your own business. 1128 
On the evening of June 16, Acting Gover.nor Aikin reluctantly took 
a belated but necessary step when he declared martial law in Beaumont. 
From then until June 20 when Aikin lifted the order, control of the city 
fell to state Adjutant General Arthur B. Knickerbocker, who sent Lieutenant 
Colonel Sidney C. Mason to Beaumont where he assumed direct command. 29 
After Aikin imposed martial law, speculation arose over upcoming 
investigations. Chief Dickey and a number of other people were convinced 
that Axis sabotage sparked the riot, and he flatly charged that "there is 
27Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 
1943; Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1943. 
28 
Memorandum, G. P. Gannon to D. M. Ladd, June 17, 1943, F.BI Records; 
Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1943; Houston Post, June 18, 1943. 
29Beau.mont .Enterprise, June 17, 1943. 
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somebody behind it and if·I could get my hands on him I would wring his 
neck." Much of Dickey's conviction came from an anonymous post card he 
received, stating that "you have just been placed on the secret payroll 
along with the Mayor of [the] United Patrons of Axis." The editor of 
the Beaumont Enterprise echoed these thoughts when he opined that "there 
is a strong suspicion that enemy agents are trying to create racial fric-
tion here, that they have been engaged in this kind of subversive work 
for months. Evidently their work is bearing fruit." These people fully 
expected an F.BI investigation to bear out their notions. Bureau agents 
began work in the city on Wednesday, the 16th; for the remainder of the 
week they tried to piece the story together. In a June 28 report to FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover, however, agents found "no indication" that the 
riot was "instigated or inspired by foreign action." The bureau elected 
to forego a complete inquiry on the basis of this report. Immediately 
the Enterprise changed its opinion on the subject, and on July 9 remarked 
that "the fault lies at home and not abroad. The chief offenders are not 
foes of this country but its own citizens who may think themselves just 
as loyal as anybody else."30 
While the FBI survey continued, the state began its own investiga-
tion, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Royal G. Phillips of the Department of 
Public Safety. He conducted a military court of inquiry to dispose of the 
231 prisoners arrested in connection with the riot. The court got underway 
on June 17 and lasted four days. Phillips discovered that about 60 percent 
30Ibid., June 17, 18, 1943; July 9, 1943; Dallas Moming News, 
June 18, 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943; Hoover to Berge, July 9, 
1943, F.BI Records. 
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of the 225 white prisoners were under thirty years of age and that thirty-
one of them bad criminal records. He also kept a close eye on the draft 
status of these people, hoping to catch evaders. When the court finished 
the hearing, it detained only twenty-nine of the prisoners for further 
action. Most of these people subsequently faced misdemeanor charges, such 
as carrying firearms, public drunkenness, and inciting to mob violenceo 
The majority received fines of $25 plus court costs, so the penalty for 
rioting essentially carried a $30.20 retribution. The police caught one 
man with a sawed-off shotgun measuring only thirteen and one-half inches 
long, a federal offense. The inquiry charged no one with arson or 
murder. 31 
On June 22 the NAACP became actively involved when Walter White 
asked Houston branch secretary Lulu E. White to employ a white man or a 
black person who could pass for white to conduct an inquiry. The Houston 
branch hired Hobart Thomas, a black man who worked for the Houston Informer, 
and he interviewed a number of people. His questioning centered around 
the character of the white woman who said a black man raped her, the nature 
of the mob and its ringleaders, the broader issues behind the riot, and 
public opinion. Meanwhile, the NAACP discovered that a group of prominent 
white Eeaumont businessmen had mised about $3,000 to compensate local 
blacks for losses during the riot. Whether they did this out of compas-
sion or to keep blacks quiet remained unclear. At any rate several blacks 
3¾1emora.ndum, R. J. Abbaticchio to Hoover, September 14, 1943, 
FBI Records; Eeaumont Enterprise, June 18, 19, 20, 22, 1943; July 10, 
1943; Eeaumont Journal, June 19, 1943. This writer was unable to examine 
the report of the military court of inquiry filed by Phillips because, 
according to DPS officials, it has disappeared. 
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received money, including Mrs. John Johnson, whose husband was killed. 
Others included H. N. LeBlanc, who received $301.97 to replace a 1936 
Chevrolet that rioters overturned and burned, and L. P. Rideaux, who re-
ceived $1300 for the loss of his shoe repair shop. Once the Justice 
Department decided against conducting a full-scale investigation, the 
N.AACP's inquiry lost its momentum and quickly died out. 32 
While the FBI, DPS, and NAACP inquiries continued, the city awaited 
June 19 with trepidation. The cancellation of Juneteenth angered many 
local blacks, and the acrimony surrounding the recall election made that 
day a test of Beaumont's stability. It passed with no racial discord, 
and residents breathed sighs of relief when the acting governor lifted 
martial law the next day. The incumbent city officials fared worse, how-
ever, because the election toppled seven of them from office. Many 
citizens held them responsible not only for rampant vice but also for the 
riot. Chief of Police Dickey left office in December. 33 
There was an ironic footnote to the Beaumont riot, for a medical 
examination revealed that the white woman who claimed to have been raped 
on June 15 had in fact not been assaulted. Barker D. Chunn, a Beaumont 
physician, examined her immediately after the alleged incident, but 
authorities withheld the findings for several days. Chunn found that she 
32walter White to Lulu B. White, June 22, 1943; Lulu White to Walter 
White, June 25, 1943; Walter White to Lulu White, July 1, 1943, in ":Beau-
mont Texas Riots," GOF; R. T. Tatum to Lulu White, September 2, 1943; Lulu 
White to Walter White, September 13, 1943; Statements of :Beulah Johnson, 
September 3, 1943, H. N. Le:Slanc, September 3, 1943, and L. P. Rideaux, 
September 7, 1943, in "Houston," :Branch File (BF), NAACP Papers. 
33:seaumont Journal, June 21, 22, 1943; Beaumont Enterprise, 
November 28, 1943. 
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had neither been sexually assaulted nor engaged in sexual activities in 
the period immediately surrounding the alleged rape. Why she claimed to 
have been raped remained a mystery, but in any event the truthfulness of 
her accusation made little difference. 34 
//: ';:t\ 
The Beaumont riot was the largest single racial outbreak of the war Z , 
in the South. The fact that it did not receive intense national coverage 
was due to the larger Detroit riot, which broke out only a few days after 
the Texas violence. The :Beaumont episode also proved significant because 
it reflected familiar southern traits that characterized previous riots. 
Interracial competition in housing and labor helped produce tension in a 
congested production area. The violence was ignited by the familiar 
claim of interracial rape, and whites reacted by rioting against easily 
accessible black residents. :Burri..ing, looting, and killing ravaged the 
black community. In this way whites demonstrated their fear of black 
advancement and isolated but significant breaches of racial etiquette in 
a period of instability. The Mobile and :Beaumont riots shared much in 
common, while the Detroit and Harlem riots both typified, in varying de-
grees, the change from white to black civilian aggression. Obviously, 
\\ 
black experiences differed from South to North. Considering the conditions 
that caused the :Beaumont riot, the city was fortunate that it did not 
suffer repeated violence. Perhaps conditions improved after 1943, or 
perhaps the city became so conscious of racial tension that efforts to 
prevent future outbreaks proved successful. 
34™, June 18, 1943; Anonymous Jefferson County official to 
H. C. Galloway, September 25, 1943, in ":Beaumont Texas Riots," GOF, 
NAACP Papers. 
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On June 16, as if to accent the nationwide deterioration of race 
relations, an outbreak occurred at the Chester, Pennsylvania, Sun Ship-
building yards. In the midst of a hotly debated struggle over union 
representation, part of which involved black participation, company guards 
shot five black workers and killed one of them. Although yard officials 
placed the blame for the incident on the CIO, the company's own guards 
proved to be the guilty parties. This incident, however, paled by com-
parison with the Detroit riot, the single largest outbreak in the nation 
iuring the war. 35 
Occurring June 20 through 22, the Detroit race riot took thirty-
.:our lives and did an estimated $2 million in property damage. The city, 
~ome of many major war industries, suffered from extremely congested con-
iitions, for well over 500,000 people moved there during the period from 
1940 to 1943. Elacks in particular found a critical housing shortage; 
~ost lived in the thirty-block ghetto known as ~aradise Valley. The 
Sojourner Truth housing riots in 19h2 attested to these difficulties, 
while the early June Packard strike provided evidence of worsening rela-
~ions in the economic sectoro 36 
The riot erupted on a Sunday ~hen an interracial fight began near 
Belle Isle, a recreation area. That night rumors flew over the city, 
with the versions varying between blacks and whites. A mob of blacks 
~shed to Belle Isle only to find it barricaded, so they resorted to 
35"Industrial Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in 
:..ace Relations, 1 (August 1943), .5; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943. 
36Guzman, Negro Year Eook, 237; Harvard Sitkoff, "The Detroit 
Eace Riot of 1943," Michigan History, 53 (Fall 1969), 187-88. 
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throwing rocks at cars and beating white passers-by. At the same time 
whites attacked blacks along Woodward Avenue. By early the next morning 
po:rtions of Paradise Valley were in ruins as blacks continued to attack 
the most accessible symbols of oppression, white-owned property, as well 
as white citizens who happened by. Whites simultaneously stepped up 
their attacks on blacks, pulling them from streetcars and businesses. 37 
The violence, which claimed thirty-four lives, all but nine black, 
ended only after federal troops entered Detroit on the night of June 21. 
Immediately a nationwide search for scapegoats got underway in an effort 
to provide explanations not only for the Detroit outbreak but the Mobile, 
Los Angeles, and Beaumont riots as well. An indignant NAACP offered free 
defense counsel for the black people arrested in connection with the riot 
and issued a report on the riot to help avert violence in other tension 
spots around the country. At the same time the Michigan state authorities 
produced a report that placed primary responsibility for the outbreak on 
blacks. Meanwhile scholars, joll.nlalists, and others puzzled over what 
the violence of the summer reflected and portended. Two sociologists, 
Alfred M. Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, quickly wrote a book dealing with 
the Detroit episode; they outlined a program for detecting symptoms of 
racial unrest and how to cure them. Other organizations warned of a pos-
sible continuation of the violence. The Urban League, for example, cau-
tioned that the recent riots "indicate organized subversive design for 
hindering war effort by stimulating racial conflict in war industry 
centers," noting that Mobile, Los Angeles, Beaumont, and Detroit all 
37sitkoff, "Detroit Riot," 189-90. 
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contained essential war production plants. Many others fully expected 
trials esa.Iia.ting from the Detroit riot to show Axis influence. 38 
Concerned writers joined in deploring violence that was especially 
shocking in view of the number of deaths, amount of destruction, and loss 
of war production. Business Week complained about the loss of manhours 
in the riot-tom cities, while the Nation observed that "the Axis is los-
ing battles in Europe and the Pacific, but it can console itself with 
victories recently won in the United States." New Republic blamed the 
governors of Alabama, California, Michigan, and Texas for exhibiting 
shortsightedness in failing to see the clear signs of unrest in their 
states. Liberal columnist Thomas Sancton attributed the recent outbreaks 
to "a general shift of the economic and spiritual position of the Negro 
group relative to the white group." John Temple Graves reiterated his 
stance on the subject by observing that the immediate causes of the vio-
lence lay in "an atmosphere of war tension and high wages in which agita-
tors for making the war an occasion for reforming race relations" and "im-
placables on the other side" were chafing for trouble. Virginius Dabney 
cautioned that evolutionary processes would provide the only answer to 
the nation's racial problems. "Men of goodwill in all parts of this land," 
he offered, "must counsel together with a view to achieving the most equit-
able and most speedy adjustments that are possible."39 
38Ibid., 191-96; Pittsburgh Courier, May 13, 1943; July 10, 1943; 
"Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, 50 (August 1943), 249; ibid. 
(September 1943), 280; Lee and Humphrey, Race Riot; National Urban League, 
Racial Conflict--A Home Front Danger: Lessons of the Detroit Riot 
(New York, 1943), 14. 
39"Race Riots Hurt," :Business Week, June 26, 1943, p. 102; "Defeat 
at Detroit," Nation, July 3, 1943, p. 4; "The Governors Pass the Buck," 
New Republic, July 12, 1943, pp. 38-39; Thomas Sancton, "The Race Riots, 11 
ibid., July 5, 1943, pp. 9-13; Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943. 
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Among conservative public officials, interest was high but explana-
tions differed. In response to a request for information from Walter 
Davenport of Collier's, for example, Governor Olin D. Johnson of South 
Carolina reported that "we people in South Carolina have always been able 
to handle the race question without riots and trouble. We can solve our 
problems without outside interference from Washington or northern agita-
tors." A similar response came from Alabama's Governor Chauncey Sparks. 
"If there be future race rioting, in my opinion, it will have its roots 
buried in inflammatory Negro newspapers." He complained that "the atti-
tude of certain ambitious politicians and misguided and emotional mission-
aries who place shibboleths above reality" represented part of the prob-
lem. Thus, whether the reactions to Detroit's violence came frow liberals 
or conservatives, they proved uniformly strong.40 
While President Roosevelt appeared nonplussed about the racial situ-
ation, other politicians took adv-c::.ntage of the violence to build support 
among blacks. In a July 24 radio broadcast Wendell Willkie joined others 
in an "Open Letter to the American People" exposing the _dangers of racial 
turmoil. "This is a time for serious thought and sober words," Willkie 
observed, adding that "the situation which flared so tragically in Detroit 
has its counterpart in many Americc...-ri cities." Vice President Henry Wallace 
countered that "those who fan the fires of racial clashes for the purpose 
of ma.king political capital here at home, are taking the first step toward 
Nazism." 
400lin D. Johnson to Walter Davenport, July 2, 1943; Chauncey Sparks 
to Davenport, June 30, 1943, in "Davenport re: Racial Tensions," GOF, 
NAACP Papers. 
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In Congress a tempestuous debate ensued over both the causes of 
the racial violence and proposed Congressional action. Southern conserva-
tive John E. Rankin attributed the Detroit riot to "the crazy policies of 
the so-called Fair Employment Practices Committee," and asserted that the 
only possibility for racial harmony was "complete segregation." Convinced 
that the Ku Klux Klan lay behind the unrest, Samu.el Dickstein of New York 
called for an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee. 
Dickstein's fellow New York Congressman, Arthur C. Klein, introduced a 
resolution calling for a select committee to probe the violence. Sena-
tors Styles Bridges and C. Wayland Brooks proposed a companion measure 
to.investigate not only the riots but the general status of minority 
participation in the defense effort.41 
Before the wheels of Congressional action could begin turning, how-
ever, the fifth and final major riot of 1943 broke out. The Harlem riot 
of August 1 and 2 epitomized the change from white to black aggression 
in civilian American race rioting, and for that reason it was perhaps the/ ;\ 
I/~ 1 
most significant of the 1943 disorders. As the largest and most influen-\_} 
tial black community in the nation, Harlem also proved one of tre most 
militant. It bad spawned the Harlem Renaissance, was home to Marcus 
Garvey during the 1920s, underwent a black-aggression riot in 1935, and 
during the war served as the militant headquarters of black America. 
It was significant, then, that such violence broke out there. 
41Pittsburgh Courier, July 17, 24, 31, 1943; New York Times, 
June 24, 1943, p. 12; U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 78th 
Cong., 1st sess., 89, pt. 5, pp. 6343, 7039, 7074; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, ibid., 7266. 
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The riot that began on the night of August 1 developed out of 
complex antecedents. Certainly the militancy that characterized Harlem 
intellectuals proved one of the factors. In addition, the riot of 1935 
remained fresh in many minds. But in general black Harlemites felt frus-
trated, and this in part led to aggressive behavior. As one social psy-
chologist who studied the riot later said, "once a framework of frustra-
tion has produced a reaction of aggression, the degree of aggression will 
depend upon the degree of frustration." Ha.rlemites felt the frustration 
of discriminatory treatment within a wartime experience that proclaimed 
democracy as the savior of oppressed peoples overseas. On that Sunday 
night a black MP, Robert Bandy, and a white policeman, James Collins, 
argued over the arrest of a black woman in the lobby of a shabby hotel 
on West 126th Street. The argument resulted in the slight wounding of 
:Bandy, but in the sweltering heat people in the streets began hearing 
rumors that the MP had been killed in front of his mother. Violence 
erupted as ordinary Harlem residents vented their anger against "the 
available symbols of the oppressor. the shining plate glass windows 
of stores" owned by whites. The rioters were not militants; rather they 
were "the Bigger Thomases of New Yorlr" who "passed like a cloud of locusts 
over the stores of Harlem." As Ralph Ellison described the scene in 
Invisible Man, "suddenly the block leaped alive. Men who seemed to rise 
up out of the sidewalks were rushing into the store fronts above me, their 
voices rising excitedly." From blind fury came a carnival-like atmosphere 
of looting and bu.ming that lasted through the night.42 
42orlansky, Harlem Riot, 4-6, 12; Pittsburgh Courier, August 7, 
1943; New York Times, August 2, 1943, p. l; White, "Behind the Harlem 
Riot," 221-22; Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (New York, 1947), 464. 
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As the destruction continued, New York Mayor Fiorello La.Guardia 
called squads of policemen, firemen, and black Office of Civilian Defense 
(OCD) volunteers into the area, and the first of 8,000 New York State 
Guardsmen mobilized in area annories. Ia.Guardia's expeditious action 
confined the rioting to one night; it could have lasted much longer. In 
the end five blacks died, an estimated 400 received injuries, police 
arrested more than 500, and the rioters destroyed $5 million worth of 
propertyo 43 
As expected, white reaction to the riot counseled caution. Even 
such liberal periodicals as Commonweal suggested "both to the Negro press 
and to such agencies as the NAACP that they reconsider their tactics in 
the light of existing circumstances." Curiously, the black reaction proved 
confused, perhaps representing the shock that many blacks suffered upon 
hearing of the nature of the outbreak. The usually militant Pittsburgh 
Courier, for example, proclaimed that "the prepondering majorities of 
law-abiding American colored people are deeply downcast and humiliated 
because of the acts of vandalism and disorder committed by their fellow-
men a short while ago." Even Walter Whi.te could not explain the violence 
and finally concluded that the riot "was the fury born of repeated, un-
checked, unpunished, and often unrebuked shooting, maiming, and insult-
ing of Negro troops, particularly in Southern states. 1144 
4~ew York Times, August 2, 1943, p. l; August 3, 1943, PPo 1, 10; 
Walter White, A Man Called White: The Autobio ra of Walter White 
(Bloomington, 1948, 233-410 
44"Assessing the :Blame," Commonweal, August 17, 1943, p. 407; 
Pittsburgh Courier, August 14, 1943; White to Henry L. Stimson, August 
6, 1943, AG 291.2, RG 407. 
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Meanwhile the summer's violence initiated widespread changes that 
attempted to bolster race relations. The black press became less militant]~ 
as editors recognized the perilous racial situation. Blacks stood to lose 
much of what they had gained, so Double V slogans and vitriolic editorials 
decreased. At the same time interracial committees sprang up across the 
nation as citizens recognized that violence could assume epidemic propor-
tions. By October, Edwin Embree of the Rosenwald Fund reported the estab-
lishment of sixty-three such committees on the local and state levels. 
Lester B. Granger of the Urban League caught the tone of a shift in inter-
racial concem by coining the term "victory through unity." In addition, 
a plethora of articles and pamphlets on ways to prevent race riots appeared 
to supplement Lee and Humphrey's Race Riot. Such pieces carried titles 
like ''Reducing Bacial Tensions," "How to Prevent Race Riots, 11 and "Race 
Riot Prescription. 1145 
In Washington a pumber of suggestions emerged. Some recommended 
tbat Roosevelt deliver a fireside chat on the recent violence, but he and 
his aides decided against it. Others suggested tmt the President create 
a committee on race relations within the Executive Office, a plan that 
received favorable publicity. Again, Roosevelt killed the idea but did 
appoint Jonathan Daniels as a coordinator of government information on the 
rioting. Finally, the administration stifled budding Congressional probes 
of the violence, so no official federal action emerged in the wake of the 
45Finkle, Forum for Protest, 168; Pittsburgh Courier, October 9, 
1943; Lester :B. Granger, "Victory Through Unity," Opportunity, 21 (October 
1943), 147-51; Alfred l3aker Lewis, "Reducing Racial Tensions," :ibid., 
156-57, 174; Winifred Raushenbush, "How to Prevent Race Riots," American 
Mercury, 57 (September 1943), 302-9; "Race Riot Prescription," Science 
News Letter, December 11, 1943, p. 381. 
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summer's rioting. Speculation pointed to the 1944 election as the main 
reason why Roosevelt remained passive toward the crisis. 46 
A brief flurry of controversy arose when the NAACP charged that 
Attorney General Francis Biddle had recommended banning black migration 
to certain congested areas as a practical way of helping ease racial 
tension. This charge stemmed from a story the New York Post carried on 
August 11 in which Biddle reportedly suggested to Roosevelt that "careful 
consideration be given to limiting, and in some instances putting an end 
to, Negro migrations into communities which cannot absorb them." Whether 
he actually made such a proposal or not, Biddle quickly denied it, ex-
plaining that he ·only meant to point out the housing problems of major 
cities like Detroit where racial tension remained high. Civil rights 
groups remained suspicious of Biddle.47 
r- .---., 
In the South the most beneficial action ta.ken during the weeks afte~ 
the riots came with the establishment of the Southern Regional Council (SRC). 
This agency was an interracial outgrowth of the all-black Durham Conference 
of October 1942 and the all-white Atlanta Conference of April 1943. Recog-
nizing the need for a broadly based regional organization to foster better 
race relations, members of both conferences convened in Richmond on June 
16. The statement the conference produced reflected a search for interracial 
stability, for it observed that the major concern confronting the South, 
46Da.lfiume, "Forgotten Years," 105-6; "Federal,State, and City 
Action," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1 (August 
1943), 15; Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 677; idem, "Detroit Riot," 204-5. 
47Telegram, Roy Wilkins to Francis Biddle, August 9, 1943; State-
ment by NAACP, August 12, 1943, in ":Biddle re: Riots," GOF, NAACP 
Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, August 21, 1943. 
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exclusive of the war, "is the problem of two great peoples caught up in 
the midst of transition between the powerful heritage of the past and the 
mighty pull of the future." The Richmond Conference laid the groundwork 
for the creation of the SRC, which in effect replaced the dying Commission 
on Interracial Cooperation. On August 4, 1943, a select group of the 
Richmond conferees met in Atlanta under the chairmanship of Howard W. 
Odum, and with that meeting the SRC formally emerged. It included among 
its major commitments in fostering interracial harmony support of a power-
ful FEPC, abolition of the poll tax, a federal agency to guarantee civil 
rights to minorities, and experimental integration of some anned forces 
units. The SRC was not without its critics from both the left and right, 
but it would play a valuable role in the future of southern race rela-
tions. 48 
The violence of the summer of 1943 made plain the conflict between 
blacks and whites over the deeper issues of the war era. In part a loss 
of communication fostered heightened discord and gave each racial group a 
warped view of each other. This difference of views permeated the politi-
cal, economic, and military spheres of World War II life. Given the con-
gestion, high mobility, shortages, and lack of interracial understanding 
that caused tensions to rise to the boiling point, it is remarkable that 
during mid-1943 even more severe violence did not erupt. That which did 
occur disrupted the war effort, but it could easily have been larger and 
4S"The Richmond Statement: Resolution"s of the Collaboration Com-
mittee," New South, 19 (January 1964), 16-17; Virginius Dabney, "The South 
Marches On," Survey Graphic, 32 (November 1943), 441-43; "Southern Regional 
Council," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1 
(August 1943), 18-19. 
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more destructive. Countless other incidents, both large and small, 
accompanied the major riots as hardly an urban center in the nation 
escaped racial conflict of some magnitude. Rumors of riots also floated 
across the country, and considering the fact that rumors ignited three 
of the five major outbreaks of this period, they could have produced 
even more grim results. 
For years historians, sociologists, and psychologists have to 
some degree been preoccupied with the issue of why riots exploded in some 
cities when many others produced similar background conditions but did not 
suffer these incidents. Models, theories, and formulas based on demog-
raphy, social indices, politics, economics, and historical antecedents 
fl d f th f d . . L.9 owe rem e pens o aca emicians. · Certainly, an examination of the 
Mobile, Los Angeles, Beaumont, Detroit, and Harlem riots provides a com-
mon variety of causal factors. The failure of interracial communication, 
the insensitivity of policy makers toward increasing tension, perceived or 
real threats by one group against another, labor and housing conflicts, 
and racial traditions manifested themselves in the five cities that under-
went riots as well as in others. But rationalizing about spontaneous, 
semi-rational incidents does not provide the full explanation. Some 
places underwent riots because the various ingredients in the overall 
formula jelled at precisely the wrong time; a relatively inoffensive in-
cident proved sufficient to ignite violence. Such was the case in five 
cities during the summer of 1943 when the exigencies of war affected 
people's sensibilities. 
49see, for example, Grimshaw, P~cial Violence in the United 
States, and Short and Wolfgang, Collective Violence. 
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The same general causal patterns that prevailed across the nation._ 
produced different results. In the South, the violence involved white 
aggression against perceived threats to the color line, while in the North 
the violence involved black aggression in varying degrees trat stemmed from 
years of frustration and oppression. Scholars have attempted to explain 
the changing nature of violence in a variety of ways. August Meier and 
Elliott Rudwick, for example, observed the shift from white to black 
aggression during the war as the result of intellectual and demographic 
alterations. Increased white sensitivity to the plight of blacks and 
corresponding militancy by blacks brought about by disillusionment with 
slow progress. in the struggle for equal rights fanned the intellectual 
shift. The growth of large, semi-autonomous ghettos formed the demo-
graphic shift. Thus, "even if white mobs were to fo:r:.m, they would be 
i.mable to attack and burn down the Negro residential areas." Similarly, 
Morris Janowitz perceived the change from what he termed "communal" to 
"commodity" riots during the war as emanating largely from "the role of 
the police and law enforcement agencies and. o • the mass media." Yet 
these and other scholars took as their focus the urban ghettos of the 
North and assumed that the southern experience was roughly similar. A j 
transformation did occur in the nature of rioting, but it essentially 
proved a sectional one.SO 
In explaining the sectional divergence, historical patterns of 
race relations emerge as crucial. For southern blacks life meant 
✓-
50August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, ":Black Violence in the 20th 
Century: A Study in Rhetoric and Retaliation," in Graham and Gurr, eds., 
Violence in .America, 405-6; Morris Janowitz, "Patterns of Collective 
Racial Violence," ibid., 413. 
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virtually total segregation in a rigidly enforced caste system. Because 
of this, little interracial understanding existed. Blacks' wo:r:king, eating, 
religious, social, and intellectual lives were restricted and defined. 
Attempts to break out of the caste system resulted in violence, thus 
helping produce the tradition of violence for which the South became 
noted. The total experience provided southern blacks with a restricted 
view a..'t'ld limited goals. When war came, conditions changed enough so that/., 
blacks in the South became hopeful of permanent advancements. When they 
:reflected this hope through assertiveness, it seemed to whites that the 
color line was in peril. To maintain it, they employed violence. 
For northern blacks the situation remained one of discrimination 
a~d oppression, but they did not suffer under a rigidly imposed caste 
system. Many attended good schools, read unprejudiced textbooks, rode 
integrated buses and trains, and enjoyed many everyday pleasures most 
southern blacks did not. Yet northern blacks faced frustration. Despite 
their freedom they remained in second-class positions. Their view was 
not limited by a visible color line, so they clearly saw that they en-
joyed more advantages than their brethren in Dixie yet remained below 
whites. They lived in a superficial nearness to whites and felt tolerated 
but never accepted. The frustration that came from this position crystal-
lized in the Harlem riot.51 
While wa:rtime conditions proved similar across the country, the 
violence differed in nature from North to South and brought different 
results. Blacks everywhere began to abandon overt forms of mili tance · -~\ 




after the riots of 1943, yet for southern blacks the retreat involved a 
bitter recognition of the power of the color line. As a larger propor-
tion of the population, and as residents of the region only seventy-
eight years removed from slavery, black southerners witnessed the limi-
tations placed on them enforced through coercion a._~d violence. Th.-e 
Beaumont riot provided the main symbolic act of white enforcement of 
the color line. 
CHA.PTER VII 
FROM WAR TO PEACE? 
The "epidemic of interracial violence" of the summer of 1943, both 
civilian and military, brought to an end the most intense racial discord 
of the war em. Through the last two years of the conflict, however, 
race relations did not measurably improve as violence continued at a 
less intense level across the South. Military mutinies and lynchings 
occurred with enough frequency in 1944 and 1945 to demonstrate that race 
\/ . 
l/ 
relations remained tense. The violence of this period also cast a shadow 
of dread over the postwar South. A new set of factors brought on by the; 
I, 
end of the conflict and reconversion would prove instrumental in the con-
tinuation of violence even as the war came to a close. There were no 
civilian riots during this period, but in the last two years other forms 
of racial violence, mutinies and lynchings, continued. 
The mutinies generally showed the dissatisfaction of black service-. 
men with degrading experiences in the military. These incidents were in-
variably resistance to white intimidation or violence. Lynchings con-
tinued to serve notice of white resistance to a softening of the color 
' line. Such incidents took on new meaning with the end of the war, becaus~ 
i 
they increasingly showed a fierce determination by southern whites to es- / ,·L 
tablish prewar race relations--strict adherence to the caste system and_j 
swift punishment of those who violated it. After the clashes of 1943, 
southern blacks, bitter and increasingly alienated, withdrew from efforts 
to break down the color line. Having reached out for the equal opportunity 
supposedly guaranteed them, they recoiled from the hostile reaction of a 
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white majority whose ideas about protecting democracy evidently did not 
extend to them. 
Lynchings and military violence began early in 1944 though the 
military incidents occurred with more frequency and intensity. 1 In 
January about thirty black soldiers from Dyersburg Army Air Force Base 
became embroiled in a shooting affray in the nearby town of Ripley, 
Tennessee. The exchange left one soldier dead and two civilian police-
men wounded. On March 22 a group of black soldiers mutinied at Dale Mabry 
Field (Tallahassee), Florida, refusing to obey the commands of their 
superiors until their grievances, based on discrimination, were heard. 
Five men, all northerners, were convicted in April of inciting a mutiny 
and dishonorably discharged with prison sentences ranging from thirteen 
to fifteen years. 2 
In May another serious riot broke out. Breckley Field, located in 
Mobile, Alabama, served as a repair and modification depot for the Army 
Air Force. It was the only such installation with deep water port facili-
ties. Built in 1940, Breckley Field housed about 15,000 soldiers and 
civilians, complete with the segregation of facilities and services black 
1The lynchings of 1944 began with the drowning death of a young 
boy, Willie Howard, near Live Oak, Florida, on January 2. On March 26 
an elderly black man, Isaac Simmons, died at the hands of a six-man mob. 
On November 23, James Scales, an inmate at a Tennessee reformatory, died 
violently after killing the family of the Pikeville institution's super-
intendent. Guzman, Negro Year Book, 302-11; "Report Concerning the Lynch-
ing of James Scales, Thursday, November 23, 1944," by Z. Alexander Looby, 
in "Lynching--Tennessee (Scales)"; David Ianier to Spessard Holland, 
February 7, 1944, in "Lyncbing--Live Oak, Floricla--Willie Howard," GOF, 
NAACP Papers. 
2Pittsburgh Courier, January 8, 1944; February 12, 1944; Florence 
Mu.rray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1946-1947 (New York, 1947), 350-51; 
Review of proceedings, U.S. v. Pvt. Joseph R. Kent et al., August 14, 
1944, in "Court Martial Cases, 1940-1947," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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Gis had come to loathe. Black soldiers at the base were physically 
isolated from the whites, for their quarters lay inside a racetrack at 
the Mobile County Fairgrounds. A forbidding barbed wire fence encircled 
the area, giving the place the aura of a stockade. The barracks bad no 
glass in the windows; the openings were covered by shutters. Only one 
post exchange served the black contingent. The main bone of contention 
✓-
among the blacks proved, as always, the rough treatment they encountered 
at the hands of white MPs. Even this late in the war the Army apparently 
used blacks as military policemen only at bases where trouble bad occurred 
or where it was convenient to do so. ]lacks at Brookley complained loudly 
about being abused by white MPs and often expressed their desire for black 
replacements. These complaints went unheeded. 3 
Conditions in Mobile itseif also left something to be desired. 1c- ✓ 
counts of discriminatory treatment and abuse at the hands of civilian 
policemen in the cit~ had circulated since Brookley opened. In 1942 a 
white bus driver shot Private Henry Williams to death for no apparent rea-
son, an incident that illustrated the raw feelings between white Mobilians 
and the black troops. The 1943 race riot aggravated the racial situation, 
and since then the reaction of local whites against black advancement bad 
only intensified. The presence of Brookley Field's black soldiers threat-
ened white control over a supposedly inferior minority group, so that Gis 
received the brunt of white Mobile's efforts to preserve the prewar racial 
3Presnell, "Impact of World War II in Mobile," 1-2, 38; J. L. 
LeFlore to Truman K. Gibson, June 15, 1944, in "Brookley Field," CASW 
Records, RG 107. 
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system. Since the May 1943 riot, complaints and individual incidents of 
white abuse of black soldiers continued.4 
For Brookley Field's black servicemen the breaking point came on 
May 24, 1944. Late that night a white civilian, Marshal L. Holt, argued 
with a small group of black soldiers just outside the north gate to the 
jim crow area of the base. Holt, it seems, had been in the habit of sell-
ing bootleg gin to the men, and on this particular night while plying his 
trade, he made obscene remarks to the female companion of a black soldier. 
The soldier beat Holt soundly. The white man immediately found two white 
MPs and told them that a group of black soldiers had beaten and robbed 
:him. The MPs then called for reinforcements, and two more MPs arrived 
shortly. They went to the scene of the alleged beating and found a group 
of about forty blacks congregated there waiting for a bus to Mobile. The 
provost marshal at Brookley arrived and immediately ordered the blacks 
back to their barracks, apparently so Holt's attackers could be found. 
Disgruntled, the blacks moved back to the "colored area" very slowly. 
Another directive quickly followed--that all black soldiers en route to 
town be returned and confined to the black area of camp. These orders, 
issued in response to what seemed like a rather mild offense, made the 
blacks angry. Once again, reaction to a breach of discipline resulted in, 
what appeared to blacks, heavy and unwarranted retribution.5 
As MPs escorted Holt around the camp in an attempt to determine 
who thrashed and robbed him, the blacks, knowing that he was lying, grew 
½,resnell, "Impact of World War II in Mobile," 37. 
5Pittsburgh Courier, June 3, 1944; Chicago Defender, June 3, 1944. 
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even more defensive and sullen. The contemptuous attitude of the MPs did 
not help matters. Seeing that the blacks were in a hostile mood, the MPs 
requested reinforcements, and shortly seven or eight more policemen ar-
rived, armed with submachine guns and shotguns. A crowd of black Gis 
gathered just inside the gate, grumbling that "if you want to play we can 
play too." Within a few minutes the crowd of about seventy-five, mainly 
from either the 437th Aviation Squadron or the 4906th AAF Ease Unit, 
broke into a gun room and absconded with about thirty-five rifles and 
twenty-five machine guns. Spasmodic shooting then broke out and continued 
for two hours. 6 
The firing began about midnight, and officers, hearing the reports 
of the rifles and quick discharges of the machine guns, headed for the 
area. Captain Robert Ferguson, acting as officer of the day, arrived 
first and implored the men to cease firing. His admonitions prompted a 
salvo of fire. Shortly afterward the commander of the 437th, Captain 
Richard Greene, arrived and shouted, "fellows, cut out the firing; I am 
coming in." Again, the mutineers ignored the order. Greene hoped to 
prevent the spread of violence, so he borrowed a machine gun from an MP 
and crawled to the 437th's gun room. There he met Sergeant Wellington D. 
Abrams, a black man, and with Captain Ferguson they quickly determined 
the number of weapons and quantity of ammunition missing. Greene decided 
to remove the remaining ammunition to a more secure location and sent 
611Report of :Board of Officers Appointed to Investigate the Cause, 
Circumstances, Facts Leading to, and Persons Involved, in a Disturbance 
and Disorder Occurring On or About 25 May 1944 at :Brookley Field, Ala-
bama, May 25, 1944," AG 291.21, RG 407; "Judge Advocate's Review, August 
4, 1944," U.S. v. Pvt. Clarence N. Rogers et al., Case 261221, JAG 
Records, RG 153. 
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Abrams to find a jeep. Abrams left, but while he searched for a jeep a 
group of MPs confronted him, decided he was one of the insurgents, and 
shot him five times. The black sergeant, critically wounded, later re-
ceived help in getting to the hospital. Greene and Ferguson continued 
to load the 4,000 rounds of ammunition and succeeded in moving it to the 
orderly room. Once there, black soldiers riddled the building trying to 
hit Greene, but luckily the shots struck neither the officer nor the 
ammunition. 
At the same time the 4906th 1 s commander, Lieutenant Howard Wisquist, 
attempted to calm his unit by talking to the men. As soon as he drove 
through the gate someone fired at least six shots in his direction, 
:arcing him to flee from his car a.Tld jU!!!p through a window into the 
~rderly room. While Wisquist 1 s Qifficu.lties continued, the floodlights 
~f the 437th and 4906th areas, hastily repaired after insurgents had 
damaged them, flashed on to expose the scramble. Immediately base offi-
cers conducted a roll call and a preliminary search for weapons. Briga-
dier General James A. Mollison, head of the Mobile Air Service Command, 
arrived and addressed the men. He reportedly also walked unarmed into the 
barracks and persuaded others to surrender their guns. At any rate the 
shooting quickly stopped. 7 
The next day a board of officers convened at Brookley Field to 
su.rvey the situation and make recommend.ationso It concluded that a more 
711Report of :Soard of Officers at :Brookley Field, May 25, 1944," 
AG 291.21, RG 407; "Judge Advocate 1s Review, August 4, 1944," U. s. v. 
~ogers, JAG Records, RG 153; Pittsburgh Courier, June 3, 1944; Atlanta 
Constitution, May 26, 1944; Mobile Register, May 26, 1944; June 27, 1944. 
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widespread disturbance was avoided because "many of the soldiers in the 
two organizations are of excellent type and character." It also concluded 
that "there was no act or treatment by military authorities which tended 
to provoke a mutinyo" In other words, the board found itself at a loss 
to explain why men with such excellent characters would incite to riot 
without a:ny pretext whatever. 8 
On June 26 a general court-martial arraigned nine black soldiers, 
six from the 437th and three from the 4906th, on charges of violating 
three articles of war: the 66th, wli.ich prohibited joining a mutiny, the 
67th, which prohibited failure to suppress a mutiny, and the 89th, which 
prohibited rioting. Fach of the nine soldiers pleaded not guilty to all 
three chargeso Without delay the defense counsel, Lieutenant Colonel 
Grant Richards, moved to strike the charges pertaining to the 66th and 
67th Articles because they represented, in effect, double jeopardy. The 
soldiers could not have both joined a mutiny and also failed to suppress 
the same mutiny. "To permit both charges to remain," the defense pointed 
out, "would place each and all of the accused in double jeopardy for the 
same offense." The trial judge advocate overruled the motions, and the 
prosecution's presentation got underway. 9 
Lieutenant Colonel William McCaw, former Attorney General of Texas, 
served as chief prosecutoro After providing evidence verifying the length 
of the mutiny, the number of firearms used, and the amount of ammunition 
8 "Report of Board of Officers at Brookley Field, May 25, 1944," 
AG 291.21, RG 407. 
911 Judge Advocate's Review, August 4, 1944," U. S. v. Rogers, JAG 
Records, RG 153; Mobile Register, June 27, 28, 19440 
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expended, McCaw called Captains Ferguson and Greene to the stand, and they 
testified to their roles in the incident and who they observed taking part. 
In addition, Mccaw called a number of black soldiers who implicated each 
of the nine defendants as either actively taking part in the riot or 
carrying guns. The defense sought to discredit portions of this testimony 
on the grounds that it was filled with contradictions, but the statements 
stood as evidence. The defense also managed to introduce the testimony 
of eight of the nine accused men in an effort to refute the previous 
testimony. The ninth, Private Willie Wright, chose to remain silento 
Each of the eight reaffirmed his innocence or pointed to the unfairness 
of the cases against them; in their opinion all of the mutineers should 
be tried or none at all. Private Willie Ward, for example, asserted that 
someone shoved a machine gun into his bands but that he laid it down, ran 
to the orderly room, and thereafter had nothing to do with the violence. 
Waro then blurted tmt "I ain't never had any trouble with the MPs--I 
. 't b 1 k d . 1 · f ,,lO ain never een oc e up in my 1 e. 
During these proceedings defense counselor Richards must have real-
ized the hopelessness of the situation, so he submitted two motions de-
signed to get the defendants off with lighter terms. On the first, he 
asked the court to render not guilty verdicts for each of the accused on 
the charge of violating the 67th Article of War. Since the prosecution 
bad to prove beyond doubt that the accused failed to exercise their utmost 
energies to suppress the riot and since there existed no ironclad proof, 
10chicago Defender, July 8, 1944; Mobile Register, June 29, 1944; 
Presnell, "Impact of World War II in Mobile," 39-41; Testimony of Pvto 
Willie Ward, Jr., U. S. v. Rogers, JAG Records, RG 153. 
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no one could say positively that they failed to actively aid in suppress-
ing the mutiny. The second motion asked that all charges be dropped 
against Privates Enos :Bailey and F,dward Reese on the basis of lack of 
evidence. The court denied both motions. 
With that the case for the defense collapsed. On June 29 the ver-
dicts came in: the court found all nine men guilty of violating Articles 
66 and 67. On the charge of violating Article 89, the court convicted 
five of the nine, and the other four were acquitted presumably for lack 
of evidence. The sentences for all nine included dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of pay, and confinement at hard labor for periods ranging 
from sixteen to twenty-five years. A subsequent review by the judge 
advocate at Brookley Field set the place of confinement as the federal 
penitentiary in Atlanta. On August 23, in a routine check by the Judge 
Advocate General's office in Washington, the legality of the trial pro-
11 ceedings and disposition of the cases received final approval. 
While the court-martial progressed, the NAACP, particularly the 
Mobile b:ranch, fumed. John L. LeFlore, cbainnan of the chapter, inun-
dated Truman Gibson at the War Department with letters pointing out some 
of the :racial difficulties that bad brought on the mutiny and arguing that 
the Army blithely ignored these factors in its investigation of the riot. 
"According to information made available to us," LeFlore complained, 
"Negro soldiers who feel that as Americans they should be treated decently, 
are growing tired of the sort of conditions that the War Department ms 
1111Judge Advocate•s Review, August 4, 1944"; Findings of Board of 
Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, August 23, 1944, U.S. v. Rogers, 
JAG Records, RG 153; Mobile Register, June 29, 30, 1944. 
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permitted to exist at Brookley Field." He pointed out the segregated and 
discriminatory nature of the blacks' existence there, including separate 
and unequal facilities and maltreatment by MPs. Gibson took note of Le-
Flore's complaints but promised nothing. Not easily rebuffed, LeFlore 
insisted that corrective action remained urgent, and he even relayed a 
request to Gibson on behalf of some of the soldiers asking that General 
Benjamin 0. Davis be sent secretly to Brookley to undertake an investiga-
tion. Gibson, however, deflated black Mobile's expectations when he re-
ported that "General Davis is out of the country so he cannot be sent." 
After this, LeFlore•s hopes for an investigation and for the possible re-
12 lease of the nine soldiers on trial evaporated. As summer approached, 
the War Department, as part of its overall effort to improve race rela-
tiorl.S, expressed concern about an increase in civilian violence. With 
the lessons of the previous summer in mind, Adjutant General of the Anny 
J. A. Ulio issued on June 14 one of the department's cure-all memorandums, 
directing commanding generals in the domestic service commands to be wary 
of a:n:y unusual strain in civilian race relations. Specifically, it noted 
that agitation among "certain negro and white" groups, "the advent of 
warmer weather with consequent increase in outdoor activities," and cut-
backs in war production that "may result in disproportionate economic dis-
advantages to the negro," served as potential causes of racial violence. 
To help pacify blacks and whites, the War Department could aid civilian 
authorities by acting in close liaison with them. It could transmit 
12LeFlore to Gibson, June 15, 191.w; Gibson to LeFlore, June 19, 19lt4; 
LeFlore to Gibson, June 28, 1944; Gibson to LeFlore, July 22, 1944, in · 
"Brookley Field," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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evidence of souring race relations, provide greater publicity for "out-
standing negro performances in both the military services and industry," 
use qualified blacks at all levels, and avail itself more frequently of 
the services of Truman Gibson. These recommendations looked good on 
paper, yet whether officers regarded them as top priorities remained a 
matter of individual disposition at direct command levels. The memoran-
dum provided another example of the Army's reliance upon a maze of 
directives and orders to clear up incredibly complex problems. 13 
Violence increased during the sunnner months of 1944 but not in~-:~-,.-
the civilian sector as the War Department anticipated. A rash of military-
related incidents in tlie South and L~ other areas followed closely the 
Brookley Field riot. No matter how many proposed changes in racial 
policy the department made, disorder would continue unless the Army en-
forced those proposals and recognized that violence was symptomatic of 
widespread dissatisfaction emanating from congestion and tension as well 
as from continued discriminatory treatment. Such violence had become a 
permanent part of the military experience and continued until the end of 
the war. 
On July 15, 1944, members of two black Camp Van Dom units, the 
1697th Engineer Combat :Battalion and the 394th Quartermaster Truck Com-
pany, fought a pitched battle that resulted in injuries to three soldiers 
and disruption of the base. The incident grew out of long-standing acri-
mony between the units over the use of the camp's jim crow post exchange. 
1¾j. Gen. J. A. Ulio to Commanding Generals, First through Ninth 
Service Commands, Military District of Washington, and Chiefs of Techni-
cal Services, June 14, 1944, in "Reports--Racial Tension," ibid. 
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That this incident involved combat between two black units made it unusual 
and showed that hostility between units did not necessarily have to involve 
racial problems. In this case, as in some others, military routine, the 
nature of camp life, and a series of minor irritants led to intra.racial 
rioting. A court-martial in mid-August convicted nine black soldiers of 
violating the 89th Article of War, but by mid-1945 most had been restored 
to active duty. 14 
As the summer progressed race relations in soutbem military bases 
appeared to regress, for in mid-August violence revisited Camp Claibome, 
Louisiana. Congested by six military installations, the area festered 
with racial violence throughout the war, both in the various military 
camps and in Alexandria. Rel.a tions bad not improved since the riot of 
January 1942 and the Raymond Carr killing the following November. The 
ADDY'S attempts to calm this situation succeeded in quelling potential 
race riots but failed to get at the heart of white civilian-black soldier 
difficulties. One soldier captured the attitudes of many blacks Gis 
toward the situation, asserting that his regiment was "never able to 
please no one. It is hell living hell here, but when we seek information, 
we are then almost in guard house." This soldier and his cohorts had ~ 
reason to complain, for during the first half of 1944, three black sol-
diers reportedly died at the bands of whites. In addition, Brigadier Gen-
eral Louis F. Guerre, the new camp commander who had previously served as 
the superintendent of the Louisiana State Police, exp:cessed :racist views 
14court-martial proceedings, August 11, 1944; "Data for Clemency 
Consideration," former Pvt. Johnnie :B. Felton, May 27, 1946, U.S. v. ~ 
Fred R. Hunter et al., Case 265598, JAG Records, RG 153. 
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immediately upon his arrival, and reportedly told a group of officers 
that he had been charged with clearing up the racial situation. Condi-
tions within the camp proved harsh for blacks, for some of the white 
officers in command of black troops vented their hostility and frustra-
tion on their men, producing a state of distrust. The situation degener-
ated to the point that the camp's commanding officers deemed it necessary 
to station a white unit at a certain spot each night, armed with gas 
masks and riot guns, ready for outbreaks between black soldiers and 
whites. Officers also conducted frequent shakedowns to discover hidden 
weapons among the blacks, placed a heavy guard at the motor pool, and 
assigned extra guards to the black area of camp. 15 
On August 8 a black soldier allegedly raped the wife of a white 
soldier at Claiborne, and six days later a black GI reportedly attacked 
an elderly white woman in the vicinity. Thoroughly aroused, local whites 
formed a posse and combed the woods surrounding camp three separate times 
between August 8 and August 16, intimidating every black soldier they en-
countered. This bullying caused even further deterioration of race rela-
tions, and black troops began to feel as though redress could only come 
if they, like the whites, took matters into their own hands. 
./ 
\ 
On the afternoon of August 16 a rumor spread through the black area 
of camp that members of the white posse had attacked and shot four black 
soldiers. Members of the black units milled around and grew increasingly 
l5"Privates of J64th" to Pittsburgh Courier, March 6, 1943, in 
"Camp Claiborne"; Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, to War De-
partment, .P.ugust 24, 1944, in "Racial Situation--Camp Claiborne, Internal 
Sec. Div., 1942-45," CASW Records, RG 107; Pittsburgh Courier, October 7, 
1944; Memorandum, Tabitha Petran to Walter White, undated, in "Claiborne," 
GOF, N.A.ACP Papers. 
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boisterous. Sergeant Conway F. Price of the 1327th Engineer General Ser-
. vice Regiment noticed around dusk that men of his unit had somehow pro-
cured weapons, but since they appeared calm and orderly, he did not con-
sider the matter serious. 
Around 10:00 p.m. the situation got out of hand. 16 The commanding 
officer of the 1327th happened upon about two hundred black Gis who had 
procured several trucks and decided to drive to the area where they 
heard that the four soldiers bad been shot. The commander told them that 
the rumor was untrue and that whites had shot no one. The troops refused 
to believe him. Recognizing the damage that might result if they left 
without supervision, the officer climbed into one of the vehicles and led 
them to the scene where they satisfied themselves that no shooting inci-
dent had occurred. The convoy then returned to camp about 11:30 p.m., 
and the men returned the trucks to the motor pool. Two hours later, how-
ever, men of the 1328th Engineer Regiment commandeered ten vehicles and, 
fully armed, clambered aboard in prepa:ration for action. No disturbance 
occurred, and the soldiers soon released the trucks. 
Because of the display of arms, regimental commanders began a 
check of the various storage rooms. The orderly room of the 1355th Dump 
Truck Company had been ransacked. While the officers stood there, a mob 
of forty to fifty blacks began firing into the building; the officers 
escaped injury, but a white enlisted man accompanying them was hit. 
The mob ordered one of the officers, Captain James Harper, out of the 
16commanding General, Eighth Service Command, to War Department, 
.August 25, 1944, in "Racial Situation--Camp Claiborne, Internal Sec. Div., 
1942-45," CASW Records, RG 107. 
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building where Private Leroy McGary jabbed him in the stomach with bis 
bayoneted rifle and threatened him. A lieutenant left the orderly room 
only to be clubbed. The group then marched to the hospital where the in-
surgents deposited the lieutenant. At that point a jeep containing two 
white MPs and an officer arrived, but the mob quickly disa:r:med them, 
lined them up, and beat them thoroughly. Two or three other whites who 
happened by received similar treatment. The mob then drifted over to a 
dispensary, and amid sporadic shooting and shouting, one of them harangued 
the others about all the injustices they suffered while at camp. A white 
officer then demanded that the troops disperse. Instead, the mob threat-
ened to kill him and beat him so badly that he suffered a concussion. 17 
Following this incident, the violence stopped; luckily no one had 
been killed. The black soldiers who participated achieved revenge against 
what they perceived as a long and dreary chain of insults by white civilians 
and the seeming insensitivity of military authoritieso Mindful of the 
probable consequences, they sought redress in the only way they considered 
effective. 
The commanding officers at the camp as well as the headquarters of 
the Eighth Service Command in Dallas acted quickly. Coming on the heels 
of other mutinous conduct, the Claibome riot served as yet another in-
stance of unruly blacks deliberately violating military discipline. With-
out delay officials arrested thirty-seven men and confined all but ten 
of them at Camp Livingston. Eventually the War Department brought 
17rbid.; Memorandum, Lt. Morris Weller, September 25, 1944; 
Findings of Eoard of Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, November 
24, 1944, U.S. v. Pvt. Leroy R. McGary and Pvt. William Smith, Jr., 
Case 265399, JAG Records, RG 153; Alexandria Town Talk, August 17, 18, 
191.ih. 
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fourteen of them before courts-martial. In addition, the black soldier 
who allegedly attacked two white women in early and mid-August was 
arrested and confessed. 18 
The trials convened in mid-September at Camp Claiborne. On 
September 16, Private Leroy McGary, ~ho bad acted as one of the ring-
leaders in the disturbance, stood trial. Previous convictions led the 
Army to regard him as a "bad influence on his associates." McGary asserted 
his innocence, protesting that "I didn't participate in none of that 
trouble," but the Army obviously did not believ-e him. The evidence against 
McGary proved incontrovertible, so after the court found him guilty it 
sentenced him to death. A few days later the trial of Sergeant Conway F. 
Price convened. Price took no part in the violence, but the prosecution 
charged that he had been negligent in trying to suppress the mutiny. Price, 
whose four-year service record was spotless, told the court that he tried 
to find superior officers to issue him instructions, but when this proved 
unsuccessful, he returned to his barracks. The court convicted him and 
sentenced him to dishonorable discharge and nine years' imprisonment. 
The NAACP filed arguments for both McGary and Price before a Judge Advocate 
Genera.l's Board of Review and succeeded in getting McGary's death sentence 
reduced to forty years. Price merited full restoration to duty in 1945. 
Thus, the Amy showed through stiff penalties that it would not tolerate 
mutiny, but quietly reduced the punishment after making its point. 19 
18Gibson to White, September JO, 1944, in "Claiborne," GOF, N.AACP 
Papers. 
191t. Col. Don T. Udall to Commanding General, Camp Claiborne, 
September 7, 1944; Testimony of Pvt. Leroy McGary, September 16, 1944; 
Findings of Board of Review, Judge Advocate General's Office, November 24, 
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Besides McGary and Price, the court convicted eleven other sol-
diers and acquitted one. It dishonorably discharged the eleven and dealt 
out sentences ranging from twenty-five years to life imprisonment. McGary 
remained the only defendant who received the death sentence, and Price's 
nine-year sentence proved the lightest of the thirteen convicted. 20 
The Camp Claiborne episode was the last of the serious military 
racial outbreaks of the war. Incidents of this nature, however, continued 
to plague the South. In September a clash occurred at Camp Livingston, 
Louisiana, followed in October by a riot at Camp Patrick Henry, near 
Hampton Roads, Virginia. In 1945 there were a number of racial incidents, 
but they increasingly took place between returning black veterans and 
white civilians rather than in military camps as had been the case since 
mid-1943.
21 
In the spring of 1945 the Army again issued dire forecasts of im-
pending racial violence for the summer months. This time, fortunately, 
tensions subsided, and conflict involving the military, or for that 
matter civilians, did not emerge as a major problem. Yet the national 
1944; Memorandum by Maj. Gen. Richard Donovan, April 16, 1945, U.S. v. 
McGary: and Smith; Testimony of Sgt. Conway F. Price, September 25, 1944; 
Memorandum, Lt. David W. Johnston, October 10, 1944; "Memorandum on Be-
half of Sergeant Conway F. Price," undated, by Thurgood Marshall and 
Edward F. Dudley; Findings of Board of Review, Judge Advocate Genera.l's 
Office, February 17, 1945, U.S. v. Sgt. Conway F. Price, Case 266171, 
JAG records, RG 153; Dudley to Lt. Col. Fletcher R. Andrews, October 13, 
1944; Marshall to Henry L. Stimson, November 3, 1944; Maj. Gen. Ed.ward 
F. Witsell to Dudley, October 29, 1945, in "Claiborne," GOF, NAACP 
Papers; Murray, Negro Handbook, 1946-1947, PP• 352-53; Pittsburgh 
Courier, October 21, 1944. 
20Pittsburgh Courier, October 14, 1944. 
21Ibid., April 21, 1945; May 12, 1945; June 30, 1945; July 14, 
1945; Murray, Negro Handbook, 1946-1947, p. 349. 
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mood proved one of suspenseful waiting. 22 
The riots at Brookley Field, Camp Claiborne, and elsewhere ended ,//' ✓, 
the violence that had plagued southern military bases. From the beginning 
of the conflict to mid-1943, clashes between black soldiers and southern 
whites epitomized the collision of two conflicting views about what the 
war meant. To blacks, it meant taking advantage of the abnormality of 
the period to seek political and economic gains and as soldiers to realize 
the dignity and respect due them. For southern whites, the war represented 
internal as well as external threats to the solidarity and consistency 
of southern life. Black soldiers threatened the status quo, and in striv-
ing to achieve victory many of the region's whites also tried to maintain 
the impregnability of the color line. As the majority and as the holders 
of power, they prevailed. This conflict helped lead to a change in the 
nature of military-related racial violence. From mid-1943 through 1944 
many black troops became more aggressive and thus more prone to mutinous 
action. Blacks saw violence and everyday degradation grow so intolerable 
......::.__-
that many of them sought redress in the most radical and direct way pos-
sible. Their actions represented the desperation of a group shocked and 
embittered by the treatment accorded them. Their violent acts, however, 
only served to bring more intense hostility from whites, a development 
that appeared outrageous to black Gis since whites seemed to them respon-
sible for causing the violence through continual race-baiting and d.is-
crimina tion. Neither the War DeP3,rtment nor most white Americans under-
stood the nature of this vicious cycle. 
2~emorandum, Col. E.W. Gruhn to the Adjutant General, April 16, 
1945, AG 291.2, RG 407. 
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In the wake of the military violence of 1944 and early 1945 the 
South and the nation at large began giving increased attention to the end 
of the war and some of the domestic problems peace would bring. Even 
though full military production continued furiously as the Allies swept 
into Gennany and hopped across the islands of the South and Central Pacific 
toward Japan, by D-Da.y in mid-1944 the outcome of the war appeared settled 
and its end a matter of time. The "arsenal of democracy" maintained its 
full flow of war goods up to Germany's surrender in May 1945, but, as the 
eventual outcome grew more obvious, many people focused on postwar America 
and the complex problems of demobilization and reconversion. While the 
conflict lasted over a year longer, domestic America by mid-1944 coula 
rest easier knowing that the end was in sight. People looked forward to 
a prosperous, peacetime America, and events during the last two yea~s of 
the war focused increasingly on that transition and the problems it con-
tained. 
One of the problems that always threatened to become a major d.iffi- / / 
V •i 
cu.lty in periods of change was race relations. As early as mid-1944 
warnings of widespread violence during reconversion emerged from a number 
of sources. An August 1944 University of Denver national opinion poll 
revealed that 63 percent of the white people contacted believed that race 
relations would prove worse in postwar America while only 37 percent 
thought they woitld improve. 23 At about the same time sociologist Charles; 
S. Johnson, one of the nation's most informed men on race relations, V 
wrote a series of articles about the existing and future status of 
southern racial discord. There were precedents for widespread violence 
2311Ra.cial Explosive," Newsweek, August 21, 1944, p. 39. 
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after the war if positive programs did not emerge in the era of transi-
tion. "There is fairly widespread agreement that race relations in the 
South have deteriorated in character since the beginning of the war," he 
observed. During a ten month period in 1943, he counted 111 racial in-
cidents in the South 11 of sufficient importance to be given attention in 
the national press." While the number decreased during 1944, this vio-
Vt/I 
lence reflected social, economic, and political changes which could prove 
worthwhile in the long run even if they fostered hostility in the short 
rt.m. Johnson tried to find a silver lining in the racial situation but 
admitted that "the whole question of race relations, not only in the 
South but in the country as a whole, is being held in a kind of suspen-
sion awaiting the end of the war and the unpredictable developments 
which will follow." Careful planning and constructive action could 
avert an interracial bloodbath. 24 
In the same vein George So Schuyler of the Pittsburgh Courier 
warned that "the problem of race relations in the United States is rapidly 
approaching the boiling point." If fundamental changes did not occur, 
such as creation of a permanent FEPC, abolition of residential segrega-
tion, and desegregation of the anned forces, racial violence would surely 
surface at the end of the war. Open racial conflict in postwar America, 
Schuyler cautioned, would doubtless occur if "white demagogues and 
timorous or complacent public officials" combined to support a retum 
to the prewar system of rigid adherence to the color line. If white 
mobs, "resenting these few Negro gains, decide to take the law into 
24Johnson, "Present Status of Race Relations," 27; ide~, "Social 
Changes and Their Effects on Race Relations in the South," ibid. (Y.iarch 
1945), 344, 348. 
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their own hands," the postwar conflict would make that of the war years 
"look tame." Another writer, fearing postwar repression and unemploy-
ment, warned that unless forces of reconciliation between blacks and 
whites quickly appeared, "strikes, riots and bloodshed may be expected 
to recur. 1125 . 
Some periodicals, like A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in \i I ~--fu 
- - j; 
Race Relations, devoted entire issues to the projected postwar racial 
situation. One article asserted that the immediate postwar months would 
prove whether :race relations organizations could cope with the changes 
in black-white status that war had wrought. The article suggested that 
expanded activity on the local level might foster better relations. If 
l \_ 
these plans did not materialize, it wamed, "the country may well be blown\\ 1if 
apart." Another article in the same issue pointed out tbs. t of the 700,000 \ \ --
black veterans planning to re-enter the domestic economy at a time when 
it stood likely to slump, 400,000 planned to return to the South. This, 
of course, would create economic as well as racial difficulties, especi-
ally if the veterans brought with them notions of equal opportu.ni ty. 26 ( \ }\\ ! 
\ 
In the midst of this discussion the nation began confronting the 
staggering problems of demobilization and reconversion. Du.ring the war, 
Congress appropriated $433 billion for the nation's victory effort, and 
the government quickly became the major buyer in the private production 
25George s. Schuyler, uThe Negro Problem Reaches a Crisis: More 
Race Riots are Coming," American Mercury, 59 (December 1944), 686, 689-
91; John H. Burma., "Tomorrow's Race Riots," Christian Century, March 21, 
1945, pp. 364-65. 
26 A. A. Li veright, "Reconversion--A Challenge to Race Rel.a tions .· 
Committees," Monthl Summa of Events and Trends in Race Relations, \J 
3 (August-September 1945, 18-23; William A. Caudill, "Negro Veterans 
--='.o.J_urn " 1·b; d 1 I, 17 
-·- l, ' ---· ' --- • 
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sector. With the end of the conflict, though, the government bad to turn 
the economy back to an essentially private venture. Few people in 1945 
realized that the rapid deterioration of Soviet-American relations would 
stem the overall plan for complete demobilization, but even with the Cold 
War, reconversion to a peacetime footing remained an absolute necessity. 
From the somewhat abrupt conclusion of the war in September 1945 to th;--; 
i 
end of the year federal munitions contracts plummeted from $40 to $13 J. 
billion. In the same period the government released about 5.4 million 
servicemen and expected them to re-enter the economy. By the begirJiing 
of 1946 over three million people could not find jobs, a problem that 
seemed almost calamitous since it followed a period when the unemploy-
ment :rate had dropped to the lowest level in years. Jobs became more 
scarce even though many peacetime industries, such as housing and automo-: 
biles, absorbed much of the veteran glut, and many housewives quit their 
wartime jobs and returned to normal activities. The Office of War 
Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) summarized the drastic effects of 
inflation, unemployment, and related problems by cautioning that "we 
cannot afford an economic Pearl Harbor. 1127 
The postwar economic situation :rapidly became muddled, and this 
had a decided effect on the way people lived. In the South, economists 
exhibited their concern over the situation by meeting at Atlanta in mid-
April 1945 under the auspices of the Southern Regional Council. Leading 
27office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, Battle for Produc-
~ion: Fifth Re ort to the President the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, Ja_"YJ.uary 1, 19h6 Washington, 1946 , 4-8, 22. Copy in\,. }j 
Papers of the Southern Regional Council, Box 22, Atlanta, Georgia (here- \ \_~-:! 
after cited as SRC Papers). 
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authorities noted that the region's economy still lagged behind the rest 
of the nation. One-third of the country's workers whose income fell be-
low the national average lived in the South. The region's taxpayers paid 
a lower per capita income tax than the rest of the nation. The South 
contained 42 percent of the nation's housing regarded as "needing major 
repairs." Despite the economic boom the South experienced during the war, 
the overall statistics remained disheartening. Ten southern states con-
taining 15 percent of the nation's land area, 14 percent of its minerals, 
10 percent of its industries, and 39 percent of its faDn population still 
received only 11 percent of the national income and 20 percent of the 
national farm income. These states gained less from war contracts than 
any other area. By 1943, for example, the South's manufactures had in-
creased over 1939 by a smaller amount than any other region, 69 percent. 
Other sections, by comparison, witnessed jumps of anywhere from 227 per-
cent to 639 percent. The conferees could only conclude that· while the 
South had benefited from the war, the gains appeared extremely modest. 
The potential for an economic ups~ing existed, but progress, as always, 
would remain slow. The South's substantial black population stood to 
benefit least from a:ny such development. 28 
Economic recession contributed heavily to southern white alarm 
over the position of blacks in the immediate postwar period. Having 
been forced to accept modest advancements for blacks during the inter-
national crisis, whites exhibited fears that such political and economic 
28 Program for "A Conference on the South's Post War Economy," .-
April 11-12, 1945, SRC Papers, Box 54. 
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gains might lead to pennanent and far-reaching alterations in southern ,. 
race relations, even seriously endangering the color line. During the 
confusion that enveloped the end of the war and preliminary reconversion 
efforts, southern whites began turning increased attention to this prob-
lem, determined to return to the prewar racial status quo. 
Congressional debates over the FEPC indicated the lengths to which ✓ 
much of the southern white majority would go to ensure regional control 
of the postwar racial situation. As early as 1944 the FEPC ran into 
serious difficulty, and in the 1945 debates over the next fiscal year's 
appropriation southern white concerns over the status of blacks in the 
postwar South emerged. During June 1945 the FEPC appropriation dis-
appeared from the House bill, and in the Senate Dennis Chavez of New 
Mexico tried to restore it. In the end the Senate provided $250,000 
for the committee, as compared with a presidential request of $599,000. 
The FEPC thus remained alive only in skeleton form for one more year. 29 
In the midst of the Senate debate over the FEPC appropriation some 
southerners used the occasion to complain not only about the committee 
but the dangers of black advancement. James O. Eastland of Mississippi, 
for example, charged that the FEPC "is a part of the Communist program 
for racial amalgamation in the United States." While on the subject of 
race relations Eastland enlarged the scope of his discussion, which 
amounted to a filibuster. Tuming to perhaps the most sensitive point 
of all, black servicemen, he stated that "the Negro soldier was an utter 
and dismal failure in combat in Europe. When I make that statement, it 
29Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 120-29. 
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is not from prejudice. I am not prejudiced against the Negro (laughter 
in the galleries)." Then, echoing a widely-held fear among many southe:rn 
whites that represented a major cause of future racial violence, he com-
plained that nby the pending measure we are actually asked to discrimi-
nate against the white war veteran, and give the Negro preference over 
him."30 
Even though the FEPC 1 s death seemed more lamentable to blacks tha.~ 
it really was given its limited powers, the debates themselves proved 
more harmful to race relations since they inflamed sensibilities and 
portended continued strained relations. White reactions to the fili-
bustering by southern senators reflected similar fears of permanent black 
advancement in postwar months, while black reaction proved unifoJ:"!"'i7 y 
negative since such statements threatened to erase wartime gains, however 
modest they may have been. One black soldier, in reference to Theodore G. 
Bilbo's part in the FEPC debates, clumsily but forcefully.requested that 
the senator "recall to his Stupid memories that Gettsburg Address by 
lincoln and he Should also try to learn that the Negro is no longer the 
ignorant whom his ancestors had to pick their cotton." Thus the lines of 
conflict had been drawn between two racial groups whose ideas toward the 
color line stood at opposite poles. 31 
\ I 
In the wake of the Congressional furor over the FEPC a series of \ 
racial incidents occurred. They served as warning signs of what upcoming 
3°u. S., Congress, Senate, Con.g-ressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st 
sess., 91, pt. 5, pp. 6992, 6994-95; New York Times, June JO, 1945, p. 9. 
3111southern Senators Play with Fire," Christian Century, July 11, 
1945, p. 805; Pvt. Solomon L. Rhoden to NAACP, July(?], 1945, in 
"Soldier Letters re: :Bilbo a...11d Eastland," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
months held for black southerners, especially veterans. Economic reces-
sion, continued poor race relations, and a conflict of ideas over the -\ 
black position in the postwar South led to a resurgence of violence that 
----·- .. - -· ·---~----------- ~·· .. _ .. _,_., __ -·-- - -- --·- .. _.,_., 
I 
began in late 1945 and lasted through 1946. The upsurge of disorder acted 
as a final, bitter blow to southem blacks as the color line emerged tri-
umphant. The return to the region of about 400,000 black veterans served 
as the focus of controversy, for to whites they represented the core of 
potential trouble, while to blacks they would hopefully act as a vanguard 
for permanent gains. The violence this conflict produced saw southern 
blacks returned to "virtually the same position they had been in before 
the war. They were still politically impotent and ••• were totally 
segregated by law and custom from the white population. 1132 
._J 
On August 25, 1945, Eugene Bells fell prey to a small band of whites 
near Liberty, Mississippi. Bells was a sharecropper and veteran who, upon 
his return from the service, flaunted his freedom by going to work for 
his father-in-law rather than his fonner employer, a white man. In re-
taliation the white fanner and several companions abducted Bells on the 
night of August 25, drove to a swamp, and killed him. The incident did 
not become public knowledge until a year later when one of Bells' friends 
mustered the nerve to tell the story. The NAACP tried to initiate legal 
action but failed.33 
Two months later, on October 11, a white mob lynched Jesse J:. __ 
Payne near Madison, Florida. Again, the tragedy involved a black 
32charles P. Roland, The Improbable Era: The South Since World 
War II (Lexington, 1975), 30-Jl. 
33Pittsburgh Courier, June 29, 1946~ 
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sharecropper who defied his white employer and thus racial etiquette. 
The white man, D. L. Goodwin, apparently responded by spreading a story 
involving Payne's rape of a five-year-old white girl. Payne was quickly 
indicted for the crime and placed in the county jail, but du.ring the 
early morning darkness of October 11 the jailer allowed a mob to kidnap 
the prisoner. The whites drove him to an isolated location and riddled 
his body with bullets. Since the jailer had acted as an accessory to the 
lynching, the Justice Department investigated for evidence of a violation 
of federal civil liberties. A conspiracy of silence faced agents, how-
ever, forcing the department to drop the matter.34 
In 1946 southem race relations remained raw, aggravated by the l/. /' 
return of both black and white veterans, the continued confusion of de-
mobilization and reconversion, and the friction generated by conflicting 
ideas along racial lines regarding black status in politics and the 
economy. The beating and blinding of Isaac Woodard in Batesburg, South 
Carolina, further reflected the nature of things to come. Woodard, a 
veteran of four years who saw action in the South Pacific, received his 
honorable discharge on the moming of February 13, 1946. The same day, 
while on his way to New York, the bus on which he rode stopped in ::Bates-
burg. Woodard had evidently irritated the driver, who called the police. 
Lynwood Shull, the town's police chief, arrived and beat the new veteran 
34:rbid., October 20, 1945; November 3, 1945; "Crime and Punishment," 
Monthl S~ of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 3 (October 1945), 
75; ibid. November 1945, 107; J. Tom Watson to Millard F. Caldwell, 
October 23, 1945; Theron L. Caudle to J. Edgar Hoover, October 16, 1945; 
Turner L. Smith to the files, November 6, 1945, Justice Department Records; 
Caudle to Marshall, November 5, 1945; Affidavits of Lucy Payne, Lillie 
Mae Payne, and Lucy :Mae Anderson, October 29, 1945, in "Lynching Geneml 
(1945), 11 GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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so severely that he permanently blinded him and then refused to p~v±de_.,...--
him medical treatment for a day following the injury. Enraged, the NAACP 
picked up the Woodard case and, though no legal redress came of its action, v 
the association made a cause celebre of it. Attempting to show the in- 7 
justices being done to black veter-c=.ns in the South, the NAACP worked up 
considerable publicity through Woodard's misfortune. 35 
The incidents of late 1945 and early 1946 served as both cause and 
effect in the general worsening of southem race relations. Their occur-
rence and the publicity generated by them fostered hostility on both sides 
of the color line. Whites suspected further breaches of racial tradition 
while blacks viewed them as additional signs of hypocrisy since the nation 
had helped defeat fascism abroad but practiced it toward minoritiesc These 
L~cidents came from conditions in the postwar South that made such deli-
cate issues as black advancement even more sensitive and caused its actual 
importance to be blown out of proportion. 
From 1944 through 1945 the United States managed to end the bloodi- .J / 
est of all wars but then faced the monumental problems of reconversion. 
Serious military clashes came to an end during this period, partly through 
overdue War Department policy changes, but more directly because the war 7~ 
I ended. At the same time, however, civilian violence began to escalate. -J 
Latent suspicions among blacks and whites toward each other surfaced in 
the postwar South and, accompanying the instability that characterized 
35"Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (September 1946), 276; 
ibid. (November_l~46), 341; Affidavit of Isaac Woodard, April 23, 1946; 
T. Gillis Nutter to Marsbali, November 14, 1947, in "Woodard, Isaac v. 
Atlantic Greyhound Bus Company," LF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, 
October 5, 1946; November 16, 1946. 
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periods of change, caused a resurgence of racial violence. Blacks, who 
at first perceived the postwar months as a period of opportlmi ty, /{\', 
1f7' 
; •-•- .. /./ 
quickly became disillusioned as the violence subverted their hopes. •, 
They continued to suffer as 1946 progressed. 
CHAPrER VIII 
"TERROR IN TENNESSEE" 
On February 25, 1946, a fist fight between two World War II veter-
ans rapidly developed into an incident that became the most significant 
racial outbreak of the immediate postwar era. The Columbia, Tennessee, 
race riot reflected the confusion and tension of a period when the nation 
stood at midstream in its efforts to reconvert from war to peace. It also 
confirmed fears that black southerners, especially veterans, woul~ attempt 
to maintain the modest gains achieved during the war, thus precipitating _ 
a reaction by elements of the white South. If the lynchings of late 1945 
indicated a general worsening of regional race relations, the Columbia 
riot confirmed the trend. That the riot occurred in an obscure Middle 
Tennessee town rather than in a bulging metropolis made the incident in 
a sense even more significant. As Walter White later observed, "the 
violent outburst had developed out of circumstances which were so simple 
and ordinary that the extent of the damage done was a remarkable barome-
ter of the fear and prejudice which haunted the community." Such racial 
tension, it might be added, plagued the entire Southo 1 
Even though the riot proved small compared with the Beaumont or 
Detroit incidents, and although the main violence came only when lawmen 
entered the black section of the town, the episode's reverbe:rations lasted 
through mid-1947 and involved a number of legal and organizational experi-
ences that ma.de it as significant as those of 1943. What the NAACP called 
¾nri.te, A Vian Called White, 3100 
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"terror in Tennessee" represented in microcosm the continuing struggle 
in the South over the color line. 
Columbia served as the seat of Maury Connty and lay about forty 
miles south of Nashville. Of the county's 40,000 residents about 12,000 
were black, and the city counted 3,000 in its total population of about 
8,000. The county had lost almost 9 percent of its population during the 
war. Dairy farming and other agricultural pursuits dominated the area's 
economy, and Columbia was noted as a mule-trading center. During the war 
the Monsanto and Victor Chemical Companies had built plants in nearby 
Mt. Pleasant, so for many county residents these factories replaced the 
tractor and plow. The plants I workers had organized with an affiliate l :¼t 
of the CIO, and the black employees in both businesses had worked for the J 
abolition of the jim crow pay differential. 2 
Within Columbia and Maury County race relations exhibited a mix- ·i,r 
. tu.re of progressivism and reaction. On the one band many black residents 
~-· ---i ,,,...-
prospered, either as farmers or through wartime employment. :Blacks were v~~-~-> 
also active in county politics, so economically and politically racial .J _.\ .: 
harmony seemed to prevail. Yet on the other hand two lynchings bad occurred 
in the county within the past twenty years, and the black community was in 
most ways rigidly segregated. In fact, blacks inhabited five distinct en~ 
claves in the city, and the business district carried the unwelcome name 
of "Mink Slideo 11 It lay just east of the courthouse square on Eighth 
2ivremorandum on Columbia, Tennessee, undated, FBI Records; Dorothy 
Sue :Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia, Tennessee, February 25-26, 1946" 
(M.A. Thesis, Middle Tennessee State University, 1972), 7; Guzman, 
Negro Year :Book, 249; U. S., Bureau of the Census, "Civilian Population 
by Counties: November 1, 1943," pp. 3-5. 
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Street, between Ma.in a...11d woodland Streets, and consisted of "cafes, drug 
stores, barber shops, pool rooms, a lodge ball, funeral establishment, 
ice plant, shoe store, pressing establishment, and a church." The black 
residential areas carried such titles as "Macedonia" and "Happy Hollow" 
(see Figure 3). 3 
In 1946 the tranquility that appeared to characterize Columbia in 
fact masked deep-seated racial hostility. The source of this acrimony lay 
in a lack of interracial communication that produced "latent mutual sus-
piciona" As so often characterized southern race relations, the actions 
of one race was seen in a different, and usually negative, connotation by 
the other. Columbia possessed no interracial committee at any level, so 
the black and white communities relied on assumptions, rumors, and the 
conservative Columbia Daily Eerald in forming their conceptions of each 
other. Most whites clung to the color line in striving to maintain segre-
gated public facilities and in stereotyping blacks as immoral, irrespon-
sible, and inferior beings. Blacks, on the other hand, read the Chicago 
Defender, and their conception of the duplicity of America's war aims grew 
increasingly bitter. One leader in the community, seventy-six-year-old 
Julius Blair, boycotted the town's picture show because he could not use 
the "white" entrance and urged others to follow suit. To blacks, Blair's 
actions served as a measure of maintaining pride and integrity. To whites, 
Blair seemed an old, cranky troublemaker. Such mutual distrust heightened 
as black and white veterans returned to the town, since both groups brought / 
with them ideas and attitudes that boded ill for harmonious relations. 4 J 
~emora.ndum on Columbia, FBI Records; Guzman, Negro Year Book, 248-49. 
4"The Social Front: Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends 
in Race Relations, 3 (March 1946), 235-36; Ernest F. Smith, "Report on 
Investigation Made on February 27-28, 1946, at Columbia, Tennessee, by 
Ernest F. Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, with Reference 
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Figure 3. Map of ColU!Ilbia, Tennessee. 
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Significantly, conflict between two veterans brought Columbia's {~~..-:-./ 
race relations to the boiling point. On Monday, February 25, two black 
Columbians, Mrs. Gladys Stephenson and her son James, visited the radio 
repair shop at the Castner-Knott department store which faced the court-
house square in the central business district. Mrs. Stephenson had left 
the radio there several months before and returned to retrieve it and pay 
the repair bill. A white employee, Will Fleming, informed her that the 
radio had been mistakenly sold to someone else. Irked, the black woman 
told others in the store not to deal with Castner-Knott. Fleming promptly 
asked her to leave and then either cursed or struck her. Defending his 
mother, James Stephenson hit Fleming and then the men, both veterans, \ """~__-
moved outside where they pummeled each other. Stephenson pushed Fleming 
through a plate glass window, causing a severe gash, and this attracted 
considerable attention. At that point two policemen arrived, broke up the 
fight, and charged the blacks with disturbing the peace. Friends took 
Fleming to the county hospital where he remained overnight.5 
John Fleming, the injured man's father, considered the charge 
against the Stephensons entirely too lenient. Because the Flemings were 
a powerful Columbia family, he succeeded in having the blacks charged 
with attempted murder. Meanwhile citizens in the black community learned 
of the incident and four black leaders, headed by Julius Blair, raised the 
necessary $3500 bond and secured the Stephensons' release. Rumors flew 
to the Disturbance on the Night of February 25th," Jim Nance McCord 
Papers, Box 18, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville. 
5Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 14-16; Theron L. Caudle to J. 
Edgar Hoover, March 4, 1946, FBI Records. 
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around the black community that whites would try to lynch them, so friends 
took James Stephenson to Nashville and then sent him to a relative's home 
··-[ ..,.f .. 
in Chicago. Other blacks, headed by recently retumed veterans, anned \ -;--. .,.,.::;,, 
themselves in preparation for the purported lynching attempt. 6 
____ . .J 
At the same time local whites grew excited as rumors floated across 
town that the black coIDililL.-rrity was preparing for a race riot. About fifty 
whites, most of them armed, gathered at the county jail and demanded tmt 
Sheriff J. J. Underwood release Stephenson to their custody. Underwood 
responded by arresting two of them, both drunk, and the mob broke upo 
Other whites armed themselves while speculation continued over develop-
ments in Mink Slide and other black enclaves. During this period the 
police force, which consisted of a chief, J. Walker Griffin, and six 
patrolmen, cruised through the town trying to calm tempers and disarm 
citizens. On at least one occasion Chief Griffin drove to Mink Slide and 
assured the blacks that nothing would happen to them, a reassurance that 
they did not wholeheartedly accept. 7 
By nightfall sporadic g,mfire started. Snipers shot out the street 
lights in the Mink Slide area. Within the black district businessmen and 
their friends waited and wondered. Around 9:00 p.m. Chief Griffin and 
three policemen drove to the edge of Mink Slide and began walking down a 
street. Someone ordered them to halt but they continued fon:ard. In the 
darkness several blacks,feeling threatened, fired at the four officers 
with shotguns, peppering all of them and seriously injuring one. Griffin, 
6
:aeeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 14-19. 
7 Ibid.; Memorandum, H. H. Clegg to Hoover, April 30, 1946; Caudle 
to Hoover, March 4, 1946, FBI Records. 
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shocked at this unprovoked attack, limped back to his office, and city 
officials hurriedly telephoned Governor Jim Nance McCord. The governor 
immediately dispatched seventy-five state troopers and five h1llldred state 
guardsmen from five neighboring cities. The first of these reinforce-
~ents arrived at 10:00 p.m. 
In the meantime both blacks and whites jumped to conclusions. To 
~ blacks it seemed that the whites, including the police, were prepar-
ing to storm Mink Slide in search of James Stephenson and that unless they 
offered resistance a full scale riot might level the area. To whites, the 
armed resistance that resulted in injuries to four city police officers 
confirmed their worst fears. The situation had become critical, as black 
veterans seemed to advocate open rebellion. The initiative rested with 
the city administration, and its desperate call for help attested to the 
confused and dangerous state of affairs. While blacks considered a riot 
imminent, whites thought the riot ha.d already begun. 8 
During the night Tennessee's commissioner of public safety, Lynn 
3omar, and General Jacob M. Dickinson, head of the state guard, arrived 
in Columbia and conferred with Chief Griffin, Sheriff Underwood, and Mayor 
Eldridge Denham. They decided to wait 1llltil dawn to take action. In the 
interim lawmen formed a cordon around Mink Slide; sporadic shooting con-
tinued. Two white civilians received slight injuries, and officers 
arrested five armed blacks attempting to escape the area. The blacks in 
Mink Slide could only imagine what would occur at daybreak, for they knew 
that troops bad arrived and that something unpleasant loomed ahead. 
8 Clegg to Hoover, April 30, 1946, FBI Records; :Beeler, "Race Riot 
.:.Yl Columbia," 19-21. 
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Shortly before 6:00 a.m. on February 26 officers moved into the 
area with orders to confiscate weapons and detain resistors. Apparently 
no one considered issuing search warrants, but such a formality would 
probably have made little difference in the nature of the operation. Some 
of the law officers proceeded in orderly fashion through the area, but 
others seemed to regard their responsibilities as a way of teaching blacks 
a lesson. They kicked down doors, r-c::.nsacked businesses, and fired indis-
criminately into buildingso Blacks who had barricaded themselves retumed 
the fire. The defenders injured t~-ee state troopers while the officers 
shot several blacks. During the operation the lawmen wrecked portions of 
}link Slide in their search for suspected caches of firearms and unruly 
blacks. James Morton's funeral horae, Sol Blair's barber shop, and Julius 
Blair's drug store suffered the worst damage. All three of these men 
were leaders in the black community. At Morton's establishment over-
zealous lawmen thoroughly destroyed the furnishings and ruined five 
caskets worth $1,725. On one of the caskets the letters "KKK" had been 
cru.dely lettered with plaster of pa.tis powder. The barber shop was 
thoroughly perforated with bullet holes, and the drug store suffered 
similar damage. Property damages eventually totaled between $30,000 and 
9 $50,000. 
As the invasion continued officers took about thirty blacks into 
custody. Lawmen found several blacks in a back room of :Blair's barber 
shop and arrested them on charges of attempted murder. Some received 
9Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 24-26; Clegg to Hoover, April JO, 
1946; "Inspection of Property ~'""e--Mink Slide Area," undated, F.BI 
Records; Smith, "Report on Investigation," McCord Papers; Pittsburgh 
Courier, April 20, 1946. 
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injuries as officers apprehended them and marched them to the county jail. 
Authorities found about twenty gun.so As this early morning operation con-
cluded, Lym1 Bomar drove through the stricken area in a sound truck, im-
ploring the blacks to go home and stop causing trouble, assuring them 
that no further violence would occur. At one point Bomar revealed his 
condescending attitude by saying, "let me see you smile. Come on, smileo 11 
Not surprisingly, those within earshot failed to see the humor in the 
situation and did not appreciate his assumption that smiling faces would 
d th 
. . 10 en e cr1s1s0 
Shortly after the initial operation Bomar, Dickinson, Underwood, 
and U.S. District Attorney Paul Fo :Bumpus conferred and agreed that an-
other search of the area was needed. After getting permission from the 
governor and attorney general, the sheriff deputized 120 troopers and 
guardsmen and sent them back to Mink Slide. By this time the blacks bad 
submitted to the overwhelming force and sullenly watched as the officers 
indiscriminately searched buildings in both Mink Slide a..~d adjacent white 
areas. They ultimately collected about 250 firearms, an arsenal that 
officials took considerable pride in displaying. Though the weapons came 
from both black and white homes and businesses, to support the popular 
theory that a conspiracy existed among the black citizens,the lawmen in-
sisted that all were found in Mink Slide. The clean-up operation con-
tinued through Thursday, February 28, and ultimately officers arrested 
10c1egg to Hoover, April 30, 1946; Interview by FBI with Lloyd 
Kennedy, March 5, 1946, FBI Records; "Terror in Mink Slide," Newsweek, 
March 11, 1946, pp. 28-29; Memorandum, James E. Ruffin to Caudle, March 
11, 1946, Justice Department Records. 
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ninety-eight blacks and the two whites that Sheriff Underwood had previ-
ously detained. 11 
Within twenty-four hours after the Stephenson-Fleming fight Mink 
Slide lay paralyzed and partially destroyed, and one hundred persons 
languished in jail. Officials subsequently released most of the prison-
ers either for lack of evidence or because they posted bond, but the care-
less manner in which lawmen arrested them and destroyed their property 
proved irresponsible. The state government's reaction to the black 
resistance of February 25 appeared to be out of proportion to the alleged 
crime committed. The heavy-hs...~ded tactics of the law can be better under-
stood in connection with the rumors that commanded Columbia's attention. 
Fears of a black insurrection shocked local whites, and the sanctity of 
Columbia's color line, already threatened by black wartime gains, appeared 
to hang in the balance as whites worried over the effect that returning 
black veterans might have. For blacks the situation involving James 
Stephenson and the invasion of Mink Slide proved too much to bear, and 
rumors of a white assault reinforced their belief that wartime sacri-
fices had not changed their status. That whites would attempt to lynch 
a black veteran and, having failed, employ the state's power to wreak 
vengeance upon them left many black Columbians incredulous. Since neither 
side lmew the real situation, the violence that erupted on February 25 and 
26 emerged from mutual suspicion and ignorance. 12 
11Ruffin to Caudle, March 11, 1946, Justice Department Records; 
Clegg to Hoover, April 30, 1946, FBI Record.so 
12Typescript of notes ta...~en at Columbia defense meeting, March 4, 
1946, in "Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers; :Beeler, "Race Riot 
in Columbia," 129. 
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Ironically, the only fatalities connected with the Columbia epi-
sode occurred on February 28. Police had been arresting and questioning 
area blacks, and on that afternoon officers brought three suspects into 
the sheriff's office for interrogation. William Gord.on, James Johnson, 
and Napoleon Stewart sat in the office while deputies informed them that 
after questioning they could leave if they made $250 bond. During a lull 
in the questioning Gordon and Johnson reached for a group of confiscated 
rifles stacked in a corner. Gordon managed to load one of these, ap-
parently with ammunition contained in a coat pocket, and shot one of 
the deputies in the ann. The shot attracted several nearby officers, 
a:n.d they quickly shot both Gord.on and Johnson. Stewart remained in his 
seat during the episode, but officers beat him up. Since Columbia 
possessed no jim crow hospital facilities, officers loaded the victims 
into a car and started the forty-mile trip to Nashville. The blacks 
iied in transit. 13 
Because of this incident and the lack of security it implied, 
G-ovemor McCord sent an additional 250 guardsmen to Columbia, bringing 
the total to about 700. These troops remained in town until March 3, 
but sixty-five state troopers stayed longer. Within a few days officials 
iropped charges against all but thirty-five of the prisoners and released 
all of them on bond. 14 
Columbia remained in a state of consternation as public interest 
!:i.eightened. Mayor Denham issued an ameliorative statement that implored 
Columbians to "refrain from congregating and be calm and sane and return 
13Ruffin to Caudle, March 11, 1946, Justice DeJ;artment Records; 
Seeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 33-35. 
14c1egg to Hoover, April 30, 1946, F.BI Records; :Beeler, "Race 
Eiot in Columbia," 33-35. 
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to normal relations with each other." Few others, however, cared whether 
the city returned to normal, because they appeared more interested in 
assigning blame or in attaching political significance to the episode. 
The editor of the Columbia Daily Herald expressed one end of the edi-
torial spectrum when he asserted that "the Negro has not a chance of 
gaining supremacy over a sovereign people, and the sooner the better 
element of i;he Negro race realize this the better off the race will be." 
On the other end the communist Daily Worker warned that "a mass Scotts-
boro fra.IJeup is in the making here in the cradle of the Ku Klux Klan," 
the result of "a violent armed invasion" on Min-1{ Slide by "white militia-
men, vigilantes and hoodlums." Taking cognizance of such stories, the 
Christia..l'l Century told its readers that "it is ]:i.ard to believe that they 
deal with the same tragedy," and that "almost everything about the riot 
points toward future trouble on a larger scale." The NAACP 1 s organ Crisis 
warned that the Columbia episode appeared to confirm the "predictions of 
many persons that mob violence would be used after the war to force the 
Negro back into his 'place. 11115 
Following the violenc~ a series of investigations and court cases 
lasted through mid-1947. Beginning on February 26, state, federal, and 
NAACP inquiries got underway, eventually leading to a series of lengthy 
court battles. The state probe proved the briefest and most superficial. 
On the 27th Govemor McCord sent his assistant attorney general, Ernest F. 
Smith, to Columbia. Smith remained there only a few days and in his 
l5Columbia Daily Herald, February 26, 1946; New Yo:rx Daily Worker, 
February 28, 1946; "Tennessee Race Riot a Danger Sign," Christian Century, 
March 13, 1946, p. 325; 11 Editorials: Terror in Tennessee," Crisis, 53 
(April 19h6), lOS. 
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report included a mixture of general factual information and personal 
opinion that apparently satisfied officials in Nashville. From the report 
it appeared that Smith made a pest of himself as he attended all official 
meetings and counted beer bottles in Mink Slide. He obviously held a 
low opinion of most blacks he encountered, and his report contained 
statements and conclusions supporting that view. Seeing a conspiracy, 
he asserted that "every character of gun" was confiscated from the black 
district, and that "I am convinced that there bad been a plan devised by 
one or more negroes in ColU1:2bia to create ill-feeling toward the white 
population." The tone of the entire report was blatantly prejudicial, 
but unfortunately Governor McCord and the other state officials relied 
on it as the official investigative documento In his conclusion Smith 
praised the local law enforcement officials and in particular Sheriff 
Underwood for doing "everything at his command to quiet the disturbance." 
He similarly lauded the state guard for its actions. Finally, Smith 
asserted that the riot would never have occurred had it not been "for 
the delibe:rate action of Sol, Julius and Charles Blair and James Morton." 
In effect, the official state report blamed blacks for a disturbance 
that began with white reaction to a fistfight and the shooting of four 
policemen, and culminated in an invasion of the black conmnmity and the 
destruction of a large part of it.16 
Meanwhile the Justice Department contacted Govemor McCord to ob-
tain his permission for an FBI probe of the Columbia incident. McCord 
agreed, and on March 1 the FBI directed special agent D.S. Hostetter 
16smith, "Report on Investigation," McCord Papers. 
to give priority to the Columbia inquiry and not to hesitate in asking 
for extra help. Apparently pressure from the White House contributed to 
the Justice Department's keen interest in the case, especially after an 
extraordinary amount of public reaction reached President Harry S. Truman. 
The bureau conducted a thorough inquiry lasting about a week, and subse-
quent follow-up probes resulted as court cases proceeded. Of the three 
major outbreaks in the South during the war years, Mobile, Beaumont, and 
Columbia, the Tennessee riot proved to be the only one the F.BI fully in-
vestigated.17 
The federal government's involvement in the case meant that federal 
statutes could have been violatedo Thus the F.BI agents in Columbia searched 
for evidence of a:ny infringement upon the ciYil rights of the Mink Slide 
inb..abitants as defined in Sections .5L and 52, Title 18, of the United 
States Code. Section 52 dealt with "depriving citizens of civil rights 
llllder color of State laws," which in this case meant that a:n:y of the de-
fendants could have charged such a violation against the local peace offi-
cers, state troopers, or state guardsmen. In addition, the FBI wanted to 
discover the truth of the rumored conspiracy to lynch James Stephenson on 
February 25. Finally, the FBI learned th9.t a series of telephone calls 
to and from Chicago had occurred at the residence of a black Columbian 
during the riot, leading some agents to suspect either an organized con-
spiracy to provoke racial discord. or subversive activity. Hostetter and 
other agents began the probe on March 1 and concluded it on March 8, 
17Memorandum, J.C. Strickland to D. M. Ls.dd, April 2, 1946, F.BI 
Records; Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 68-70. 
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18 interviewing almost four hundred people in the process. 
Although a number of black people remained in the Maury County jail 
for several days following the mass arrests without having a:n:y charges 
placed against them, only three persons charged that their civil rights 
bad been violated in this connection. Predictably, those three were 
Julius Blair, Sol Blair, and James Mortono They complained that local 
officials held them in jail an unreasonable length of time without giving 
them the opportunity to make bond and, more important, that their Mink 
Slide businesses had suffered unnecessary damage during the state intru-
sion on February 26. Although others could have made the same complaints, 
intimidation or the desire not to cause further difficulties compelled 
them to remain silent. The Blairs and Morton, however, displayed remark-
able fortitude in their actions which cast them as heroes among blacks 
and as troublemakers among whiteso When the F.BI probe ended on March 8, 
the agents concluded that no basis existed for a.riy violation of federal 
laws, although the bureau continued to make inquiries, and, after a 
federal grand jury convened, it engaged in yet another flurry of activityo 19 
As the state and federal investigations continued, the NAACP en-
tered the fray. The association's involvement in the case proved a god-
send for the black defendants but did nothing to quell the acrimony among 
whites. On the moming of February 26 a frantic telephone call awakened 
Walter White in New York, telling him of the riot. He immediately 
18Horace Frierson to Caudle, March 1, 1946, Justice Department 
Records; Memorandum, Caudle to Hoover, March 1, 1946; Clegg to Hoover, 
April 30, 1946; Memora.ndum, D. M. Ladd to E. A. Tamm, March 2, 1946, 
FBI Records. 
19c1egg to Hoover, April 30, 1946; Caudle to Hoover, March 8, 
1946, FBI Records. 
contacted NAACP officials in Chattanooga. By that afternoon a young white 
\..---
lawyer and Navy veteran, Maurice Weaver, was at the scene as the national 
office scrambled into action. While Weaver attempted to talk with some 
of the prisoners, White telegraphed Governor McCord asking for an appoint-
ment. When he arrived in Nashville a local attorney, West Indian-bom 
z. Alexander Looby, and the Reverend William J. Faullmer of Fisk Univer-
sity accompanied him to the governor's office where a decidedly hostile 
conversation ensued. White's irritating manner and McCord's provincial 
attitudes resulted in heightened suspicion on both sides. White set up 
his base of operations in Nashville, and NAACP special counsel Thurgood 
Marshall joined him. They proceeded to construct a.defense for more than 
thirty black Columbians charged with assault to commit mu_T'(ler. 20 
On March 4, W~..i.te, Looby, Weaver, James Dombrowski of the Southem 
O:>nference for Human Welfare (SCHW), and others met with the Blairs and 
James Morton. The three defend.ants retold the story of the mob action 
stemming from the Fleming-Stephenson fight, the Mink Slide incursion of 
the next day, and their experiences before and after being arrested. A 
sizeable publicity campaign appeared necessary, both to gain financial 
support and to keep the attention of federal authorities. After weighing 
various alternatives, they decided to form a loose coalition for the de-
fense of the blacks and simultaneously to attract groups and prominent 
individuals to their cause. On }fu.rch 11 the NAACP formally announced 
that it would defend the Columbia blacks, and three days later 
20White, A Man Called White, 309-13; Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 
49-51; Interview, Maurice M. Weaver to James A. Bur:ran, July 8, 1977, 
Chattanooga, Tennessee. 
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representatives of nineteen organizations formed the National Committee 
for Justice in Columbia, Tennessee (NCJC). Besides the NAACP and SCHW, 
other groups present included the Urban League, ACLU, CIO, National Law-
yers Guild, and Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Port~rs. The group agreed to 
allow the NAACP to take the initiative in future actions, which included 
asking Attorney General Tom Clark to investigate fully the operations of 
the state authorities in the February 26 Mink Slide invasion, seeking an 
appointment with President Truman, and raising funds. 21 
On March 19 White asked Eleanor Roosevelt and Channing H. Tobias 
to serve the NCJC as co-chairmen, and they accepted. Within a few weeks 
the list of participating organizations had grown to about sixty, but 
along the way the NCJC suddenly faced a problem that threatened its con-
tinuation. One of the member groups that joined the coalition during 
this period was the Communist Party. On the one hand the NAACP could 
hardly afford to refuse membership to the communists since both claimed 
to be defenders of the oppressed. :But some important NCJC supporters, 
most notably Mrs. Roosevelt, balked at the addition of communists to the 
group. The situation in Columbia, already unpromising, could be lost 
altogether if the commimists tied themselves to the defense effort. 
The communists themselves solved the problem. The Daily Worker 
sent Harry Raymond to the scene to photograph the destruction while 
Robert Minor, secretary of the legislative committee of the party and 
long-time civil liberties advocate, accompanied him. They generated so 
21Typescript of notes taken at Columbia defense meeting, March 4, 
1946; Press release, March 11, 1946, in "Press Releases--Columbia, Tenn. 
Riot"; "Minutes of Meeting re: Columbia Riot," undated, in "Minutes, 
Columbia, Tennessee Meetings," GDF, N ..A. .. ACP Papers. 
246 
much hostility among the local residents, lawofficials, and FBI, that the 
NCJC disassociated itself from them. Minor committed the main error when 
he called a meeting among local blacks to form the Maury County Voters 
League, an act that Walter White blasted as "the damndest piece of ill-
advised action imaginable." Press reaction proved similarly hostile, with 
the Nashville l3anner charging that "Commies" and "celebrities of pink hue" 
lay behind "this mess that threatens to disrupt an otherwise happy and 
22 contented people." 
Meanwhile the NCJC and other groups worked to raise money and focus 
attention on the Columbia defense. These activities included a benefit 
dance at New York's Savoy Ballroom on May 3, at least one radio broadcast 
and perhaps most important, a series of publicity tours by the defendants. 
The idea for these tours came from the NAACP, and from mid-April through 
mid-Vay the NCJC and the association's Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
branch took most of the defendants in five separate groups to forty-eight 
cities, most in the North and Midwest. These tours raised $7,000 and 
prompted thousands of protest letters. Although most of the NAACP's 
strength lay in areas outside the.South, this drive showed its renewed 
vitality just as it provided the association with valuable experience it 
would employ during the 1950s. 23 
22Telegrams, White to Eleanor Roosevelt, White to Channing H. 
Tobias, March 19, 1946; White to Roosevelt, March 25, 1946, in "Co-
Chairmen--E. Roosevelt-a. Tobias (Columbia)"; White to John Hammond, 
April 22, 1946, in "Committee, Columbia Tenn. Correspondence--Harold 
Oram," GOF, NAACP Papers; Nashville :Banner, April 16, 19460 
2311Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (May 1946), 151; 
Press release, May 3, 1946, in "Press Releases--Columbia Tenn. Riot"; 
"Tour Schedule for Columbia Defendants," undated; Memorandum, Madison 
s. Jones to White, May 13, 1946, in "Columbia Tenn.--Speakers and 
Meetings," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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With the conclusion of the F.BI, state, and NAACP investigations, 
there followed a tangle of legal battles, simultaneous hearings on differ-
ent jurisdictional levels, pleas for changes of venue, arguments over the 
composition of the juries, and other squabbles that eventually found their 
way to the Tennessee Supreme Court. In mid-March a Maury County grand 
jury handed down indictments against thirty-one Columbia blacks. Twenty-
eight were indicted for attempted murder or inciting others to murder, 
while the jury indicted the other three on lesser charges. In addition, 
the jury indicted four whites, including the two drunks arrested on Febru-
ary 25. At this time fede:r:al intervention seemed remote, especially con-
sidering the F.BI findings. Yet public pressure and keen White Bouse 
interest prompted Attorney Gene:r:al Clark to convene a fede:r:al grand jury 
in Nashville, with Judge Elmer D. Davies presiding. At issue was the 
possible violation of the defendants' civil rights, including the rumored 
attempted lynching of James Stephenson, the failure of law officers to 
obtain search warrants, the unnecessary damage done to Mink Slide busi-
nesses, the unreasonably lengthy detention of the defendants, and the 
deaths of William Gordon and James Johnson. 24 
The federal grand jury met in Nashville on April 8, and immedi-
ately Judge Davies began complaining about civil rights groups and their 
publications regarding the Columbia riot. Davies produced a copy of the 
SCBW's publicity pamphlet, "The Truth About Columbia," and suggested that 
the grand jury subpoena the SCHW 1s officials. If the statements proved 
24"Along the NAACP :Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (August 1946), 251; 
:Beeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 68-70; Strickland to Ladd, April 2, 
1946, F.BI Records. 
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true, he observed, "you should act accordingly and return indictments 
against the persons responsible for those acts." If the statements proved 
false, however, the "circulators of this pamphlet should be exposed for 
deliberately agitating matters of this kind to cause difficulties between 
races which are trying to live together in peace and harmony." In the 
midst of this and other complaints the grand jury sifted through the evi-
dence but appeared to be getting little done. Finally, on April 29, the 
court determined that it could proceed no further until the F.BI investi-
gation was made available. It adjourned until late May as the F.BI re-
viewed its files and released the interviews. 2' 
The bureau not only reviewed its files but followed up on leads 
and controversial points developed during the initial inquiry. It man-
aged to identify seveml whites, photographed by newspaper and magazine 
correspondents, who appeared to be in the process of ransacking Mink 
Slide businesses but took no action against them and did not recommend 
local prosecution. The bureau also investigated the widespread belief 
that Columbia blacks had conspired to cause trouble by anning themselves 
and holding secret meetings prior to February 25 but could not substanti-
ate such beliefs. Finally, the F.BI followed its lead involving mysteri-
ous telephone calls to and from Chicago in the immediate aftermath of 
the violence, a fact that bad earlier appeared to corrobomte the con-
spimcy theory. In May, agents discovered that the calls in question 
came from James Eooker, a black man from Chicago, whose purpose lay in 
2
' 11The Social Front: Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and 
Trends L~ Race Relations, 3 (April 1946), 266; Clegg to Hoover, April 30, 
1946, FBI Records. 
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confinning the safety of his mother who resided in Columbia. In an over-
all review to J. Edgar Hoover, Justice Department official H. H. Clegg 
chided the director for failure to clear up these problems earlier and 
implied that the bureau's handling of the Columbia investigation had been 
26 sloppy. 
After the grand jury received the F.BI's transcripts of nearly four 
hundred interviews and other material, it reconvened. On June 14 it 
issued its report which concluded that local and state authorities bad 
violated no federal laws during or after the riot. The jury noted that 
_ "an efficient and adequate guard was not maintained throughout the 'Mink 
Slide' area" after the violence·but contended that this did not consti-
tute a violation of federal statutes. The jury recognized the destruction 
of portions of the area but complained that available evidence made it 
"wholly impossible to determine the identity of such person or persons 
or to elicit facts upon which to predicate an indictment in this respect." 
The actions of the state authorities on February 26 in moving through Mink 
Slide and subsequent imprisonment procedures appeared perfectly legal to 
the grand jury, so the charges by Julius Blair, Sol Blair, and James Mor-
ton that their civil rights bad been violated collapsed. Finally, the 
jury found no evidence to support a rumored lynching attempt on February 
25, ma.inly because no evidence revealed the purchase of a rope on that 
day. The deaths of Gordon and Johnson on the 28th were ruled justifiable 
26FBI Report on Columbia Riot, Memphis Tennessee, May 10, 1946; 
F.BI Report on Columbia Riot, Memphis, Tennessee, May 17, 1946; F.BI Report 
on Columbia Riot, Chicago, Illinois, May 17, 1946; Clegg to Hoover, April 
30, 1946, F.BI Records. 
homicide. In the remainder of its report the federal grand jury ex-
pressed alarm at various newspaper reports and pamphlets which had as 
their purpose "the malicious intent and desire to incite racial discord 
and intolerance and to cause further racial strife." In a patriotic con-
clusion the jury's report admonis~ ... eci "the good citizens of both races [ to] 
be on their guard against insidious a...'Yld false propaganda. u27 
£lthough the grand jury answered the question of federal interven-
tion in the case, the fates of the black defendants remained undecided. 
On ¥.LS.y 28, as the federal grand ju_r:; reconvened in Nashville, a ¥.iaury 
Cou..'Ylty circuit court convened to try those people indicted by the local 
g:r-c:.nc. jury. Twenty-six, includir.g J·..llius a..'r'ld Sol :Blair and Ja!!les Morton, 
faced two counts of attempting to commit murder in the first degree and 
accessory before the fact. Additional charges of accessory after the fact 
and carrying a shotgun faced Morton, and a charge of carrying a pistol 
added to Sol :Blair's problems. J~es and Glaciys Stephenson faced other 
. ~. . t 28 
l.IlO.lC't'.i!len s. 
Without delay defense attorney Maurice Weaver asked that the in-
dictments be qua.shed because the Y.i.au.ry County grand jury systematically 
excludeci blacks. Prosecuting attomey Paul F. :Bumpus denied such allega-
tions and threatened to contest every move the defense made, but Jmge 
Joe M. Ingram agreed to begin hearings on the subject. In two weeks 
Weaver called 223 blacks, most of whom proved qualified to sit on grand 
2711Report of G:ra.nd Jury in the Matter of the Racial Disturbance 
at Columbia, Tennessee, June 14, 1946, 11 F.BI Records. 
28TY,Pescript of indictments in Columbia trial, undated, in 
"Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers; "Along the NAACP :Battle-
front," Crisis, 53 (July 1946), 212. 
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juries, but the fact remained that no blacks had acted in such a capacity 
in the county for fifty years o On June 12 :Bumpus beg-c::.I1 a refutation of 
the defense's charges, and six days later Judge Ingram ruled that he could 
see no discrimination in the system of jury selection. Anticipating this 
decision, Weaver and Thurgood Marshall asked for a change of venue. They 
hoped that the proceedings could be moved to Davidson County, where the 
defend.ants stood more likely to receive a fair trial. Arguments on the 
change of venue took place from July 2 through S, when Ingram granted the 
change for twenty-six of the defend.ants. Instead of moving the trial to 
Nashville, however, he chose Lawrenceburg, thirty-four miles away. 29 
While Weaver, Looby, and the other defense lawyers worried over 
their next move, Thurgood Marshall developed pneumonia and bad to bow out 
of the case. He did not return until October. Meanwhile the citizens of 
Lawrenceburg exhibited as negative an attitude toward the change of venue 
as the defense COtL'!'lselors. Mayor R. O. Downey complained, "we feel ~hat 
we have been imposed upon and unjustly treated in this matter," and "we 
do not feel that we should bear the stigma of something tbat happened 
somewhere else and in which we have no part." Similarly, the editor of 
the local Democrat-Union grumbled that "Lawrenceburg people do not feel 
an obligation to wash the dirty linen of Columbia ••• or any other 
city."30 
Despite these and other protests, preliminary hearings began on 
August 3. Looby and Weaver filed a second request for a change of venue, 
29:aeeler, "Race Riot in Columbia," 80-90; Weaver to Bu.rra.n, July 
8, 1977. 
30unidentified memorandum describing Marshall's illness in 
"Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers; Lawrenceburg Democ:rat-
U:iio:!:.. ?,_11:--· J'.?. io~i:;. 
producing affidavits from area blacks to support their contention that 
Lawrenceburg represented no improvement over Columbia. Ingram denied the 
request. The defense then asked for postponement of the proceedings be-
cause of Marshall's illness, but the judge would not be delayed. The 
trial began on August 13. Immediately frustrations over jury selection 
emerged. Weaver planned to use all two hundred of his peremptory chal-
lenges to insure a palatable panel, but Ingram foiled him. After three 
weeks of haggling over the prospective jurors, the judge handed down the 
unusual ruling that he, and not the lawyers, would question the veniremen. 
For the next two weeks Ingram ad.mi tted several persons to the jury who 
proved clearly undesirable to the defense, including one IJan who said he 
believed in separate types of justice for whites and blackso Along the 
way one of the prospective jurors produced a medical certificate confirm-
ing that he suffered from a form of psychoneurosis, whereupon Ingxa.m 
leaned over and asked him, "where does it hurt? What ails you?" Finally, 
from over four hundred veniremen, the jury was completed. It consisted of 
six farmers, two carpenters, a janitor, a chemical plant worker, a mer-
chant, and a saw mill operator. All were white. One of the jurors, a 
state guardsman, had been on duty in Columbia during the February violence. 31 
As the trial got underway the defense attempted to prove that Lynn 
Bomar and his state troopers, the first state officials at Mink Slide, 
illegally moved into businesses and homes, ransacked them, recklessly shot 
up the area, arrested blacks without warrants, and beat some of them while 
3l"Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, 53 (September 1946), 277; 
ibid. (October 1946), 309; Columbia Daily Herald, August 3, 1946; Lawrenoe-
burg Democrat-Union, September 20, 1946; "Mink Slide: The Afte:cma.th," 
Time, October 14, 1946, p. 29; Weaver to Burran, July 8, 1977. 
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holding others incommunicado. Weaver's questioning of :Bomar on September 
26 bore out the allegations. The highway patrol chief admitted searching 
and arresting without warrants, kicking down doors, and beating up prison-
ers but maintained that such tactics were necessary in a state of emer-
gency. He admitted that his men did not have full police power and that 
their only specific duties were issuing traffic citations and confiscating 
illegal liquor. "Sometimes we assume some powers we really don't have," 
he explained. Later, Weaver asked :Bomar if he bad "any feeling at all 
against any of these defendants." He replied, "I don't have any feeling. 
I have some very good friends among the colored people and I have got 
more respect for any colored men here than I have you. 1132 
In early October the prosecution and defense delivered their final 
orations. :Bumpus ignored the issues and asserted instead that "I will 
continue to defend my people against the Fascist tendencies created by 
dirty rats who are misrepresenting actual conditions in Tennesseeo" He 
scolded the "agitators" who "poured out a flood of sewerage that would 
nauseate a skunk." L.A. Ransom of the defense then reminded the jury 
that the Columbia violence had been started by a white lynch mob and that 
the defendants had simply tried to pr~tect themselves. At 5:00 p.m. on 
October 4 the verdict came in: the jury found all but two of the de-
fendants not guilty. Robert Gentry and John McKivens were convicted of 
attempted murder. 33 
32Alva W. Taylor, "Sift :Blame for Tennesse Riot," Christian Century, 
April 24, 1946, pp. 531-32; Tennessee v. Sol Blair et al., September 26, 
1946, in "Tennessee, Columbia Riot," LF, NAACP Papers. 
33columbia Daily Herald, October 3, 4, 5, 1946; November 11, 21, 
1946; Pittsburgh Courier, October 12, 1946. 
254 
The defense was elated; Maurice Weaver melodramatically shouted, 
"this makes a man proud to be an American." The prosecution, visibly de-
flated, sat stunned as the courtrooE cleared, for the general consensus 
as the trial came to a close clearly favored the prosecution. 34 That a 
jury composed of rural southern whites freed all but two of the defendants 
in a trial emanating from a well-publicized threat to the racial system 
proved remarkable. Civil rights groups frankly expected another kangaroo 
court, similar to the Scottsboro trials, and in some ways the two cases 
reflected similarities. The object of the defense lay in taking the case 
to the Supreme Court, but the jury's decision precluded that possibility, 
especially after the state reversei itself and dropped the charges against 
Gentry and McKivens. 
The remaining legal battles proved anticlimactic. The four whites 
arrested in connection with the riot, along with Jam.es and Gladys Stephen-
son, we~t free when the state dropped the charges against them. Two other 
blacks, Lloyd Kennedy and William Pillow, were tried in Columbia during 
November on charges of attempting to kill Ray Austin, a state trooper. 
The court found Pillow innocent but convicted Kennedy. The NAACP appealed 
Kennedy's conviction to the state supreme court, which upheld the lower 
court in a June 1947 decision. Kennedy went to prison on a one-to-five-
year sentence, and with that the long struggle to free the Columbia de-
fendants ended. 35 
34Tra.nscript of telephone conversation, White to Ollie Harrington, 
October 5, 1946, in "Dept. of Justice--FBI/Columbia, Tenn.," GOF, NAACP 
Papers. 
35columbia Daily Herald, November 19, 1946; December 7, 1946; 
February 1, 11, 1947; June 5, 1947; Kennedy v. Tennessee, 210 S. W. 2d 
132 (1947). 
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The most arresting fact about the Columbia riot was that a rela-
tively small outbreak provoked such widespread publicity, inquiries, and 
legal action. The town and its inbabi tan ts mirrored others across the 
South in the wartime population loss, the stringent system of race rela-
tions underneath a deceptive picture of harmony, the latent interracial 
suspicions, and white fears of the impact of retuming black veterans on 
southern society. \In the face of political and economic changes many 
'-
whites attempted to preserve familiar institutions, and any action by 
blacks that appeared to threaten the color line invited swift retribution. 
At the same time, however, blacks tired of the continuing discrimina-
tion. They saw white reactions to their improvements as part of an over-
all attempt to deny gains they deserved. In Columbia, a threatened 
lynching as the result of an inter::acial brawl confirmed their suspicions, 
while to whites the fight served as proof that black veterans intended to 
challenge racial t+a,ditions. 
That both groups interpreted the riot differently reflected the 
lack of interracial communication that lay at the heart of the violence 
and explained the overwhelming response by the state of Tennessee. To 
whites, the riot started when Mink Slide residents shot four policemen 
on the night of February 25. To blacks, this incident was a regrettable 
but unavoidable outgrowth of white preparations to lynch James Stephenson 
and perha.po ,even his mother. For the blacks, the riot started on the 
moming of February 26 when well over one hundred lawmen invaded Mink 
Slide, wounded several residents, and destroyed property. To the whites, 
including the decision makers in Nashville, the Mink Slide intrusion 




seve:ral officers received injuries represented not black self-defense 
but a blatant disregard of established authority. 
The FBI investigated the Columbia incident for evidence of viola-
tion of civil liberties and subversive activity but found neither. Those 
blacks who faced trial were bitter, for they contended that they committed 
no crime in defending themselves against a state-supported extra.legal in-
vasion. Whites, on the other band, saw the trials as justifiable, coming 
from violent and unwarranted action which threatened their concept of 
postwar stability. From this incident such groups as the NAACP gained 
valuable experience that it would use in its school desegregation struggles 
of the next eight years. 
In the end only Lloyd Kennedy went to prison. The acquittal of 
the remaining defendants was generally hailed as nothing short of miracu-
lous, and sages predicted a new era in southern justice. Yet Kennedy's 
fate still proved more the rule and the acquittals more the exception for 
this period. The outcome of the trials must be viewed on two levels--the 
national and the local. From the national perspective the NAACP won an 
incredible victory. But from the local viewpoint the victory meant little. 
As soon as the state and federal agencies left Columbia, little change 
could be seen, save perhaps increased mutual suspicion. Southern blacks, 
especially those who lived in places lil:e Columbia, could not depend on 
the NAACP or the SCHW to rescue them. They had to live within the tra-
ditions established by the majority, and effective changes would come 
only from the grassroots level. 
CHA.PTER IX 
THE COLOR LINE TRIUMPHANT 
The February 1946 Columbia riot was the largest incident of 
racial violence in the immediate postwar era. The number of clashes, ...... 
however, rose dramatically in the period following, peaking in the summer~~, 
months of 1946. During the course of these outbreaks, the wbi te South's 
opposition to postwar gains for blacks crystallized. The cycle of 
southern mce relations seemed complete, for as the international crisis 
passed, many of the modest strides southern blacks had taken during the 
war passed with it. The most significant of these gains had occurred 
in the economic and political spheres. For example, the black propor-
tion of the nationwide work force rose during the conflict from about 3 
percent to over 8 percent, with southern blacks benefitting to some de-
gree, while the demise of the white primary found an increasing number 
of black southerners registering to vote. The violence and conservatism 
that many whites exhibited in reaction forced them into the same separate 
and unequal coexistence that existed before the war. Although this did 
not occur with blacks standing idly by, continual attempts to preserve 
their gains invariably met with intimidation and violence. Blacks 
clutched at the elusive strands of advancement, but whites always kept 
the goals out of reach. Their efforts stymied, blacks drew back in a 
state.of bitterness and alienation. 1 
1wynn, Afro-American and Second World War, 55. 
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Thus, by the end of 1946 southem blacks were in much the same 
position as they had been in 1940 and earlier--firmly locked behind the 
color line. They did sense a negative difference though. Before the war 
economic destitution seemed to ignore the color line, but with reconver-
sion prosperity appeared to e:rase the familiarity that had once emerged 
from adversity. Whites meant for prosperity to serve them first, especi-
ally with the relatively high :rate of unemployment that produced a 
scramble for jobs. Such economic competition proved directly responsible 
for the Athens, Alabama, riot of A¾---ust. Violence built the wall sepa-
:rating the races even higher than before, and the doors leading to the 
American mainstream slammed shut. This left blacks with two alternatives: 
to leave the South altogether or to refine further their generations-old 
subsociety. Some fled, but most opted, mainly out of necessity, to re-
main. Their wartime gains, then, proved in many ways ephemeral. 
In addition to the general tension evident in the postwar South, 
other factors perpetuated violence. The resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan 
and likeminded groups epitomized a reactionary fringe element that his-
torically has emerged in periods of change and instability. Once the 
unity and feverish pace of the war effort subsided, these groups tried 
to recreate some imagined golden age of morality and white supremacy. 
In October 1945, Jesse B. Stoner, who served as "Kleagle" of the "Realm 
of Tennessee," predicted that the KKK would reach its zenith during the 'r 
period when jobless veterans and laid-off workers retumed to their homes 
looking for employment. "The conflict," Stoner reportedly said, "will 
come when Negroes, who have gotten jobs because of the war and the 
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FEPC, won't give up those jobs. 112 
The Klan revival lasted only a few years. By 1952 most state 
governments managed to suppress the organization, but revoking charters 
or infiltmting "klavems" sometimes had little effect on diverting re-
actionary feelings. This resurgence, like that of the 1920s, involved {/ ·'.j\,~-
"marginal" white businessmen and blue collar workers, among others. One 
scholar who studied the renewal of Klan activity during the late 1940s 
noted characteristics that transcended temporal factors. "The excessive 
vehemence with which some klansmen extol their white status and disasso-
ciate themselves from Negro status," he observed, "suggests that basi-
cally they may feel themselves as weak, deprived, and helpless as they 
i.Iragine the Negro to be." They appeared to have been thwarted in achiev-
ing worthwhile goals and usually occupied precarious positions within the 
social system. As a result, they saw themselves as the victims of "in-
scrutable conspiracies and enemies." The postwar Klan, then, embmced 
those people whose powerlessness approoched ths.t of southem blacks. 3 
By early 1946 the Klan revival proved most evident in Georgia, 
Alabama, Tennessee, and Florida, with some activity in South Carolina. 
The Appalachian hill country of Fast Tennessee, North Georgia, and North 
Alabama provided their strongest bailiwick. In March a score of burning 
crosses lit the night near Chattanooga. and Knoxville, followed in April 
by six cross burnings in Birmingham and similar activity in Miami. On 
2Harold Preece, "The Klan Declares War," New Masses, October 16, (,/ 
1945, pp. 3-4. 
3James W. Vander Zanden, "The Klan Revival," American Journal of 
Sociology, 65 (March 1960), 456, 458, 460-62. 
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May 9 klansmen burned a giant cross atop their shrine, Stone Mountain, 
near Atlanta. About seven hundred members of the Invisible Empire and 
over one thousand spectators attended the ceremony, which featured the 
initiation of five hundred new members. One observer noticed that most 
of the parked cars bore license plates from Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, 
and South Carolina.4 
During the 1930s, the Klan in Georgia obtained a charter that 
described it as a "fraternal organization for white gentiles only." 
Following the Yiay 9 demonstration, an aroused Southern Regional Council, )f ½ 
based in Atlanta, decided to investigate the Klan. Stetson Kennedy, one 
of the SRC 1 s most energetic investigators who built a one-man campaign 
against the KKK, wrote Georgia Governor Ellis Arnall to ask if he might 
consider legal action against the Invisible Empire. Arnall already had 
the same thought in mind, and after consultation with Georgia's attomey 
general, the state made Kennedy an undercover agent. Kennedy did con-
siderable snooping, and as a result on June 20 the state filed a suit 
against the Klan. It asked the group to show reason why the state should 
not revoke its charter, especially in light of recent terroristic acts 
against innocent citizens. The Klan representatives simply denied the 
allegations and then asked tmt the charges be dropped and tl:Bt the state 
be required to pay the court costs.' 
4Guzman, Negro Year Book, 217-20; Pittsburgh Courier, March 30 
1946; "The Social Front: Violence," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends 
in Race Relations, 3 (April 1946), 267; "The Social Front: The Ku Klux 
Klan," ibido (May 1946), 3010 
5Report by Stetson Kennecy, undated; Transcript of information, 
Georgia v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, June 20, 1946, SRC Papers, Box 1. 
Whether or not the Klan's charter remained valid in Georgia JIB.de 
little difference in its activities. The KKK, essentially a covert or-
ganization a:nyway, did not really need such formalities as a charter. 
Besides, other organizations spawned by postwar fears and insecurities 
could take the Klan's place if it collapsed. The Columbians of Atlanta 
proved typical. Headed by people who believed the doom of the "Aryan" 
race was imminent, it caused considerable commotion until late in the 
year when a Georgia jury convicted its leaders for "usurping police power." 
Such organizations as the Klan and Columbians played an effective role in 
provoking the postwar racial · violence in the South. 6 / / 
Politics also proved responsible, at least indirectly, for ;:M~--,::. 
longing the resurgence of violence in mid-1946. In at least two southern 
states, Georgia and Mississippi, race-baiting found its way into the 1946 
gubernatorial and congressional elections. By 1946 the liberalism of 
Ellis Arnall, combined with the postwar situation, led many Georgia 
voters to react against moderate politics, and blacks provided the first 
object of attention. Gubernatorial hopeful Eugene Talmadge exploited it. 
Concurrently with the race for the Democratic nomination came a court 
ruling based on Smith v. Allwright that allowed blacks to vote in the 
previously lily-white primary. This action doomed the Amall forces and 
gave Talmadge a winning issue. Georgia's voter registration doubled, 
and fearing the black threat, many Talmadgites conducted wholesale purges 
of their registration books--blacks faced hostile officials who asked why 
6"The Social Front: The Columbiana," Monthly Summary of Events and 
Trends in Race Relations, 4 {November 1946), 102; "The Social Front: 
The Hate Outfits, 11 ibid. (March 1947), 234. 
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they should not be barred from voting due to "illiteracy, criminal record, 
bad character," and the like. 7 
The symbolic rejuvenation of the Ku Klux Klan at Stone Mountain on 
May 9 added fuel to Talmadge•s fire, the Negrophobic candid.ate and In-
visible Empire complementing each other. In a June speech Talmadge clari-
fied his views on race when he stated, "I was raised among niggers and I 
understand them. I want to see ~hem treated fairly and I want to see them 
have justice in the courts. But I w--c:.nt to deal with the nigger in this way: 
he must come to my backdoor, take off his hat, and say, 1yes, sir.'" 
Racial tension heightened in the days before the primary, and violence 
thereafter seemed inevitable. 
ballotingoB 
T~imadge emerged victorious in the June 17 ----
Meanwhile the senior seE.~r from Mississippi, Theodore G. Bilbo, 
mounted a similar campaign. :Slacks in his state, under the influence of .. ·· .. 
( .. ~ ·--... 
returning veterans and local leaders, began a voter registration effort \...., .... /.::. _ _., 
to permit their participation L'l1 the July primary. Alarmed, Bilbo urged 
his supporters to use whatever means necessary to keep blacks away from 
the polls and repeatedly condoned violenceo In fact, Bilbo became so 
exercised over the thought of their casting ballots in the state tmt be 
dusted off one of his pet projects--sending all blacks back to Africa. 
By the time of the July 2 primary election, most blacks in Mississippi, 
through weeks of intimidation, stayed away from the pollso Bilbo eked 
7william Anderson, The Wild Man from S r Creek: The Political 
Career of Eugene Talmadge Baton Rouge, 1975, 215-22; Smith v. Allwright, 
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Report by Kennedy, undated, SRC Paperso 
8Anderson, Wild Man, 229-33• 
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out a narrow victory over four opponents. 9 
The postwar tension and instability, the rise of the Klan and 
similar groups, and Negrophobic politics converged in the summer of 1946 \::,,?\::_, 
to continue the violence that had escalated since late 1945. It ma:c:ked 
both the climax and the end of the South's postwar racial violence. On 
July 17 a mob of .four whites shot and killed Ma.ceo Snites in Taylor (~;:.::. 
County, Georgia. He had breached the bounds of racial etiquette by be-
ing the only black person to vote in the primary. A coroner's jury re-
ported that his attackers shot him in self-defense. 1O 
On the heels of the Snites lynching came another in Holmes Cotmty, 
Mississippi. On July 19 a white fanner, Jeff Dodd, filed a complaint 
against one of his black tenants, Leon McTatie, for allegedly stealing 
three saddles. Sheriff Walter Murtagh arrested McTatie the same day and 
placed him in the cotmty jail in Lexington. On the 22nd, however, Dodd 
reappeared and withdrew his complaint. Placing McTatie in his car, Dodd 
and five other white men drove the black man to his farm and began beating 
him in an attempt to extract a confession. McTatie continually denied 
knowledge of the crime and tried to stall his assailants by mentioning 
the names of several other local blacks who might have been involved. The 
ploy failed, for the men continued to beat him until they killed him. 
McTatie 1 s wife, hiding in a clump of bushes nearby, witnessed the entire 
9Pittsburgh Courier, July 13, 1946; U.S., Congress, Serate, Hear-
ings before the Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Ex-
penditures, 1946, Pursuant to S. Res. 224 2 A Resolution to Appoint a Special 
Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Contributions and Expendi-
tures in the 1946 Election, Mississippi, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 342. 
lO"America's Roll of Dishonor," Monthly Summa:ry of Events and Trends 
in Race Relations, 4 (August-September. 1946), 28; "Georgia: The :Best 
People Won't Talk," Time, August 5, 1946, p. 25; Atlanta Constitution, 
July 26, 1%6. 
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episode. After McTatie died Dodd and the others decided to get rid of 
the body, so they drove to Sunflower County, about sixty miles distant, 
and dumped the corpse in a creek. County officials discovered the body 
and, Uilable to identify it, buried it. The incident thus came close to 
being one of many undiscovered lynchings. 11 
The murderers, however, did not suspect McTatie's wife would tell 
the sheriff what she saw. When she did, Murtagh locked the six whites in 
jail pending an inquest. Meanwhile, the sheriff learned that an uniden-
tified black man lay buried in Sunflower Co1mty, so he got a cou_rt order, 
exhumed the body, and took it back to Lexington. Confronted with the 
evidence, three of the whites confessed to the beating, though they 
denied killing him. Shortly thereafter McTatie's two young stepsons, 
along with a white man, confessed to stealing the three saddles from 
12 Dodd and told the sheriff that McTatie had no knowledge of the theft. 
Following a brief investigation by the FBI, officials charged .- ·· ( ~i, 
\ j.,V 
five of the six whites with murder and awaited a grand jury hearing. ;:·-.,._S -
The sixth man, an Army private, was not charged. In October a Eolmes 
County grand jury indicted the five for manslaughter; apparently the jury 
considered a murder charge too severe in connection with the death of a 
black man. The county circuit court inexplicably ordered two of the 
defendants acquitted, and after a brief trial the jury deliberated 
1~emorandum, Fred G. Folsom to Tu.mer L. Smith, July 30, 1946, 
Justice Department Records; Atlanta Constitution, July 31, 1946. Con-
temporary sources spelled McTatie's name several eays, such as McAtte 
and McAtee. Most spelled it McTatie. 
12Folsom to Smith, July 30, 1946, Justice Department Records; 
Jackson Clarion Ledger, August 1, 1946; "Mississippi: Awaiting Action," 
Time, August 12, 1946, pp. 20-21. 
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only four minutes before acquitting the other three men. 13 
Only three days after Leon McTatie 1 s death the most heinous lynch-
ing of the entire war era took place and the first multiple lynching in 
Georgia since 1918. It represented the most shocking result of violence 
brought about by postwar tension, reactionary activities, and racist 
politics. On July 14, Roger Malcolm, a black farmhand who lived near 
Mo:nroe (forty miles east of Atlanta), got into a fight with Barney 
Hester, Malcolm's former employer. The black man charged that Hester 
kept his wife as a mistress. Hester received a severe knife wound, and 
his brother-in-law, Deputy Sheriff Louis Howard, immedi~tely arrested his 
assailant. Before Howard could deposit the black farmer in jail, however, 
ten white men tried to lynch him. A white woman intervened and per-
suaded the assailants to let him go. Malcolm remained in jail from 
July 14 until July 25, when his wife arranged to free him on bond. 14 
:Malcolm's sister and her husband, May and George Dorsey, worked on 
Loy Harrison's farm in neighboring Oconee County. Dorsey was ~ recently ( ·~:.- ·. 
'--, 
discharged veteran. They cooperated with Malcolm's wife, and on July 25 
persuaded Harrison to help them post bond for the prisoner. The three 
blacks and Harrison drove to Monroe and Harrison posted $600 bond. They 
remained in town for a couple of hours and did not leave on the return 
trip until about 5:30 p.m. Harrison, a 275-pound ex-convict, did not 
13Folsom to Smith, July 30, 1946, Justice Department Records; 
Jackson Clarion Ledger, August 1, 1946; Pittsburgh Courier, August 10, 
1946; October 19, 1946; "The Social Front: Lynching," Monthly Summary 
of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (November 1946), 105. 
1½>ittsbu.rgh Courier, August 3, 31, 1946; Atlanta Daily World, 
July 27, 1946; Thomas W. Johnson to Walter White, July 28, 1946, in 
"Walton County Ga. Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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return on the main highway but instead took a back road. When the car 
reached a bridge spanning Apalachee Creek, which divided Walton and Oconee 
counties, it suddenly stopped. On the other side of the bridge stood 
twenty to thirty armed white men who leveled their guns at the auto 
while one pointed at Malcolm saying, "we want that nigger." He then 
gestured at Dorsey and said, "we want you, too." Harrison offered no 
resistance, but as the mob led the two men away, Malcolm's wife recognized 
one of the whites and implored him not to kill Dorsey and her husband. 
This cost both women their lives. The leader of the throng, a large, 
well-dressed man in his sixties, instructed four of the whites to bring 
the women along. At the same time another white asked Harrison if he 
recognized anyone; he naturally replied "no." The band of whites marched 
the four blacks a short distance, lined them up, and executed them. One 
of the lynchers then told Harrison to leaveo Two hours later he called 
the Walton County sheriff and reported the crime. 15 
The news of this multiple lynching sent shock waves across the 
nation. As soon as Govemor Ania.11 heard of the incident, he issued a 
statement proclaiming that "the decent people of Georgia are humiliated 
about the mass murder," and he put up a $10,000 reward for information 
leading to the.arrest and conviction of the.lynchers. He also sent 
William E. Spence, chief of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), 
to Walton County. President Truman called on Attomey General Tom Clark 
to undertake an exhaustive investigation to determine whether a federal 
15Pittsburgh Courier, August 3, 1946; Atlanta Constitution, July 
27, 28, 1946; Atlanta Daily World, July 27, 1946; "Georgia: The Best 
People Won't Talk," Time, August 5, 1946, p. 25; "Along the NAACP :Battle-
front," Crisis, 53 (September 1946), 277; New York Times, July 27, 1946, 
pp. 1, 32. 
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case could be developed and called for renewed consideration of an anti-
lynching bill. Six F.BI agents arrived on the scene and worked closely 
with the Gl3I. One of the federal agents maintained constant surveillance 
over Loy Harrison, the only known eyewitness. 
Meanwhile, an outraged NAACP contacted a white Macon lawyer, 
Thomas W. Johnson, and employed him as an investigator. In his first 
report to the New York office on July 28, Johnson confirmed Harrison's 
bootlegging activities, observed that the lynching appeared to have been 
planned in advance, and suggested that Eugene Talmadge 1 s recent campaign 
was indirectly responsible for the violence. The NAACP forwarded the 
reports to Attorney General Clark as an indication of the association's 
interest in solving the case. The NAACP also matched Arnall's $10,000 
16 reward, and other groups added to the sum. 
Other groups and individuals expressed similar concern and outrage 
over the incident, but Talmadge, vacationing in Wyoming after his arduous 
primary campaign, dismissed the matter casually. "Things like that are 
to be regretted," he remarked, adding that "nothing can be gained by 
giving equal rights to someone with an artificial civilization that has 
been forced upon him only 1,50 years ago. 1117 
Loy Harrison's role in the murders raised several crucial ques-
tions. His proclaimed innocence in the lynching appeared extremely 
16Atlanta Daily World, July 28, 30, 1946; Atlanta Constitution, 
July 28, 29, 31, 1946; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Harry S. Truman, 1946 (Washington, 1962), 368; Interoffice 
memorandum by White, July 2.5, 1946; Johnson to White, July 28, 1946, in 
"Walton County Ga. Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
l7Pittsburgh Courier, August 3, 1946. 
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questionable. As a lifelong resident of the area and a well-known boot-
legger, Harrison certainly knew many area residents. When questioned, 
he described the leader of the mob as tall, dignified, in his sixties, 
wearing a brown suit and wide brimmed straw bat, and raving "a good 
Florida tan." Yet Harrison insisted that he could not identify him or 
any other member of the mob, all of whom were unmasked. He admitted 
that Malcolm's wife had recognized one of the lynchers as they mrched 
into the woods and yelled his name, but protested that he had not heard 
the name clearly, so he could not remember it. Harrison also offered 
no explanation for driving home from Monroe on a back road instead of 
taking the Atlanta-Athens highway as he bad on the initial leg of the 
trip. 
Investigators discovered that on July 4 Harrison had beaten his 
tenant, George Dorsey, and ordered him off the farm, possibly as a way of 
gaining possession of his crop. Officials found no record of the $600 
bond supposedly posted by Harrison on July 25, but they did learn that 
the deputy sheriff who released Malcolm to Harrison's custody was a 
relative of :Barney Hester, the man Malcolm had stabbed. 18 
A virtual conspiracy of silence by blacks and whites thwarted 
attempts by investigators to discover substantive facts. By July 30 
the GBI knew the identity of at least five of the mob members and that 
Loy Harrison was unquestionably a co-conspirator, but the authorities 
possessed no evidence against them that would stand up in courto The 
six FBI and five GBI men thus proved unable to surmount the hostility of 
18Ibid.; "The Social Front: Lynching," Monthly Summary of Events 
and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (August-September 1946), 4. 
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local authorities and the unwillingness of many of the area's inhabitants 
to talk. In addition, local lawmen and townspeople bad t:rampled the scene 
of the crime, picking up the physical evidence in the process. As a re-
sult, investigators found nothing at the scene to help them--not even a 
bullet or shell case. Desperate for a lead in the case, the GBI considered 
bringing in either lie detector equipment or sodium pentothal (truth 
serum) o It discarded this_ plan, however, and relied on more conventional 
techniques in unraveling the mystery. 19 
Meanwhile public interest in the case continued to mounto The re-
ward money, which stood at $20,000 following the NAACP's contribution, 
soon rose to $32,000, and ultirra.tely reached $64,000o Contributions came 
from such organizations as the Civil Rights Congress, the Southern Regional 
Council, and the American Civil Liberties Union. During the weeks follow-
ing the incident, Atlanta, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia held pro-
test parades, rallies, and official days of mourning. Max Yergan, head 
of the National Negro Congress, led a protest march of one thousand people 
down Constitution Avenue to the White House. Thousands of letters poured 
. f d. d' 'd 1 20 in rom groups an in ivi ua s. 
All the demonstrations, protests, and letters, however, could not 
expedite the investigation, though the NAACP did manage to discover four 
blacks who claimed to be eyewitnesses to the lynchingo Willie Johnson told 
of how he sat Ulllloticed in a store as carloads of armed men headed for the 
19Press release, July 30, 1946, in "Walton County Ga. Lynching 
(Dept. of Justice--FBI), 11 GOF, NAACP Papers. 
20Atlanta Daily World, July 30, 1946; August 2, 1946; "Progr-c:.!ils 
of Action: Action Taken on Monroe, Georgia, Lynchings," Monthly S1.l!iE:.ary 
of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (August-September 1946), 29-300 
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fateful bridgeo He and a friend followed them on foot and hid in the 
bushes while the crime took place. The NAACP tracked down Johnson in 
Augusta. The other eyewitnesses, Johnny Burdette and his girlfriend, 
were patted on the back road near where the lynching took place and 
witnessed the murders. Fearing for their lives, they refused totes-
tify publicly. The NAACP's discovery, therefore, added little to the 
development of the case. The major investigations led nowhere, and by 
mid-August rumors floated across the area that the GBI and FBI planned 
t . ·h . . 21 ogive up on~ e inqw.ry. 
Finally, Attorney General Clark empaneled a federal grand jury 
to convene on December 2 in Athens. "I am sorzy to say there is no 
field of law in which the Federal GoveI.'!lIIlent is expected to do so much 
with so little," he added pessimistically. "The right of life, liberty 
and property, the Supreme Court of the United States bas repeatedly held, 
is not a federally secured right." After weeks of intense investigation 
and questioning 2,500 Walton County residents, the Department of Justice 
22 entered the grand jury hearing with little hopeo 
The jury that convened included two blacks, but they undoubtedly 
felt pressure from their white co-jurors. Two of the other members, the 
NAACP complained, were relatives of Barney Hester. In all, the twenty-
three man jury included "thirteen farmers, two merchants, two coal dealers, 
21Deposition of Willie Jolmson, undated, in "Walton County Ga. 
Lynching"; \fuite to Tom C. Clark, August 12, 1946, in "Walton County Ga. 
Lynching {Dept. of Justice--FBI)," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
2211The Social Front: Lynching," Monthly Summary of Events and 
Trends in Race Relations, 4 (November 1946), 104-5; Press release, Decem-
ber 2, 1946; White to Clark, December 1, 1946, in "Walton County Ga. 
Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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a barber, a cotton gin opera.tor, a banker, a laundry manager, a clerk and 
a 'retired fanner. '" U. S. District Attorney John Cowart presented the 
government's case, and Loy Harrison was the chief witness. The key issue, 
as always in an investigation of this nature, centered on whether the 
lynching involved the violation of federal civil rights statuteso The 
jury deliberated for seventeen days but on December 20 unanimously agreed 
that it could not identify "any person or persons participating in the 
murders or in any violation of the civil rights statutes of the United 
Stateso 1123 
By the time of the grand jury's report, most of the parties in-
volved concluded that no indictment appeared possible. When the results 
emerged, few people seemed surprised. The result pointed up once again, 
this time in the boldest relief possible given the nature of the lynching, 
the critical need for federal anti-lynching legislation. As the most shock-
ing lynching of the war era, the case made martyrs of the four victims and 
provided much-needed publicity that later sparked renewed efforts in Con-
gress for passage of an anti-lynching lawo The crime itself revealed some-
thing about the rature of southem race relations and the lack of inter-
racial understanding, just as it illustrated the continued deterioration 
of relations stemming from wartime changes. The inability of many "1hites 
to countenance even modest changes in the status of southem blacks indi-
cated that they felt threatened by what postwar America might bringo 24 
23Press release, December 2, 1946, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, 
December 28, 1946. 
2411The Social Front: Crime and Punishment," Events and Trends in 
Race Relations: A Monthly Summary [title changed as of January 1947], 4 
(February 1947), 202. 
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If the Monroe incident stood as the largest and most gruesome of 
the wartime lynchings, the episode that followed proved the most bizarre. 
While southerners watched as the Monroe investigation proceeded, an 
attempted double lynching took place near Minden, Louisiana. Again, the \. ~··> 
sordid story included a black veteran, John C. Jones, a twenty-eight-year-
old ex-GI. He returned home after his discharge on January 7, 1946, to 
Cotton Valley, a small town several miles north of Minden and just east 
of Shreveport, situated in the oil-rich lands of northem Louisianao Once 
home Jones found the audacity, gained through his service in the Army, to 
ask embarrassing questions about his grandfather's fleecing at the bands 
of the Premier Oil Company. It seems that the seventy-six-year-old man, 
who could neither read nor write, owned land that had produced oil for 
yearso The company took advantage of the situation by signing a lease 
for the oil at ridiculously low prices--thirty-nine cents a month for one 
well, $1.50 a month for another. Jones questioned tmt arra.ngement--a 
breach of local racial etiquette that provoked local whites. In addition, 
Jones' bra.very as a corporal and Battle of the Bulge survivor represented 
a threat to racial harmony in Cotton Valley, and the black man soon earned 
the reputation of being "uppity" and a "smart nigger. 1125 
•,. 
On July 31 local police arrested Jones' younger cousin, Albert {}>· . 
Harris, Jr., and charged him with helping Jones rape a young white womano 
In this way local whites hoped to fabricate a charge against Jones, for 
after beating Harris the young man, fearing for his life, told them that 
2511The Social Front: Violence," ibid. (August-September 1946), 
4-5; Press release, September 5, 1946, in "Minden La. Lynching," GOF, 
NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, August 24, 1946. 
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he and the veteran had attempted the rape. A few days later Jones joined 
Harris in jail, but on August 8 authorities were forced to release them 
because the alleged victim insisted that neither of the prisoners fitted 
the description of her assailant. 26 
That evening the police watched Harris and Jones walk out of the 
Minden jail and into the hands of ten white men lying in wait. After 
abducting the blacks, the whites drove to an isolated area along Ba.you 
Dorcheat, several miles north of town, and began beating them. Harris 
lost consciousness and the whites, assuming he was dead, turned their 
full attention to Jones. The beating soon turned into a sadistic spree 
and the lynchers used a meat cleaver and acetylene torch. Satisfied tmt 
they had ta.ken care of the area's principal black troublemaker, they 
left. Harris regained consciousness shortly thereafter and stumbled 
home. His father hastily placed him in an auto and sped away. 27 
For a week the lynching remained shrouded in secrecyo Local authori-
ties, who obviously participated in the overall plan, were anxious that 
news of the crime remained a local matter. Whites in the area shared 
the same concern, while local blacks dared not talk. Finally, on August 
15, the date of Jones' frmeral, news leaked out. Immediately, the story 
appeared in several Louisiana newspapers, and Daniel E. Byrd, head of the 
26Daniel E. Byrd to NAACP national office, rmda ted, in. "1-1".inden Lao 
Lynching--Correspondence"; Affidavit of Albert Harris, Jr., August 29, 
1946, in "Minden Lao Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers; Pittsburgh Couxier, 
September 7, 1946. 
27Pittsburgh Courier, September 7, 1946; Atlanta Constitution, 
August 16, 1946; New York Times, August 16, 1946; Press release, August 
19, 1946; Affidavit of Albert Barris, Jro, August 29, 1946, in "Minden 
la.. Lynching," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
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state's NAACP branches, telephoned Walter White. On August 22 White con-
tacted the Justice Department, and once again investigators went to work. 
The NAACP 1 s main hope in effecting prosecution rested with ilbert 
Harris, but his father had taken him to an undisclosed cityo Realizing 
that his testimony would provide the only real evidence of a violation 
of civil rights, the association decided to search for him. After two 
weeks, NAACP investigator Madison S. Jones found Harris in Muskegon, 
Michigan, and persuaded him to fly to New York and swear out an affi-
davit. l3y the end of August, Harris bad revealed the story to Justice 
Department officials, and on that info:cna.tion the department plunged into 
the 28 case. 
Results came quickly. On October 18 a fedeml grand jury in Monroe, 
Louisiana, indicted six white men on charges of violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment and related civil rights statutes. The Justice Department 
quickly dropped all charges against one of the defendants for lack of 
evidence, and when a fedeml district court trial began on February 14, 
1947, five accused lynchers faced conviction. As in the grand jury bear-
ing, Albert Harris provided the crucial testimony. U. So District Attor-
ney Malcolm Iafargue, the chief prosecutor, argued trat Harris had been 
arrested and confined to jail on a false pretext and that the defendants 
lynched Jones and tried to lynch Harris from personal vendettas. He also 
charged that the mob members and lawmen planned the incident together. 
28
Pittsburgh Courier, August 24, 31, 1946; Theron L. Caudle to Smith, 
August 22, 1946, ·Justice Department Records; "Along the NAACP Battlefront," 
Crisis, 53 (October 1946), 309-10; Press release, September 5, 1946; Inter-
office memomndum, undated, in "Minden La. Lynching--Correspondence," GOF, 
NAACP Papers. 
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The defense, led by A. S. Drew, complained that the F.BI had come into the 
state like a "swarm of locusts" and had used intimidation and threats in 
securing evidence for the October grand jury. Du.ring the final summa-
tion, Drew resorted to wailing over "the sanctity of our womanhood" and 
protested the interference of "that negro uplift society up north." 
Elements in the East, he grumbled, were t:r.ying to ·force "co-mingling 
of blacks and whites." Lafargue countered by asserting, "I come from 
this state, my grandfathers had slaves, but to me civil liberties mean 
human rights, God-given rights, for all Americans. If you want a feudal 
society, with overlords, or a Hitler or Mussolini government then this 
country is not for you." After less than two hours of deliberation the 
all-white jury acquitted the defendants. 29 
The wave of lynchings continued into the late summer and fall as(~ ' 
hostility against blacks, and especially veterans, remained high. In mid-
August a .band of twenty whites hunted down and killed a twenty-year-old 
ex-soldier, J.C. Farmer. A farmhand who lived near Wilson, North Caro-
lina, he fought with a local constable and shot the lawman in the hand 
with the officer's gun. Enraged citizens tracked down the fleeing Farmer 
and killed him near his home. On August 12 three whites shot and killed 
James Walker in front of his house near Elko, South Carolina, the result 
of a squabble in a local bar. Walker had incurred the enmity of whites 
in the area, since he was a member of the Charleston branch of the NAACP. 
Later in the month a coroner's jury decided that the Walker killing 
29Pittsburgh Courier, October 26, 1946; "Along the NAACP :Battle-
front," Crisis, 53 (December 1946), 373; ibid., 54 (April 1947), 116; 
Caudle to Malcolm E. Lafargue, November 21, 1946, Justice Department 




constituted "justifiable homicide," and the Justice Department concluded 
that the incident did not fall within its jurisdiction.30 
Although never officially confirmed, two lynchings occurred in 
mid-August near Marshall, Texas. In the July 27 primary election the Army 
stationed MPs at Marshall's polling places (as it did elsewhere) to pro- ( '?\_·. , 
. .......,_...., 
tact black veterans as they voted. This irritated many of Marshall's 
conservative whites, and in mid-August two veterans, Richard Gordon and 
Alonza :Brooks, died in separate incidents at the hands of white mobs. 
The local police reported Gordon's death to have resulted from a hit-and-
run driver but offered no explanation of why his throat had been slashed 
from ear to ear or why the rest of the body bore definite marks of having 
been dragged behind an automobile. :Brooks died the same week, but his 
body remained undiscovered until three days after his death. Again, the 
corpse showed signs of lynching. In both cases the police proved unco-
operative, but eyewitness accounts enabled NAACP investigators to piece 






Yet lynching declined after World War II in the South. '\ There would ~=<..-· 
I 
be other killings, especially during the civil rights revolution, but the 
tradition of mob lynching was passing from the scene. In assessing such 
JOPittsburgh Courier, Augu.st 24, 31, 1946; "Memorandum on Elko, 
S. C. Lynching," by John H. McCray; Caudle to Robert L. Carter, Septem-
ber 6, 1946, in "Elko S. C.," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
31Press release, August 22, 1946, in "Lynching--1946," GOF, NAACP 
Papers; "Along the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis, .53 (October 1946), 311. 
Other incidents reported included the lynching of John Gilbert on August 
3 near Gordon, Georgia, and the lynching of Dan Carter Sanders on 
November 18 near Smithfield, North Carolinao Various sources during 
1946 continually referred to mysterious deaths that never appeared in 
print. 
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violence, the most arresting fact is that lynchings continued long after 
the legal system caught up with America's vigilante tradition. As late 
as World War II, the United States still suffered from a form of vio-
lence that federal laws did not expressly prohibit. Since lynching had 
increasingly become a southern problem, it reflected the violent side of 
a rigidly enforced caste system based on race. The decline of lynch- ---1 
\ 
ing after the war era resulted from a retum to more prosperous times, I 
increased efforts especially on the federal level to stop it, the return \ 
I 
of black southerners to a traditional position within the racial system, I f 
i 
I 
and the continued exodus of blacks from the South. Peace and relatively 1 
tranquil domestic life added to the factors that helped cause the vir-
tual disappea:r:ance of the concentrated lynchings that had plagued the 
South for decades. Civil rights legislation later effectively ended 
the lynching threat. 
Proof of the interracial hostility generated by postwar tensions 
~ 
and particularly by economic competition came not only from the lynching :::t, 
wave of mid-1946, but also from the Athens, Alabama, race riot. Like the 
Columbia riot of February, the Athens incident took place in a small city 
and reflected the problems of unemployment, veterans' rights, and strain-
ed race relations caused chiefly by white desires to force blacks back 
into prewar political and economic positions. Although it proved a 
relatively small occurrence, it merited national attention in part be-
cause conditions existed in many other cities that could have caused 
similar disorders. It showed once again that the white South's concern 
over fissures in the color line, compounded by economic competition 
between whites and blacks, led the majority forcibly to attempt a return 
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to prewar standards and in the process threatened modest wartime gains 
by blacks. 
Athens, a city of about 4,300, lay about twenty miles south of 
the state's northern boundary, near Huntsville. Decatur, the scene of 
the Scottsboro trials, was about fifteen miles southwest. The city 
served as the seat of Limestone County and contained about nine hundred 
blacks. The region's economy depended upon cotton, so Athens was a 
typical fann town, providing the necessities of an agrarian populace. 32 
In mid-1946 Athens labored under a host of postwar difficulties, 
most of which resulted from unemployment and other economic problems. 
By 1943 the county had lost 11.1 percent of its population to urban-
industrial centers, characteristic of many rural counties. At war's end 
the area still suffered from this loss. Retuming veterans and defense 
workers made up part of the wartime decline, but the county's population 
still fell short of 1940 levels. In addition, veterans brought unantici-
pated problems. As unemployment rose, more veterans retumed, worsening 
the economic situation. Desperate for jobs, many whites tried to take 
over jobs held by blacks. 
Veterans also brought political problems. Former Gis, both black 
and white, wanted to assure themselves of a political voice in Athens, 
so in the 1946 primary they ran a GI ticket to replace entrenched politi-
cians. This resulted in a sizeable increase in black voting, from fifty 
or sixty to over three hundred, most of whom were fomer soldiers. The 
321. Maynard Catchings, "Analysis of the August 10th, 1946, Racial 
Disturbance at Athens, Limestone County, Alabama," August 14, 1946, 
Johnson Papers, Box 143. 
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ex-Gis lost, but they were heartened by the successful GI revol-t in near-
by Athens, Tennessee. In that election a faction of the Crump machine 
that ruled most of the state fell to a GI ticket. Open warfare accom-
panied the balloting which resulted in three deaths and fifty injuries. 
Veterans in Alabama's Athens look~d with a mixture of pride and envy 
upon that political coup. 33 
A rigid hierarchy among Limestone County whites added to area 
difficultieso Two distinct classes existed, the townspeople and pros-
perous famers, and the lower class subsistence-level whites who in-
habited enclaves outside of town. A familiar southern paradox prevailed: 
even though the lower class whites and blacks shared economic and politi-
cal goals, poor whites hated blacks more than anyone elseo The "better" 
sort of whites, meanwhile, exhibited contempt for both of the "meaner" 
groupso 
To further compound the problem, some black veterans returning to 
Athens demanded fair treatment from whites. Having served in the fight 
for democracy, they made it plain that they intended to exercise their 
rights. More conservative blacks must have counseled moderation in view 
of postwar tensions, but even the sight of a black veteran brought to 
whites the disconcerting picture of a new and dangerous threat to the 
local system of race relations and the sanctity of the color line. 34 
33Ibid.; U. S., Bureau of the Census, "Civilian Population by 
Counties: November 1, 1943," pp. 3-5; Nashville Tennessean, August 2, 
1946; Birmingham World, Augu.st 16, 1946; 
34catchings, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson 
Papers. 
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On August 10, a Saturday, the tense racial situation exploded. 
As a farm community, Athens became on Saturdays a city of twice its nor-
mal size as citizens from the hinterland, both black and white, converged 
to conduct their weekly business. Some people milled around the main 
streets, and stores did a lfrisk trade, while others simply loafed or 
took in the town's modest amusements. Around midday a shoving match 
occurred in front of the .town's only theater, the Ritz. L. C. Horton, 
a black veteran and employee of the theater, and two white brothers, 
Ben and Roy Massey, the former a veteran and the other an Army private, 
began jostling each other. Horton struck one of the whites and fled 
around the corner of the theater toward the "colored" entrance. The 
police arrived immediately and arrested the two whites on charges of 
public drunkenness. As word of the incident spread, whites became in-
furiated at the thought of two whites locked behind bars while the black 
man escaped punishment. Within a few minutes a crowd of several h1.u1dred 
whites collected, chiefly younger men led by poor whites from surrounding 
areas. 35 
The mob moved toward the theater, surrounded it, and prepared to 
storm the building in an attempt to locate the black fugitive. At that 
juncture Judge D. Lg Rosenau arrived and persuaded the crowd to appoint 
six of its members to search the building. A search failed to produce 
HortonQ Enraged, the mob drifted over to the jail and tore down the 
front door, attempting to free the Massey brothers. Fearing that the edi-
fice might suffer considerable damage, city officials hurriedly arranged 
for the release of the prisoners to their father's custody. The incident 
35Ibid.; Huntsville Times, August 11, 12, 1946. 
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might have stopped there, but one of the ringleaders took the opportunity 
during this momentary lull to climb upon a bread truck and harangue the 
crowd about how the law had turned "partial" to blacks and that they 
had been getting "out of their places." Wo:r:ked up to a frenzy, the mob 
of about two thousand then split into smaller groups and began beating 
blacks and chasing them from town.36 
The disturbance lasted four hours, and an estimted fifty to one 
hundred blacks received injuries. J. R. Powell of Nashville, a :Baptist 
minister, did not suspect trouble until he alighted from a bus and fell 
into the hands of an angry throng. Another black who worked for a local 
businessman was surrounded and threatened if he did not give up his job 
to a white man. The manager of the store arranged for the black man's 
escape to his home but otherwise did nothing to protect him. Other small 
bands invaded stores along the main streets where blacks worked and de-
manded their replacement with whites. If they encountered resistance 
they often pounced upon the black employee in question. In one case a 
band of rioters invaded a business and demanded tmt a black employee be 
replaced, whereupon the manager asked the whites if they would accept the 
job his black worker held. One of the whites asked how much he earned, 
learned that the job paid $25 per week, and revealed that it would take 
$35 for him to accept the position. In other cases white proprietors took 
firm stands against the whites, who then wandered back into the streets 
to beat the first blacks they encountered. Clearly, tensions brought 
36catchings, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson 
Papers; Huntsville Times, August 11, 12, 1946; Guzman, Negro Year :Book, 
253-54; Birmingham World, August 13, 1946. 
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by interracial economic competition proved crucial in producing much of 
the violence. 
Many blacks escaped unharmed. As soonas the violence b:roke out, 
a few businessmen drove their black workers home where they remained in 
the relative security of the black community. Others simply fled the 
city before falling into the hands of the rioters. A white filling sta-
tion opera.tor locked his black employee, Robert Caldwell, in the "white" 
restroom where no one thought of looking. And one black man, caught in 
the downtown area, surprised his would-be assailants by driving them away 
with a knife. 
During the outbreak the local law authorities stood helpless. The 
combined forces of the police and sheriff's departments numbered a paltry 
eight men unable to cope with the violence. Recognizing the hopelessness 
of the situation, Mayor R.H. Richardson hurriedly phoned the govemor's 
office in Montgomery but discovered that Chauncey Sparks had gone fish-
ing. George C. Clear, the state's adjutant general, responded in the 
governor's absence by ordering elements of the state guard to the em-
battled area, and fifty state troopers raced to the scene. These men, 
however, reached Athens after the major violence had subsided. Ey mid-
night law officials had the city under occupation, and a semblance of 
order retu.rnea. 37 
Without delay embarrassed city officials arrested nine whites, 
charged them with unlawful assembly, and jailed them. Eight of the nine 
37catcbi.ngs, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson 
Papers; ::Birmingham World, August 13, 1946; Pittsburgh Courier, August 17, 
1946; New York Times, August 12, 1946, p. 21; Huntsville Times, Augu.st 
11, 12, 1946. 
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turned out to be teenagers, the youngest of whom was thirteen years old. 
The main contingent of the rioters, residents of the poor white sections 
of Limestone Coimty, provided the city administration with a scapegoat 
for the incident since most of them were not residents of the city. The 
next day, Simday, only two of the city's black churches held services as 
the victims remained at home dressing their woimds; Limestone County con-
tained no jim crow hospital. Mayor Richardson called an interracial meet-
ing for Sunday night, and prominent blacks and whites congregated to dis-
cuss the problem. Richardson and his associates used the occasion to 
disclaim complicity in the incident and promised complete protection for 
the black community; the black conferees accepted the mayor's assurances. 
In reality, of course, most blacks remained hostile and bitter. 
The lawmen from outlying areas remained in Athens for several days 
following the riot to make sure violence did not recur. A rumored assault 
on the jail to release the nine whites held in connection with the affray 
never took place, probably because of the presence of the state authori-
ties. In the immediate wake of Saturday's incident, local whites expressed 
little remorse, and as one of them noted, there was "gonna be more trouble, 
too. It's got to the place white fol.ks can't walk on the streets for 
niggers. It's nigger Gis that's getting out of their place. 1138 
The city took immediate but relatively mild action against the ring-
leaders of the mob while the Justice Department, following a cursory 
examination, remained out of the picture. On August 12 officiaJsordered 
38catchings, "Analysis of Racial Disturbance at Athens," Johnson 
Papers; "Trouble at Athens, Alabama," Monthly Summary of Events and Trends 
in Race Relations, 4 (August-September 1946), 50-51; Birmingham World, 
.August 16, 1946. 
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a special session of the county grand jury convened. Circuit Solicitor 
George C. Jolmson declared, "I will not tolerate mob rule in Limestone 
County" and asserted that the riot represented "a disgrace to a town that 
has for more than 150 years had no race disturbance." On August 23, 
after hearing seventy-seven witnesses, the jury indicted sixteen whites 
on various misdemeanor charges. In April 1947 a non-jury court convicted 
eleven of these persons and fined them $80 plus court costs. Justice bad 
been done while the light penalties assured no pe:c:nanent discomfort to 
the defendants. 39 
The Athens riot reflected forms of collective behavior common -~o 
other mob actions of the war years. First and fo:!:"emost, perceived tb:ree:~s 
against the racial caste system resulted in the appearance of a deter-
mined defense of traditional racial p:3,tterns that characterized much of 
the white South from 1940 through 1946. Many whitesj unable to cope -with 
changes in the racial system or other alterations in political or economic 
areas, drew together in opposition and lashed out at the most accessible 
symbol of their problems. Blacks, who hoped to gain permanent changes 
for the better in the wake of the war, saw their hopes dashed against 
the formidable color line and emerged from the entire experience frus-
trated and bitter. Jobs seemed to be at the heart of the Athens riot, 
and along with heightened tensions that returning veterans brought, the 
general atmosphere of postwar confusion and the deterioration of race 
39caudle to J. Edgar Hoover, August 19, 1946, Justice Department 
Records; New York Times, August 13, 1946, p. 16; August 24, 1946, p. 13; 
Birmingham World, August 16, 1946; Pittsbuxgh Courier, August 31, 1946; 
Huntsville Times, August 23, 1946; "The Social Front: Violence," 
Events and Trends in Race Relations: A Monthly Summary, 4 (May 1947), 
302. 
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relations produced conditions that many other southern towns ancfcities 
faced. The riot unfortunately forced blacks and whites even further 
apart, and with separation came a loss of interracial understanding. 
On the surface blacks bad to play traditionally subservient roles, but 
underneath indignation festered. Athens blacks, like others in the South, 
felt betrayed. 
The racial violence of late 1945 and 1946 shocked civil rights 
groups and spurred them to seek redresso The Columbia riot, the lynch-
ings of mid-1946, the Athens riot, and other incidents provoked concerned 
organizations to find solutions even as the violence continued. On 
August 6, 1946, a thoroughly aroused NAACP convened a meeting of t~se /,/ 
groups and formed the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence, 
In issuing the call, Walter White emphasized that it would act as a 
"working conference to devise and implement most effective methods of 
organizational, governmental and public action on forces of bigotry which 
threaten all Americans." In addition to the NAACP, the Southern Regional 
Council, Southern Conference for Human Welfare, American Federation of 
Labor, American Jewish Congress, National Urban Leagu.e, American Civil 
Liberties U:¢.on, and thirty-three other groups convened. Spurred by the 
Monroe lynching, one of the new committee's first actions was to send a 
telegram to President Truman expressing its condemnation of that inci-
dent as well as those that had preceded it. Truman proved receptive, and 
on September 19 a delegation met with him to discuss the problem of in-
creasing mob violence.40 
40White to "various organizations," undated; National Emergency 
Committee Against Mob Violence to Harry S. TrLlillB.Il and Tom Clark, August 
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At the same .time a group known as the American Crusade to End 
Lynching began a series of publicity activities, which included a h1.U1dred-
day campaign climaxed by a September 23 meeting with Truman. This dele-
gation, headed by Paul Robeson, delivered a three-point plan to the 
President that requested apprehension and punishment of lynchers, a 
federal anti-lynching law, and removal of the Klan from the Senate--an 
obvious reference to Theodore G. Bilbo. The crusade also sponsored a 
mass rally at the Lincoln Memorial tba.t attracted five thousand specta-
tors.41 
These campaigns and the rising tide of violence managed to jolt 
the federal government into action. Attomey General Clark called upon 
"every loyal citizen and law enforcement officer" to help prevent mob 
violence. "Every resource at my command as the head of your Department 
of Justice has been marshaled and has been ordered into action to dis-
cover the perpetrators of the horrible crimes which have been committed." 
Clark then declared that "the time has come when Congress may have to pass 
legislation to insure to all citizens the guarantees under the Constitu-
tion." Congress made a gesture toward an anti-lynching bill but did 
little else. In response to Clark's appeal and continued violence, Sena-
tors James M. Mead and Robert F. Wagner laid plans to rescue such a bill, 
introduced on Augu.st 2, that had disappeared in the Judiciary Committee. 
Their efforts succeeded in raising concem over lynching but failed to 
6, 1946; Press release, September 19, 1946, in "National Emergency Com-
mittee on Mob Violence," GOF, NAACP Papers. 
4l"The Monroe, Georgia, Lynching Case," Monthly Summary of Events 
and Trends in Race Relations, 4 (October 1946), 77-78. 
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revive the legislation. More significant, Truman created the Committee'."'·.\_ 
on Civil Rights, a direct outgrowth of the protests against·postwar 
violence. Established in December, the committee consisted of fifteen 
prominent persons who issued a report in October 1947 condemning segre-
gation and discrimination in government institutions. Truman bailed the 
report and proposed civil rights refoms based on its recommendations 
that seriously threatened southern racial traditions and led to a split 
in the Democratic Party by 1948. While the Committee on Civil Rights 
sparked widespread discussion, however, effective implementation of most 
of its recommendations ca.me only after the mid-1950s. 42 
•-.;·_/ 
A fitting end to the postwar racial violence in the South came in - !\- ; 
late 1946 with the collapse of the Talmadge era in Georgia and the Bilbo 
reign in Mississippi. Negrophobic politics in the 1946 elections emerged 
as one of the roots of the racial violence of that year, coming as it did 
in the midst of postwar reconversion difficulties, so the deaths of two 
of the most vitriolic perpetrators of racial hatred served as the symbolic 
end of an era. After winning both the primary and general elections for 
governor on an anti-black campaign, Eugene Talmadge gratified his opponents 
by suddenly dying on December 21. Theodore :Bilbo fell from power in more 
ignominious fashion. :Because of his unabashed threats against blacks who 
tried to vote in 1946, a Senate committee decided to investigate his cam-
paign. The NAACP in Mississippi proved instrumental in this development. 
The national office recognized that this hearing could eventually bar 
42Pi ttsburgh Courier, August 24, 31, 1946; Roland, Improbable Era, 
31-33-
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Bilbo from the Senate, so it bent every effort toward that end.43 
Its efforts proved fruitless. After four days of hearings, the 
committee, chaired by South Carolina Senator :Burnet R. Maybank, decided 
that :Bilbo had done nothing wrong during the primary campaign. Even 
though the Mississippi senator bad repeatedly urged his white constitu-
ents "to resort to any means" in stopping the black voting threat, the 
evidence against him did not appear to carry much weight during the pro-
ceedings. A concurrent Senate War Investigating Committee hearing into 
Bilbo's activities with state war contractors had a greater impact on 
his downfall, for in the end it decided to condemn his activities and 
table his credentials prior to the swearing in date. Bilbo never re-
turned to Congress, and in late August he died of cancer.44 
Bilbo's fate, along with that of Talmadge, in a symbolic sense 
marked the end of racial violence in the South during World War II. Vio-
lence did not end, of course, with the_death of Talmadge or the downfall 
of Bilbo. Nor did the violence stop at the end of the year. Acts of 
lynching and other mob violence continued into 1947, but on a lesser 
scale as it appeared to die out with each passing month. 45 As the nation 
43Anderson, Wild Man, 236; White to Allen J. Ellender, November 
23, 1946, in "Meeting Wash.--Sept. 24--re: Bilbo," LF, NAACP Paperso 
44.u. S., Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Special Committee 
to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, Mississippi, 1-11, 23-
37, 333-44; Richard C. Ethridge, "The Fall of the Man: The United States 
Senate's Probe of Theodore G. :Bilbo in December 1946, and Its Aftermath," 
Journal of Mississippi Historz, 38 (August 1976~, 243-44, 248-55; A, 
wigfall Green, The Man Bilbo Baton Rouge, 1963, 109-19. * 
45For a summary of the violence of 1947 through the middle of the \ · 
I '-
year, see 11 The Social Front: Violence," Events and Trends in Race Rela- .1 · 
tions: A Monthly Summary, 4 (July 1947), 365-68. 
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successfully reconverted and the abnormal years of World War II receded 
into memory, the violence directly associated with it correspondingly 
expired. The summer of 1946, as part of the overall spate of postwar 
violence, reflected the continued attempt by whites to force blacks out 
of the American mainstream and in the process kept the battered system 
of race relations from healing. The postwar violence represented the 
most obvious reaction of a society unsure of itself and marked one of 
the two high points of racial discord during the entire war era. 
World War II left a mixed legacy for black southemers. In cer-
tain restricted areas they enjoyed modest gains, such as in employment 
and politics. Yet in. the immediate postwar months many of those ad-
vancements disappeared, and in other areas the situation remained at or 
near prewar standards. Traditional mcial mores had caused separation, 
and with separation came a loss of interracial communication. The vio-
lence of the war years was the most obvious reaction to real or perceived 
threats by blacks against racial traditions on which the white majority 
placed disproportionate emphasis. Instability and confusion characterized 
the years from 1940 through 1946 in the South, prompting violent reaction 
against black gains. The South did not experience all of the wartime 
racial discord, but suffered most of it because rigid racial mores held 
vast importance, and the mjority of America's blacks lived there. In 
the end, little improvement for black southerners could be seen, whether 
in small towns like Columbia, Tennessee, or in cities like Beaumont, 
Texas, or Mobile, Alabama. The one area in which black militancy ignited 
violence, the military, came from the bitter realization that fighting/ ft 
for democracy abroad apparently did not entitle black Gis to equal rig~-
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at home. Such violence only produced more intense reaction from whites 
who viewed black soldier militance as dangerous and contagious. 
Southern blacks remained repressed, bitter, and alienated until 
the mid-1950s, despite the finn stand that President Truman took on civil 
rights. Changes in the nature of race relations could have been per-
manently effected during the war years in the South if whites bad not 
reacted so forcibly, but such alterations seemed too drastic at the time. 
Changes bad to come from the grassroots level as well as from the top, 
and this did not occur until after 1954. From the mid-1950s through the 
1960s the federal government and a new generation of blacks and whites 
tried to implement those long-overdue modifications. The Second Recon-
struction did not begin in the South until the fifth decade of the 
twentieth century. 
~ "-:::--------.--
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